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A peculiarity of the US banking system is that it spans from a few large and systemically 
important banks to many, small community banks. Changes in the US banking sector during 
1990s have diminished the number of community banks. During the banking crises of late 
1980s to early 1990s and the Global Financial Crisis, over 2,500 community banks ceased 
operations. However, community banks still account for 92 percent of the total number of 
banks, suggesting that they are a fundamental part of the US banking system. A striking feature 
that differentiates community banks is that they are considered to be “relationship bankers”. 
They are small in terms of their asset size and operate within limited geographic scope. They 
engage mostly in traditional loan making and deposit taking activities and their ownership 
structure is concentrated. In this thesis, we investigate how the uniqueness of the community 
banking business model translates in differences in the risk profile, efficiency and market 
power of community versus non-community banks.  
First, we compare insolvency, credit and liquidity risk of community banks to their non-
community counterparts using an array of bank-specific, macroeconomic and market structure 
variables. We uncover strong evidence that community banks have lower insolvency and credit 
risk but higher liquidity risk. Furthermore, the community bank risk profile shows important 
similarities and differences in the sensitivities to an extensive array of financial indicators. 
Second, we compare the two bank types on the basis of cost efficiency and we further 
decompose efficiency into a persistent and a residual component; the former capturing market 
structure and regulatory changes, the latter reflecting managerial performance. We find 
evidence of higher efficiency for community banks and the decomposition reveals that 
community banks benefit from superior managerial capabilities and from developments at the 
regulatory front. The third study analyses the relationships between capitalisation, stability and 
efficiency in the US banking and introduces for the first time the effect of competition on that 
nexus. By including business model dynamics in the above nexus, we investigate how the 
relationship approach adopted by community banks fares against its competitors. Empirical 
evidence from this study confirm our results from the two previous studies on stability and 
efficiency and bring to light novel findings for higher market power for community banks. Our 
findings have important implications for regulators in tailoring the supervisory practices to the 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
1.1 Background on community banking and motivation 
The last major global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007-08 highlighted the vulnerability of the 
conventional banking and changed the thoughts about the principles and practices of the world 
mainstream banking and financial system. The exposure of the conventional banking system 
to various types of risks and the consequent systemic failures of the banks has led to distortions 
in the financial system and the spill-over of banking and financial distress to the larger economy 
(Hellwig 2009). In the US the removal of regulatory restrictions on interstate banking in the 
1980s and 1990s led to an increase in competition and an increase in bank risk-taking. A mega 
trend in banking has been the decrease of traditional interest income as banks were doing more 
securities and less loans. However, with the GFC a lot of scepticism was put under complex 
derivatives and off- balance sheet structures. After the GFC and the key role that megabanks 
played for that, the focus has turned to alternative banking models and the tangible benefits 
that they can have in the economy. Still, literature is inadequate on areas of the modus operandi 
of alternative banking models and the disintegrated comparison of its profile vis-à-vis 
conventional banks using advanced methods.  
A uniqueness of the US banking system is that it spans from a few, large systemically important 
financial institutions (SIFIs) to many, small community banks (CB). The long-standing 
tradition of community banks in the US dates back to the prohibition of interstate banking 
(McFadden 1927 Act), which increased the number of small, local (i.e., community) banks. 
Changes in the US financial sector however, particularly the abolishment of interstate banking 
prohibitions (Riegle-Neal Act and Branching Act 1994), have reduced the number of the 
community banks. Over 2,500 community banks have disappeared during the banking crises 
of the late 1980s/early 1990s and the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), while the share of banking 
assets held by community banks declined by 28 percentage points during the 1984 – 2012 
period (FDIC 2012). Despite these structural changes, community banks accounted for 92 
percent of total number of banks insured by the FDIC and 95 percent of US banking 
organizations in 2011, suggesting that they remain an integral part of the US banking system.  
According to the FDIC, community banks hold most of the deposits in US rural and 
micropolitan areas and almost one out of every five counties have no other physical banking 
offices apart from those operated by community banks. This suggests that community banks 
are strongly linked with geography. There is a significant difference between community and 
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non-community banks in the degree to which they are located in rural areas. Figure 1.1 presents 
how the percentage of community banks changed from 1984 to 2018 in terms of their number 
and also in terms of the amount of assets that they hold in each state. The share of community 
banks is higher in rural areas that actually make up most of the country. States such as Maine 
(ME), North Dakota (ND), Idaho (ID) and Vermont (VT) are served exclusively by community 
banks in 2018. Mississippi (MS) and Montana (MT) moved from a lower percentage of 
community banks during 1984 (around 50% and around 80% respectively) to a much higher 
percentage during 2018 (around 90% both).  This prevalence of community banks in nonmetro 
areas remains an integral part of the uniqueness and plays a catalytic role in the way they 
conduct business.  
[Figure 1.1 around here] 
One of the key characteristics of community banks is that they act as providers of microcredit, 
ensuring funding for SMEs and start-ups which are the backbone of the US economy. In 2016 
US banks with assets less than $1 billion held more than 25% of loans extended to small 
businesses (Conference of State Bank Supervisors and Federal Reserve 2017). Via their lending 
to small firms, community bankers contribute to the development of the local economy and to 
the economic recovery following natural disasters (Cortés 2014). Regulatory relief in 2015 
boosted small business lending by community banks and had measurable positive effects in 
local economies. Because hundreds of community banks failed in the aftermath of the 2008-
2009 financial crisis, the sensitivity of these banks to systemic shocks poses a concern for both 
policymakers, community banks, and the job-creating small businesses that depend on a 
vigorous community banking sector. Community banks and small banks in general can be more 
effective than non-community banks in relieving the financial constraints that small firms face 
via relationship banking and reliance on soft information (Elsas 2005; Behr et al. 2013; Berger 
et al. 2015).  Thus, the consolidation process in US banking and the disappearance of small 
banks can be a source of social costs (Berger et al. 2017). This indicates the desire for better 
public policy to ensure community banks could serve the economic needs of their communities. 
Understanding the way community banks do business will open the way to better policy 
decisions. FDIC research on community banks has shown that they are a remarkably dynamic, 
flexible and innovative segment of the industry. One central policy question for community 
banks is how they will meet the challenges of an evolving financial sector while continuing to 
serve as relationship lenders. In this thesis we want to uncover compelling facts about the 
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enduring importance and sustainable business model of community banks. The next three 
sections of this chapter discuss the research topics studied in this thesis and provide a brief 
summary of the methodology, findings, and contributions for each of them. 
1.2 Does relationship lending affect financial risk for US community 
banks? 
Is the relationship lending approach of community banks any good for their financial risk 
profile? In order to address this research question, we assess three types of risks, namely 
insolvency, credit and liquidity risk for community banks and their non-community 
counterparts. We use data on US banks over the 1984-2013 period and the new FDIC definition 
that accounts for business model differences of these banks. For insolvency risk we utilize the 
z-score indicator following Cihák and Hesse (2007). Credit risk is proxied by the ratio of net 
loan losses in the current period to the allowances for these loan losses recorded in the previous 
period and measures the unexpected loan default ratio of the bank (Imbierowicz and Rauch 
2014). For liquidity risk we utilize the respective measure of Imbierowicz and Rauch (2014), 
which accounts for short-term funding risks of banks, includes off-balance sheet items and 
accounts for classic “bank run” risks. We compare insolvency, credit and liquidity risk of 
community banks to their non-community counterparts using an array of bank-specific 
variables, such as size, capitalization, profitability, liquidity, asset quality and business 
orientation. We also allow for macroeconomic, financial and market structure variables to 
affect financial risk.  
Our results show that community banks have lower insolvency risk and credit risk, but higher 
liquidity risk than their non-community counterparts. Furthermore, the community bank risk 
profile shows important similarities and differences in the sensitivities with respect to key 
financial indicators. In particular, capitalisation affects the insolvency risk of community banks 
in a similar fashion to the non-community ones. However, the community banks’ insolvency 
risk is found more robust to asset quality changes. Our results are robust to two different 
specifications of the z-score, which use different time window to estimate the mean and 
standard deviation of the ROA as per Mare et al. (2017). The significantly lower credit risk of 
community banks is primarily affected by capitalisation and income diversity. Community 
banks’ focus on traditional loan making activities and limited access to capital markets make 
liquidity risk more of an issue for this bank type. Moreover, we elaborate on the loan portfolio 
risk contributions by investigating the marginal contributions of each loan category on bank’s 
12 
 
risk profile for community and non-community banks and we investigate the impact of banking 
crises on the risk profile of the two bank types by using a difference-in-difference setup with a 
crisis dummy. In the final part of our analysis we address endogeneity concerns from 
simultaneity bias by using a three-stage least squares (3SLS) design and we produce results 
qualitatively similar to our previous analysis.  
This research contributes to the literature in two important ways. We provide new empirical 
evidence on the comparative performance of community and non-community banks by 
comparing the financial risk profile of these banks in three pillars, namely insolvency, liquidity 
and credit risk. Also, this is the first study that compares and contrasts the sensitivity of these 
banks’ financial risk profile to key bank-specific and macroeconomic indicators following the 
change of the community bank definition from the FDIC. Our findings have important 
implications for regulators in tailoring the supervisory practices to the unique characteristics 
and different nature of risks that each bank group faces.   
1.3 The efficiency of US community banks 
The question of how efficient small US banks are is important for economic theory and policy. 
If these banks are efficient then this raises the question of why large banks have been 
swallowing them up for the past thirty years and whether this reflects a failure of regulatory or 
competition policy. In this study we focus on the business model used by US community banks 
and we compare cost efficiency of community versus non-community banks1. Our approach 
relies on a novel method proposed by Kumbhakar et al (2014) which accounts for unobserved 
heterogeneity at bank-level, thereby avoiding the confounding of latent heterogeneity with 
efficiency. We decompose cost efficiency into a persistent and a residual component; the 
former capturing the market structure and regulatory changes, the latter reflecting managerial 
performance. In addition, we explore the bank- specific, macroeconomic and market structure 
factors that explain differences in the bank efficiency between the two bank types. 
 
 
1 In comparative analysis between alternative banking systems, it has been argued that focusing on profit analysis 
(whether in the form of profit efficiency or profit related financial ratios) may disadvantage the specialist banking 
group that could be following different objectives outside a strict profit maximisation dogma. In our case, 
community banks may be focusing on the welfare of the local community. Similar arguments have been put 
forward for comparative analysis between Islamic and conventional banks, where shying away from a profit 
efficiency study has been on the grounds that the former may have additional objectives encompassing social 
value and ethical behaviour (Johnes et al., 2014). By contrast, profit efficiency assumes that profit maximisation 
is the sole goal of the bank (Berger and Mester, 1997). This reasoning motivates our choice of cost efficiency. 
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Our estimates show community banks to exhibit a 4.9% higher efficiency compared to their 
non-community counterparts. The decomposition further reveals that community banks benefit 
from superior managerial capabilities and from developments at the regulatory front. Size is 
non-linearly related to efficiency and large community banks are the most efficient. A strong 
positive link between profitability and efficiency exists for community banks, with the effect 
being muted in non-community banks. Participation in bank holding companies is harmful for 
community banks’ efficiency. Liquidity creation is positively (negatively) related to efficiency 
of (non-)community banks, and highlights the distinctiveness of the business models and the 
need for differentiated regulatory supervision. Community banks efficiency is positively 
(negatively) related to liquidity (credit) risk. We validate the robustness of our results by 
implementing an alternative specification of cost efficiency, two matching techniques (k-
means nearest neighbour and propensity score matching) and different classification of the 
community banks.  
To the best of our knowledge, the comparative efficiency literature for US community and non-
community banks has not accounted for the distinct business model of community banks when 
defining them. This study departs from prior research by employing the FDIC definition of 
community banks rather than a single size criterion. Second, we contribute to the US banking 
efficiency literature by offering the first study to decompose cost efficiency into persistent and 
residual. Thus, we can disentangle cost efficiency differences related to 
policy/regulatory/structural changes from managerial capabilities. Third, this is the first study 
that investigates the impact of liquidity creation, credit and liquidity risk on cost efficiency.  
1.4 The impact of competition on the capitalisation-stability-efficiency 
nexus across different bank types; the case of US community banks. 
This study analyses the relationships between capitalisation, stability and efficiency in the US 
banking and introduces for the first time the effect of competition on that nexus. Emphasis is 
given in distinguishing between community and non-community banks, the former acting as a 
proxy for the traditional banking approach. We test the hypotheses of “bad luck”, “bad 
management”, “skimping”, “moral hazard” and “regulatory hypothesis” (Berger and DeYoung 
1997), the “franchise value” (Keeley 1990) and “risk-shifting” paradigm (Boyd and De Nicolo 
2005), the “quiet life” hypothesis (Berger and Hannan 1998), the “efficient structure 
hypothesis” (Demsetz 1973) and the “information generating hypothesis” (Marquez 2002) for 
the US community and non-community banks. Furthermore, we examine the determinants of 
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banking competition and whether it is primarily driven by the small-and-numerous community 
banks or the large-and-few non-community banks. 
Empirical evidence shows higher capitalisation, greater cost efficiency, superior financial 
stability and higher market power for community banks. We find a positive relationship 
between cost efficiency and capitalisation and between stability and capitalisation which 
supports the “moral hazard hypothesis”. Community banks are found to be less prone to cost 
skimping behaviour than their non-community counterparts. Our results on competition 
support the “competition-fragility” view, however the traditional banking model of community 
banks acts as a layer of protection against competitive pressures. Community banks capitalise 
on information monopoly advantage and translates higher market power into higher efficiency. 
Market power is increased through higher efficiency in the case of non-community banks and 
higher liquidity creation in the case of community banks. Finally, we find that non-community 
banks can reap significant benefits in terms of stability, efficiency and market power when 
operating closer to the traditional banking model through increased relationship lending and 
branching. 
These findings contribute to the literature in a number of ways. We introduce an important 
forth factor in the capital-efficiency-stability nexus that had been excluded in previous studies- 
competition. By including business model dynamics in the above nexus, we investigate how 
the relationship approach adopted by community banks fares against its competitors. Finally, 
we go further than the binary classification of community banks and create a continuous 
variable measuring the intensity of traditional banking activities which enables us to quantify 





Figure 1.1: Percentage of community banks by state in 1984 and 2018 
Percentage of community banks in 1984 
 






Figure 1.1 (continued) 
Percentage of assets held by community banks in 1984 
 
Percentage of assets held by community banks in 2018 
 
NOTES: Maps show the percentage of community banks in number and in assets that operate at each state in 




Chapter 2 – Does relationship lending affect financial risk? The case of US 
community banks 
2.1 Introduction 
A peculiarity of the US banking system is that it spans from a few, large systemically important 
financial institutions (SIFIs) to many, small community banks (CB). The long-standing 
tradition of community banks in the US dates back to the prohibition of interstate banking 
(McFadden 1927 Act), which inflated the number of small, local (i.e., community) banks. 
Changes in the US financial sector, particularly the abolishment of interstate banking 
prohibitions (Riegle-Neal Act and Branching Act 1994), have reduced the size of the 
community banking sector. This has been materialised through mergers and/or acquisitions 
(M&A), change of status or bank failure. The technological, regulatory and legal requirements 
place additional challenges for the long-term survival of the smaller of community banks. Over 
2,500 community banks have ceased to exist during the banking crises of the late 1980s/early 
1990s and the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), while the share of banking assets held by 
community banks declined by 28 percentage points during the 1984 – 2012 period (FDIC 
2012). Despite these structural changes, community banks accounted for 92 percent of total 
number of banks insured by the FDIC and 95 percent of US banking organizations in 2011, 
suggesting that they remain an integral part of the US banking system.  According to the FDIC, 
community banks hold most of the deposits in US rural and micropolitan areas and almost one 
out of every five counties have no other physical banking offices apart from those operated by 
community banks. This suggests that community banks play a key role in the US economy. 
Although risk in the US banking system has attracted significant academic attention, little 
research exists into the comparative performance of community and non-community banking. 
This is, in part, attributed to the relatively new definition of community banks by the FDIC. 
An interesting finding arising from the FDIC (2012) study suggests that community banks have 
a lower propensity to fail than non-community banks. This study supports the relative stability 
of community banks by looking at the number of failures, consolidation and mergers and 
acquisition for the two bank groups, the failure rates and the age distribution of charters. We 
are building on this study by undertaking a comparative analysis of community and non-
community banks risk profile and exploring the different impact that bank- specific and 
macroeconomic factors have on financial risk for the two bank types. 
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In their intermediary role, banks are exposed to a variety of risks, most notably insolvency, 
credit and liquidity. The importance of insolvency risk within the banking research is reflected 
on the literature that seeks to identify the determinants of banking failure and/or design early 
warning systems that could signal a potential banking failure (Berger and Bouwman 2013; 
Akins et al. 2016; Aubuchon and Wheelock 2010; Betz et al. 2014; Berger et al. 2012). A more 
recent strand of research investigates the cross-relationship between credit and liquidity risks 
and/or how this affects bank stability.2 Quite notably, Imbierowicz and Rauch (2014) find that 
both of these risks affect bank stability, but they also have a convoluted relationship that is 
particularly challenging for risk managers and regulators alike. Credit risk is pivotal to the 
overall stability of the bank and it has been shown that failed banks had significant exposures 
to non-performing loans in their balance sheet (Ng and Roychowdhury 2014; Cole and White 
2012). Following from the Basel ІІ framework there has been a renewed interest in improving 
the understanding of credit risk modelling, with the literature distinguishing between two types 
of determinants affecting credit risk; macroeconomic factors that have a systemic effect on 
credit risk, and bank-specific factors that affect the credit risk of individual banks (see for 
example Berger and DeYoung, 1997; Festic et al, 2011). Prior to the GFC, Calomiris and 
Mason (2000), in the analysis of the causes of bank distress during the Great Depression, find 
some evidence in support of the notion that illiquidity crises prompt bank failures. Following 
the GFC where illiquidity (rather than insolvency) has been a characteristic feature of failed 
banks, interest in this type of risk has been re-ignited (Acharya and Mora 2015). As a response 
to the financial crisis and in recognising the role of liquidity risk, the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS) devoted a specific “pillar” to liquidity risk in Basel ІІІ. To measure liquidity 
risk, BIS has proposed two new liquidity risk measures, the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and 
the net stable funding ratio (NSFR).  
From a regulatory perspective, the additional risk-types being monitored and the emergence of 
SIFIs as evident by the special provisions in Basel III, should at least in theory enhance the 
stability of the banking system.3 However, different business practices, such as the relationship 
lending that community banks adopt, which could limit the asymmetric information problems 
that commercial banks have, may contribute to increase financial stability. Furthermore, 
 
 
2 See for example Imbierowicz and Rauch (2014); Acharya and Mora (2015); Goldstein and Pauzner 
(2005); Wagner (2007) 
3 See for example, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3/b3summarytable.pdf  
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community banks engage in traditional loan- giving and deposit- taking functions; thus, 
steering away from the complex financial instruments structures that have been, in part, blamed 
for the financial exposure of commercial and investment banks during the GFC. That is not to 
say that community banks are not exposed to the same economic shocks as non-community 
banks, but the claim is that these would have a differentiated impact on the banks risk profile. 
This raises several interesting questions regarding the relative performance of community 
banks in terms of financial risk. How do these two bank types perform in terms of insolvency, 
credit and liquidity risk? Does their financial risk profile show different sensitivities to key 
bank-specific and macroeconomic indicators? Do financial crises affect their risk profile in a 
similar fashion? To answer these questions, we compare the financial risk profile of US 
community and non-community banks over the 1984 – 2013 period. We assess three types of 
risk; insolvency, credit and liquidity risk. For insolvency risk, we utilise the popular z-score 
indicator as per Cihák and Hesse (2007). Credit risk is proxied by the ratio of net loan losses 
in the current period to the allowances for these loan losses recorded in the previous period, 
and measures the unexpected loan default ratio of the bank (Imbierowicz and Rauch 2014). For 
liquidity risk we rely on the respective measure of Imbierowicz and Rauch (2014), which 
accounts for short-term funding risks of banks, includes off-balance sheet items and accounts 
for classic “bank run” risks. Our control variables capture bank-specific financial statement 
information, such as size, capitalisation, profitability, liquidity, asset quality and business 
orientation. In line with the literature we allow for an extensive array of macroeconomic, 
financial and market structure variables to affect financial risk. 
Our findings from the first step of our analysis reveal that community banks exhibit lower 
insolvency risk than their non-community counterparts. We find that this bank type does not 
derive additional benefits in terms of stability from having a larger asset base, however higher 
capitalization, better asset quality and higher liquidity offer them a significant risk reduction 
effect. In terms of the macroeconomic environment, inflation is particularly relevant for the 
stability of community banks. This result probably reflects the strong connection of this bank 
type to the real part of the economy as most of their investments are tied up in loans. Our results 
are robust to two different specifications of the z-score, which use different time window to 
estimate the mean and standard deviation of the ROA as per Mare et al. (2017). The 
significantly lower credit risk of community banks is primarily affected by capitalisation and 
income diversity. The former’s contribution on credit risk reduction is significantly more 
pronounced compared to the non-community counterparts, while the latter signifies that 
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community banks with more focused operations on lending reap the benefits in terms of credit 
risk reduction compared to more diversified banks. Higher inflation weakens the community 
banks’ customers’ ability to pay their debt, thus increases credit risk. Further, our findings 
suggest that community banks bear more liquidity risk. Their focus on traditional loan making 
activities and limited access to capital markets makes liquidity risk management a challenge. 
In periods of higher economic growth banks tend to run down their liquidity buffers by lending 
more, thus increasing liquidity risk. 
We elaborate more on the loan portfolio risk contributions by investigating the marginal 
contributions of each loan category on bank’s risk profile for community and non-community 
banks. We do so by including in the regressions from the previous analysis the ratio of each of 
the loan category (i.e. Agricultural, Commercial and Industrial, Commercial Real Estate, 
Construction and Development, Residential Mortgages and Loans to Individuals) to total 
assets. Our findings reveal that loans to individuals, agricultural loans and commercial and 
industrial loans negatively affects the stability of community banks. In terms of credit risk, 
higher proportion of agricultural loans, commercial and industrial and loans to individuals 
increases credit risk for community banks. Further, commercial and industrial loans and loans 
to individuals increases liquidity risk for this bank type. 
Additionally, we investigate the effect of banking crises on the risk profile of community and 
non-community banks. We believe this is particularly interesting since the community banking 
sector has proven to be more resilient during the GFC than the commercial counterparts, see 
for example Alton Gilbert et al. (2013). Following Berger and Bowman (2013) we use a 
difference-in-difference setup with a crisis dummy to capture the sensitivities of community 
and non-community banks’ risk to bank- specific characteristics during periods of crises. Our 
findings suggest that liquidity risk for community banks is higher during banking crises, 
whereas insolvency and credit risk show no difference between normal periods and periods of 
crisis. 
In the last part of our empirical analysis, we use a three-stage least squares (3SLS) design to 
eliminate any endogeneity problem from simultaneity bias. Our results suggest that the 
sensitivities to key explanatory variables remain qualitatively similar to our previous analysis. 
Further, we verify the results of Imbierowicz and Rauch (2014) by finding that liquidity and 
credit risk are highly interlinked. The 3SLS analysis shows some interesting results on the 
contemporaneous relationships between the three types of risks. In particular, higher 
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insolvency risk increases both credit and liquidity risk, higher liquidity risk increases both 
insolvency and credit risk, and higher credit risk increases insolvency but decreases liquidity 
risk. 
Our contribution to the literature is twofold. First, we compare the financial risk profile of 
community and non-community banks, thereby contributing to the literature on the 
comparative performance of these bank types. Second, we compare and contrast the sensitivity 
of these banks’ financial risk profile to key bank-specific and macroeconomic indicators. This 
is the first study to embark on such task following the change of the community bank definition 
from the FDIC. Previous research has established a single size criterion in order to define 
community banks - typically $1 billion in assets. However, this definition fails to capture 
characteristics of the community bank business model that are not only size related. These 
characteristics though could have a different impact on the financial risk of this bank type. We 
attempt to build on the Stiroh (2004) study that finds a negative link between bank- specific 
factors (i.e. non- interest income and commercial and industrial lending) and community banks 
risk-adjusted performance. Our study is also close related to DeYoung et al. (2004) paper which 
finds evidence that support the economically viability of the community banking business 
model. Since the financial crisis and the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) enhanced prudential standards have been applied 
and increased the differences in supervisory practices among different bank organizations. This 
has brought new attention to the importance of balancing regulation based on varying bank 
groups and the different nature of risks they face. The application of those supervisory practices 
need to be tailored to the unique characteristics and objectives of these bank groups. This 
pertains especially to community banks because regulation needs to be shaped with account to 
the traditional, relationship banking model and unique risk profile of this bank type. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: In Section 2.2 we discuss the specifics of 
community banks and the relevant literature. Section 2.3 describes our methodology and 
section 2.4 introduces the variables and the data used. In section 2.5, we provide our empirical 
results and test the robustness of our findings. Section 2.6 offers a brief conclusion.   
2.2 Theoretical background on community banking and related literature 
A striking feature that differentiates community from non-community banks is that they are 
considered to be “relationship bankers”. They are typically small-sized and operate within a 
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limited geographic area. Community banks engage mostly in traditional banking activities, 
such as loan making and deposit taking, while their ownership structure is concentrated. In this 
section, we briefly explain these key features of community banking and their possible impact 
on risk.  
2.2.1 Bank size and financial profile 
Community banks are generally small in size. An upper threshold of $1 billion in assets has 
typically been used to define a community bank (Feng and Zhang 2012; Berger and Bouwman 
2013). Empirical evidence suggests that large banks may be less likely to fail as they are better 
in diversifying credit risk, reap economies of scale and have better access to capital markets 
(Shaffer 1989). The ability of the bank to access external funding depends on size. Large banks 
have broad access to financial markets, while community banks cannot access such markets 
easily. As such liquidity management in community banks may be more challenging. 
Small bank size is often associated with inefficiency as they are not able to use economies of 
scale/scope to their advantage. Banks with assets below $25 million are, on average, less 
efficient and a critical asset size of at least $50 million is required for the bank to be efficient 
(Shaffer 1989). Inefficient banks exhibit lower asset quality and a higher propensity to fail 
(Kwan and Eisenbeis 1997; Wheelock and Wilson 1995). This might be because inefficient 
banks incur higher costs and/or have inferior management, which may prove critical at times 
of distress. The largest percentage of failing banks had assets below $25 million during the 
1984-1988 period (Shaffer 1989). Yet, small banks can build protection for themselves by 
specializing in niche markets. For example, Cihák and Hesse (2010) find that small Islamic 
banks face lower insolvency risk than similar sized commercial banks.  
Low profitability makes it difficult for the bank to increase its capital base and enhance its 
viability (Arena 2008). Large asset size is often associated with high profitability through better 
investment/diversification opportunities these banks enjoy, and consequently lower failure risk 
(Calomiris and Mason 2000). Still, it is possible for small, often highly specialised banks to 
outperform large banks in terms of profitability. For example, Bassett and Brady (2001) finds 
that banks with less than $1 billion assets managed to outperform larger banks in terms of 
profitability. Large banks under the “too-big-to-fail” doctrine can exploit their dominance in 
the market by taking disproportionate risks (and reaping the extra returns) on the assumption 
that under financial distress they will be bailed out (Boyd and Runkle 1993).  
23 
 
2.2.2 Relationship banking  
A stark difference in the community banking model is that they are considered to be 
“relationship bankers” rather than “transactional bankers”. Under “relationship lending” 
approach, credit decisions are based primarily on “soft information”, which would include non-
standard data and qualitative information that is related to human interaction. “Transaction 
banking”, on the other hand, suggests that any financial decision is based on hard information 
that can be quantified, such as financial statements and credit history. Due diligence is 
conducted based on hard information that can be easily verifiable. 
Relationship lending is more important for community banks than non-community banks as 
they invest in long-term relationships with their customers and have the advantage of offering 
personalized services. The relationship banking approach could help mitigate credit risk as the 
bank pays more attention to the client and builds close ties with him/her. In that sense, 
relationship banking encourages better monitoring by the lender and resolves agency and 
informational problems (Berger et al. 2005; Boot and Thakor 2000). The bank is better able to 
access the borrower’s repayment capability and thus, the bank explores a comparative 
advantage in lending (Boot 2000). Relationship banking approach smooths the informational 
asymmetry between borrowers and lenders and thus provides an advantage for community 
banks in terms of credit risk. Cornée et al. (2012) claim that borrowers’ repayment rate is 
significantly higher when a bilateral relationship between the borrower and the lender exists. 
This is in line with the notion of “reciprocity”, according to which borrowers that consider 
themselves fairly treated undertake investments with low risk in order to reciprocate the bank’s 
gesture hence lower their probability of default (Cornée and Szafarz 2013). As such, moral 
hazard issues may appear less pronounced under a relationship banking model. For example, 
it may be more difficult for a community bank to securitise bad loans in its books. This would 
give the bank the incentive to better screening and monitoring process.  
However, potential threats arise for the bank from engaging into relationship banking approach. 
The soft budget constrain problem is related to the fact that the bank may lack the toughness in 
enforcing credit contracts. The firm benefits from building close ties with the lender in the form 
of increased financing (Petersen and Rajan 1994). The bank may choose to provide further 
credit to a borrower that is close to default in the hope of recovering a previous loan. This is in 
line with the notion of “zombie banks”, where insolvent banks attempt to remain in business 
by taking excessive risks in the anticipation that the situation of the borrower would improve 
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(Acharya et al. 2011). The findings of Elsas and Krahnen (1998) suggest that Housebanks in 
Germany provide liquidity insurance to the borrowers in cases where his rating deteriorates 
unexpectedly.  
2.2.3 Geographical concentration 
The business model of community banks goes beyond their financial profile and relates to their 
location too. They are prevalent in small towns and rural areas, which make up for most of the 
US. It is three times more likely for community banks to hold a banking office outside a metro 
area (FDIC 2012). Moreover, community banks may be at a single location or have a limited 
number of offices, while the level of deposits that they hold is also commensurate with their 
network size. 
Community banks play a key role in the economy by providing financial services in their local 
communities. The fact that community banks operate within a limited geographic scope 
suggests that they hold less diversified portfolios. Portfolio theory suggests that geographically 
concentrated banks are riskier than geographically diversified banks because they bare higher 
credit risk.  However, evidence from the literature is mixed. Meyer and Yeager (2001) find 
little correlation between the geographic concentration of the bank offices and its vulnerability 
to local economic shocks. Alton Gilbert et al. (2013) suggest that community banks that thrived 
during the GFC were not necessarily concentrated in areas with strong economic growth but 
were geographically concentrated to areas that are relatively prosperous in agriculture and 
energy; sectors that were particularly unaffected by the GFC. Yeager (2004) compares the 
performance of banks located in counties that went through economic shocks in the 1990s with 
banks in other counties and find that community banks are not systematically vulnerable to 
local market risk. Community banks hold more diversifiable credit risk than their commercial 
counterparts because they conduct geographically concentrated business (local market risk) 
and they are smaller in size (idiosyncratic risk). Emmons et al. (2004) look at the ability of 
community banks to diversify default risk through geographic diversification and size growth 
and they find that more risk reduction benefits are achieved by increasing the bank’s size, 
whereas local market risk is less severe. Similarly, evidence from US banks during the period 
2007-2010 suggests that extensive branching across counties does not seem to be associated 




2.2.4 Traditional banking approach of Community Banks 
Community banks derive most of their revenue from net interest income as they are primarily 
engaged in the loan-making and deposit-taking business. By contrast, non-community banks 
are generally more involved in off-balance sheet banking activities, i.e. they have shifted from 
interest income generating activities to non-interest income. These banks are using off-balance 
sheet instruments to hedge part of their risk, so overall their exposure to risk is lower. Since 
non-community banks engage in more sophisticated risk management techniques, the impact 
of credit risk is less pronounced for this bank group. At the same time, financial innovation has 
enabled banks to mitigate liquidity pressures. This is more prevalent for non-community banks. 
On the liability side, they increase their share on wholesale funding and on the asset side they 
securitise their loans. Those financial innovations allow non-community banks to reduce their 
reliance on deposits and to convert illiquid loans into cash (Loutskina 2011).  
However, additional risk arises from engaging in that type of activities. DeYoung and Torna 
(2013) suggest that when more investment opportunities are available to a bank, it may opt to 
incur more risk, so higher involvement in non-traditional banking activities is often associated 
with lower stability. Gilbert et al. (2013) examine the characteristics of community banks that 
maintained the highest supervisory ratings during the financial crisis and emphasize that 
conservative lending and tighter lending standards infused financial stability for community 
banks.  
2.2.5 Ownership Structure 
Ownership of community banks is concentrated in the hands of few stockholders who are 
actively involved in the management of the bank. This implies localized decision making, 
which is necessary for the relationship banking approach practiced in these banks (Hein et al 
2005). In particular, loan officers in community banks should have the flexibility to act 
independently on the basis of information they have. This relates to the study of Brickley et al. 
(2003) who finds managers of small banks to have more decision authority. By contrast, Berger 
and Udell (1995) claim that stockholders of large banks are less eager to allow local managers 
the authority of decision-making and instead rely on bureaucratic and time-consuming 
procedures.  
The fact that owners are actively involved in the bank’s management mitigates agency 
problems. When the ownership structure of the bank is more concentrated, the owners are able 
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to monitor the managers closely and discipline their risk appetite. Cooperative banks in Europe 
which are typically owned by their members are found to exhibit higher financial stability than 
other banks (Cihák and Hesse 2007). These banks focus on preserving their capital base, 
preventing losses in their portfolio, and maintaining a stable basis of depositors, which could 
act as protection in periods of distress. Likewise, we would expect managers of community 
banks to be risk averse. 
2.3 Methodology  
2.3.1 Insolvency, credit and liquidity risk proxies 
We use three main proxies to measure risk, one for insolvency risk, one for credit risk and one 
for liquidity risk. The description of each variable and its calculation is provided in Table 2.1. 
We proxy insolvency risk (IR) using the z-score, a widely used proxy for this type of risk (Boyd 
and Runkle 1993; Cihák and Hesse 2007; Lepetit et al. 2008; Cihák and Hesse 2010; Abedifar 
et al. 2013). In principle the z-score calculates the number of standard deviations that the bank’s 
return on assets (ROA) must fall below its mean in order to deplete equity. The z-score 
increases with higher profitability and capitalization levels and decreases with volatile 
earnings. Therefore, high values of the z-score show financially stable banks with low 
probability of default. In practice, there are several alternative definitions of the z-score, see 
Mare et al. (2017) for a comprehensive review. In our study we use the Cihák and Hesse (2007) 
variant. This measure of the Z-score considers only the last period value for the Equity/Assets 
and the ROA, while it computes 𝜎(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝛵) over the whole sample period. However, in our 
robustness tests we also include alternative z-score measure, which we discuss in more detail 
at section 5.5.1.  The z-score can be equally applied to community and non-community banks 
since these operate in the same environment and face the same risks in case they run out of 
capital. As the z-score features high skewness we use the natural logarithm transformation, in 
line with Laeven and Levine (2009).4  
To proxy credit risk (CR) we use the respective measure of Imbierowicz and Rauch (2014), 
which is similar to Angbazo (1997) and Dick (2003). The credit risk variable measures the 
 
 
4 Another popular measure of insolvency risk is the Distance-To-Default, which uses stock price data 
to measure the volatility in the economic capital of the bank (Danmark Nationalbank, 2004). However, 
as most community banks are not listed in a stock exchange, market price data are not available. 
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unexpected loan default ratio of the bank. It is calculated by dividing the average net loan losses 
(loan charge-offs minus loan recoveries) in the current year by the average loan loss allowance 
in the previous year. This measure captures the current riskiness of a bank’s loan portfolio and 
the ability of the bank’s risk management to anticipate near-term future loan losses.  High 
values of the CR ratio suggest high credit risk for the particular bank.  
In the past studies have focused on the use of CAMEL-type liquidity ratios to measure liquidity 
risk.5 However, Poorman and Blake (2005) emphasized that traditional CAMEL-type liquidity 
ratios do not fully capture the complexities of liquidity risk. Hong et al. (2014) calculate the 
Basel ІІІ liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and the net stable funding ratio (NSFR) for US banks 
over the period 2001-2011. However, calculating these measures can be challenging because 
there exists a gap between historical data and the information required for calculating the LCR 
and NSFR. 
To proxy liquidity risk (LR) we use the respective measure of Imbierowicz and Rauch (2014). 
The intuition behind the LR ratio is that in case of sudden withdrawals from the bank, the full 
volume of liabilities may not be liquidated at short notice and/or without substantial cost. Hence 
the LR proxy subtracts the volume of all assets that the bank can at short-time and low-cost 
turn into cash from the volume of liabilities that can be withdrawn from the bank on short 
notice. The LR proxy takes into account the bank’s exposure to the interbank lending market 
and derivatives market as well as off-balance sheet liquidity risk positions through, for 
example, unused loan commitments. The LR ratio is standardised by Total Assets. Higher 
values of the LR ratio indicate a bank that is in worse situation to meet unexpected liquidity 
demand and is therefore subject to higher liquidity risk.  
[Table 2.1 around here] 
2.3.2 Econometric model  
To assess differences in the risk profile of community and non-community banks, we rely on 
panel robust regressions for each of the three risk measures, namely insolvency risk, credit and 
liquidity risk. All regressions control for bank type, bank-specific, market structure and 
macroeconomic factors. We allow for four formulations of each model, hereafter referred to as 
 
 
5 See for example Ahmed et al. (2011); Bonfi and Kim (2012)  
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Models I to IV respectively. The models are increasingly less restrictive by allowing for less 
similarities between the two bank types. Model I is fitted on all banks and only allows for a 
level shift in the respective risk quantity by the inclusion of a community bank (CB) intercept 
dummy. Hence, it implicitly assumes that the sensitivities to control variables are identical for 
the two bank types. Model II adds interaction terms between the CB dummy variable and the 
control variables, thus allowing for the sensitivity of the modelled risk quantity to differ 
between the two banks. Models III and IV are fitted to community banks and non-community 
banks separately. They can be viewed as unrestricted in the sense that they allow for more 
differences between the two bank types compared to Models I and II.   
For each of the models outlined above we consider two variants. The first relies only upon 
bank-specific variables sourced from the financial statements. The second further adds market 
structure and macroeconomic variables. In all estimations we use Huber-White robust standard 
errors and year and state fixed effects. We estimate the following model:  
 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐶𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝛸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝛭𝑖,𝑡−4 + 𝐶𝐵𝑖,𝑡 × 𝛸𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝜆𝐶𝐵𝑖,𝑡 × 𝛭𝑖,𝑡−4 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑖,𝑡 
(2.1) 
 
where 𝑖 indexes banks, and 𝑡 indexes the time period in quarters. The dependent variable, 𝑦 is 
the z-score for the insolvency risk, the credit and liquidity risk proxies for the respective risk 
profiles. 𝐶𝐵𝑖,𝑡 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the bank is a community bank at 
time 𝑡 and 0 otherwise. 𝛸𝑖,𝑡−1 is a matrix of bank-specific independent variables; 𝛭𝑖,𝑡−4 is a 
matrix of variables capturing the macroeconomic and market structure conditions; 
𝐶𝐵𝑖,𝑡 × 𝛸𝑖,𝑡−1 is the interaction between bank-specific variables and the community bank 
dummy; 𝐶𝐵𝑖,𝑡 × 𝛭𝑖,𝑡−4 is the interaction between macroeconomic variables and the community 
bank dummy; 𝑣𝑖 is the unobserved random effect that varies across banks; 𝑖,𝑡 is an 
idiosyncratic error term. All variables are lagged one quarter to eliminate any potential 
endogeneity issues, while GDP growth and inflation are lagged four quarters as generally such 
variables take longer to reflect on bank operations. 
Certain remarks are in place here. From the Liquidity Risk regression, we have excluded the 
ratio of Net Loans to Total Assets and from the Credit Risk regression the Loan Loss Allowance 
to Total Loans. This is done because each of these ratios are conceptually related to the 
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dependent variable. The community bank dummy is time dependent because the status of a 
bank can change in light with the FDIC definition. 
2.4 Data 
We use unconsolidated data from the Call Reports of US banks, beginning from the first quarter 
of 1984 till the fourth quarter of 2013. Community bank status is taken from the FDIC and is 
matched to the Call reports using the FDIC certificate number. The macroeconomic variables 
are collected from Datastream and the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Banks with missing 
or zero assets, equity, loans, deposits and other non-commercial banks are excluded from the 
original dataset. Also, to avoid any distortion in the ratios, for the banks with equity below 1% 
of the assets, the equity value is set as 1% of the assets. The sample consists of 20,406 banks 
and over one million bank-quarter observations. In our sample, 14,394 (70%) of the banks have 
always been community banks throughout the study period based on the FDIC community 
bank definition, 2,470 (13%) have always been non-community banks and 3,542 (17%) have 
changed status between 1984 and 2013. The large sample composition of community banks (at 
least 70%) is consistent with similar comparative studies and is mainly driven by the small size 
and local operations of these banks.   
2.4.1 Community Bank Dummy Variable 
Previous research has simply established an upper assets size threshold-typically $1 billion- in 
order to define community banks. However, this definition has several deficiencies. First and 
foremost, it does not take into account factors such as inflation, economic growth or the size 
of the banking industry. This is particularly relevant for studies like ours that compare distinct 
bank types across a large time span, as applying a single size criterion may exclude the large 
community banks or small non-community banks. The FDIC 2012 definition accounts for such 
factors to impact on bank characteristics. Moreover, it goes beyond a single size criterion and 
introduces business model criteria. Our community bank dummy is constructed based on this 
definition. In order for an organization to be classified as a community bank it should have at 
least 33% in the Loans/Assets ratio and at least 50% in the Core Deposits/Assets to ensure that 
the bank focuses on traditional deposit-taking/loan-making activities. The organization must 
have at least one office, but less than an upper threshold that is adjusted over time. Moreover, 
the organisation can have offices in a maximum of three states and two large metropolitan 
areas, so as to ensure that the organization operates within a limited geographic scope and can 
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engage in relationship lending. Lastly, the upper level of deposits that any branch can hold is 
set, which is adjusted over time. Banks that have at least 50% of their assets in specialty 
organizations, such as credit card specialists, consumer nonbank banks, industrial loan 
companies, trust companies, banker’s banks are excluded from the community bank definition. 
Excluded are also banks that hold at least 10% of their assets in foreign offices, have no loan 
making activities and/or take no deposits. The FDIC definition is summarised in the Appendix 
2.1.   
2.4.2 Explanatory Variables 
Empirical literature has shown that most of the financial stability explanatory power comes 
from bank-specific and macroeconomic variables. We consider key financial ratios, in line with 
the CAMELS framework. CAMELS proxies have been found to be important determinants of 
bank failure (Lane et al. 1986; Thomson 1992; Cole and Gunther 1995; Cole and Gunther 
1998). In particular, high leverage, low cost efficiency, poor asset quality and low profitability 
are some of the key characteristics of distressed banks (Wheelock and Wilson 2000). 
Capitalisation is proxied by the ratio of Equity / Assets, in line with the studies of Altunbas et 
al. (2007); Berger and DeYoung (1997); Fiordelisi et al. (2011) and measures the bank’s 
financial cushion to absorb financial losses. Capitalisation is perhaps the single most important 
metric from a regulator’s perspective to the financial health of a financial institution. Asset 
quality is proxied by the ratio of Loan Loss Allowance/Total Loans. Several studies have used 
the non-performing loans to total loans (NPL/TL), see for example Berger and DeYoung 
(1997); Fiordelisi et al. (2011); Dong et al. (2017). Non-performing loans to total loans is less 
susceptible to managerial discretion compared to loan loss provisions and/or reserves 
(LLP/TL), see for example the studies of Tan and Floros (2013); Williams (2004);  Altunbas 
et al. (2007) which opt for these proxies mainly driven by data availability issues. We control 
for earnings quality differences through the Return on Assets (ROA). This ratio, alongside 
Return on Equity (ROE), is one of the most commonly used to gauge profitability of a bank, 
see for example Cole and Gunther (1995). The Non-Interest Income / Total Income ratio is 
included to proxy for income diversification.6 A bank may diversify its operations away from 
 
 
6 We also experiment with the Income Diversity proxy as per Laeven and Levine (2009). Income 
Diversity is a measure if diversification across different sources of income, computed as 1 -
│
(𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒−𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
│with higher values indicating higher degree of diversification.  
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the traditional deposit-taking/loan-making and focus on fee-generating sources of income, such 
as stock broking and/or insurance (Beck et al. 2013). The Cost/Income ratio is a proxy for cost 
efficiency with poorly run banks having higher costs compared to their income (Cihák and 
Hesse 2010). Liquidity differences among banks are proxied by the Net Loans/Total Assets 
ratio. This ratio indicates the percentage of assets that are tied up in loans, which is inversely 
proportional to bank liquidity as loans are among the least liquid investments. Other studies 
that use this ratio include Cihák and Hesse (2010); Beck et al. (2013). Bank size differences 
are captured via the natural logarithm of Total Assets, in line with the literature (Wheelock and 
Wilson 2000). All monetary values have been deflated using the GDP deflator following 
Berger and Bouwman (2009). To reduce the impact of outliers in our analysis we winsorize 
each variable at the 1st and 99th percentile, following Beck et al. (2013). 
Macroeconomic and market structure variables are also included in our specifications. To 
capture the macroeconomic environment, we follow the studies of Cole and Gunther (1995); 
Cihák and Hesse (2010); Houston et al. (2010); Berger and Bouwman (2013); Schaeck and 
Cihak (2014) among others. Our macroeconomic controls include: i) real GDP growth; ii) 
inflation; iii) oil price change; iv) house price change; v) long-term government bond yield. All 
variables are computed as the quarter-on-quarter logarithmic change in the respective 
underlying index and are stationary.  
The macroeconomic environment plays a catalytic role on bank distress. We adjust for the 
impact of macroeconomic cycle by including a number of macroeconomic variables. We 
include the GDP growth to capture the economic growth (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 
2000). High GDP growth improves the bank’s survival probability. We also control for the 
inflation of the economy.  High inflation has an adverse effect on bank’s stability. High 
inflation in the early 90s was one of the main factors underlying the elevated probability of 
crisis in Mexico (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 2000). Sectoral- specific developments, can 
have a severe impact on the banking system. Close to the beginning of our sample period, oil 
prices plunged dramatically. During this time, states with oil dependent economies exhibited 
higher rates of bank failures. In Texas for example many banks closed as the state went into a 
recession after declining oil prices. Texas is the second biggest state in terms of population and 






banks located in states that were hurt by the energy recession failed earlier than banks located 
elsewhere. This is particularly relevant for community banks because by operating locally they 
become more exposed to local economic shocks. So, oil prices may be a barometer of some 
local economies and particularly in oil-producing states such as Texas and North Dakota.  To 
control for the effects of the oil-price shock of 1986 we include the oil price index in our 
analysis. Similar is the case of the house price fluctuations of the early 1980s and the late 2000s. 
In the 1980s, a small percentage of bank assets were exposed to real estate, however by 2008 
that percentage more than doubled. Real estate is used as collateral so changes in the real estate 
prices are likely to affect bank performance, particularly through the evolution of non-
performing loans. In addition, as banks get involved in trading and securitisation operations, 
their exposure to real estate price risk is likely to increase. We control for changes in the real 
estate prices by including the house price index. 
At country level we want to examine the impact that banks’ competitive position has on risk 
profile. To capture the market structure, we use the banking concentration Hirschman-
Herfindahl Index (HHI) as well as the state-level community bank share, in line with the studies 
of Berger et al. (2009); Jiménez et al. (2013); Abedifar et al. (2013); Pappas et al. (2016). We 
calculate the HHI at state level using total loans, instead of the most popular total assets so as 
to ensure a level-playing field between the two bank types.7A higher HHI would suggest higher 
degree of market power based on local market loan share. We also use the market share of 
community banks at each state to measure concentration. The community bank share is 
calculated as the total loans held by community banks in each state over the total loans in that 
state at quarter end.   A positive coefficient for this variable would suggest that larger presence 
of community banks enhances risk-adjusted performance at state level. 
Appendix 2.2 identifies the explanatory variables that appear in the model and offers a brief 





7 We do a robustness check with HHI calculated using Total Assets, however the qualitative nature of 
the results does not change. 
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2.5 Empirical results 
2.5.1 Preliminary Data Analysis 
As a preliminary analysis between the two bank types, the bank-specific variables are reported. 
Table 2.2 gives the main descriptive statistics for the variables used in our analysis. Figure 2.1 
shows the time evolution of key ratios for the two bank types. 
[Table 2.2 around here] 
[Figure 2.1 around here] 
A cursory inspection of Table 2.2 shows that the average community bank is about 3 times 
smaller than the average non-community bank. Due to the new FDIC definition, we observe 
that the largest community bank manages 22,400 billion USD, much larger than the 1$ billion 
used in previous studies. Despite their smaller size, community banks are better capitalised 
than their non-community counterparts as borne out by the higher Equity/Assets ratio (0.1020 
against 0.0969 respectively). Community banks’ loan portfolios are of superior asset quality, 
as suggested by the lower Loan Loss Allowance/Total Loans ratio (0.0157 against 0.0190 
respectively). In terms of liquidity, community banks are more liquid than the non-community 
ones, as evidenced by the lower Net Loans/Assets (0.5668 against 0.5988 respectively). By 
contrast, non-community banks show significantly lower Cost/Income ratios than the 
community banks (0.8148 against 0.8416 respectively). Non-community banks are also more 
diversified in their operations as a higher proportion of their income comes from non-interest-
bearing sources, such as trading, investment banking and venture capital activities (0.1429 
against 0.0906 respectively). With regards to the three risk measures, the unconditional analysis 
suggests that community banks have significantly higher z-score (21.54 against 19.15 
respectively), which suggests that they exhibit superior financial stability. Community banks 
also show significantly lower credit (23.39 against 38.32 respectively) and liquidity risk (29.50 
against 90.04 respectively) as borne out by the respective indicators.   
Figure 2.1 shows the time evolution of key ratios. A brief inspection shows that the non-
community banks adjustments on certain ratios are more pronounced compared to the 
community banks around periods of turmoil. In particular during the GFC community banks 
increased their LLA/TL by 30% while non-community banks by 51%. During the same period, 
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profitability declined by 76% for community banks and by 128% for their non-community 
counterparts. 
The non-interest income/total income ratio also provides interesting reading as it shows that 
both bank types gradually increase their non-interest income component, however, non-
community banks do so at a much faster pace. In particular, while in 1984 about 5% of the 
community banks’ and 8% of non-community banks’ income came from non-interest sources, 
by 2013 this had grown to 14% for community banks and 23% for non-community banks; a 
1.8 and 2.8 times-increase respectively. In terms of insolvency risk, community banks have 
been consistently operating at higher z-score levels throughout the study period. However, in 
terms of credit and liquidity risk, non-community banks have been outperforming the 
community ones during the 1980s. The situation changes after the 1990s where community 
banks operate at lower credit and liquidity risk levels. During the GFC the level of credit risk 
increased more prominently for non-community banks than community banks (235% against 
200%). Liquidity risk exhibits a downward sloping trend for both bank types after the mid-
1990s. 
Our preliminary analysis of CAMEL(S) ratios and risk proxies support the hypothesis that the 
community and the non-community banking models are distinct; thus clearly setting the scene 
for the differentiated profile with respect to insolvency, credit and liquidity risk. 
 
2.5.2 Results on Insolvency Risk 
Table 2.3 shows the results of the insolvency risk estimation for Models I-IV of section 2.3.2, 
and presents estimated coefficients, robust standard errors and standard goodness-of-fit 
statistics. 
[Table 2.3 around here] 
Of primary interest is the coefficient of the community bank binary variable. The results of the 
fairly restricted Model I, which only allows for a level shift in the insolvency risk of the two 
bank types, suggest that community banks have lower insolvency risk. The more generalised 
Model II that allows for different sensitivities of insolvency risk to bank-specific, market 
structure and macroeconomic variables shows that community banks exhibit lower insolvency 
risk. As such it corroborates further on the different business model and the unique 
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characteristics these banks exhibit. This result is in support of our earlier, unconditional 
findings and the FDIC (2012) study.    
The positive and significant coefficient on Total Assets suggests that large banks are more 
financially stable by exhibiting lower insolvency risk, however the magnitude of the effect is 
very small. Calomiris and Mason (2000) suggest that larger banks are better able to diversify 
their loan portfolio, thus to reduce their asset risk. The interaction of the community bank 
dummy with total assets suggests that the size effect on insolvency risk is uniform in direction 
and magnitude across bank types. This suggests that community banks do not seem to derive 
additional benefits from having a larger asset base, probably because their ability to deliver 
relationship-based services is associated with their relatively smaller size.  
The positive coefficient on the capitalization ratio (Equity/Assets) suggests that better 
capitalised banks face lower insolvency risk as they are more resilient to economic shocks. 
Banks with higher capitalisation are better protected against debt overhang problems (Myers, 
1977), can withstand adverse economic shocks, therefore they have lower probability of 
default. The positive coefficient on the interaction of the community bank dummy with the 
capitalisation ratio suggests that this risk reduction effect is more pronounced for this type of 
banks. The differentiated impact of capitalisation on financial stability may relate to the 
regulator’s perception about bank risk taking in the two banks. Capitalisation is a major 
component in the regulator’s controlling of bank risk taking. However, it has been documented 
that, other things being equal, efficient banks exhibit better risk management; hence are more 
likely to be granted with more room for leverage (Altunbas et al. 2007). Our regression results 
verify an inverse relation between bank efficiency and insolvency risk for all banks, as 
suggested by the negative coefficient on Cost/Income ratio and this effect is more pronounced 
for community banks. Consequently, non-community banks could mitigate their risk exposure 
either through capitalisation adjustments or through their superior efficiency scores (see also 
previous section results). By contrast, community banks exhibit lower efficiency hence 
capitalisation adjustments are a more prominent measure for mitigating risk in these banks, 
which would partially explain the significant higher magnitude, relatively to the non-
community banks.         
Loan Loss Allowance / Total Loans exhibits a positive relation with bank insolvency risk 
suggesting that lower asset quality is harmful for the bank’s stability, which is evidenced by 
the negative coefficient. This suggests that banks set aside more provisions when the quality 
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of their portfolio is poor, a finding that is in line with the literature (Betz et al. 2014). However, 
when using the generalised Model II, we find that this effect is mainly driven by the community 
banks, as verified by the respective negative interaction term. This means that asset quality is 
of crucial importance to the stability of community banks. We argue that the reason for this 
effect is, in part, due to the securitisation capabilities and practices of the larger non-community 
banks, which allow them to shift risk exposures inherent in their loan portfolios away from the 
core bank operations. By contrast, community banks would be less likely to engage in such 
activities, possibly due to their limited access to capital markets and lack of relevant expertise 
and/or their closer connection to society. In particular, reputational risk is important for the 
community banks that operate in local areas and are active in relationship banking practices.        
Liquidity is a key determinant of bank stability as it allows banks to withstand unexpected 
deposit withdrawals and meet payments and margin calls related to their securities 
investments/trading operations (Calomiris and Mason 2000). We find that the Net Loans / Total 
Assets ratio enters the regression with a negative coefficient for both bank types, indicating 
that the higher the loan component in the bank’s portfolio the lower the financial stability, a 
result that has received support in the literature (Wheelock and Wilson 2000). The interaction 
of community bank dummy with Net Loans to Assets ratio as well as the comparison of Model 
III and IV coefficients suggest that the liquidity effect on bank stability is important in 
community banks. This reflects the specialized focus that community banks have on traditional 
lending activities. At the same time community banks have significantly lower income 
diversification compared to non-community banks, which limits their ability to tap into capital 
markets to boost their liquidity, further highlighting the importance of liquidity management 
in these institutions. Concentration on non-interest income has a different effect on the stability 
for the two bank types. It comes with a positive coefficient for non-community banks however, 
for community banks the effect becomes negative. Because of their focus on traditional lending 
and deposit gathering activities, community banks derive most of their revenue from net 
interest income. Non-community banks on the other hand have greater success in generating 
noninterest income from a variety of sources. Higher profitability, as proxied by the ROE, is 
associated with higher financial stability owing to the positive coefficient. The effect of 
profitability on financial stability is more pronounced for community banks.   
With respect to the macroeconomic environment, real GDP growth enhanced financial stability 
in the banking sector, while Inflation hampers it. Inflation is particularly relevant for the 
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financial stability of community banks, perhaps a reflection of their investments that are tied 
to loans in the real part of the economy as well as their more limited income diversification 
compared to non-community banks.  The community banks’ financial stability is more heavily 
influenced by movements of the interest rates, perhaps expectedly as they are more dependent 
on interest revenue. Non-community banks on the other hand are able to hedge their exposure 
better and offset adverse changes. Higher oil prices enhance the financial stability of either 
bank type; however, the effect is more pronounced for non-community banks. This verifies the 
findings of Cole and Gunther (1995) which suggest that oil price shock is a significant 
determinant of the bank’s survival probability. Non-community banks were hurt by the Energy 
Recession when there was a falling demand for crude oil. Banking systems in oil dependent 
states (e.g., Oklahoma, Texas, Wyoming, North Dakota, Alaska and Louisiana) were largely 
affected, particularly as there was a dense concentration of non-community banks.  
In terms of goodness-of-fit measures, we observe that the R2 statistics reported are close for the 
variants including bank-specific, macroeconomic and market structure variables and those 
based solely on bank-specific variables. In particular, the average R2 is 33.43% for the former 
and 32.75% for the latter, suggesting that the accounting statement variables carry most of the 
predictive power. 
2.5.3 Results on Credit Risk 
Table 2.4 shows the results of the credit risk estimation for Models I-IV of section 2.3.2, and 
presents estimated coefficients, robust standard errors and standard goodness-of-fit statistics. 
[Table 2.4 around here] 
Our primary interest focuses on the community bank dummy which in models I and II bears a 
negative and significant coefficient. This suggests that community banks have superior asset 
quality compared to their conventional counterparts, ceteris paribus. This may be partially 
explained by the fact that community banks have stronger incentives for screening and 
monitoring process, as bad loans are more likely to stay in their books and not be securitized. 
The relationship banking approach of community banks provides the bank with access to soft 
information about the loan takers that could resolve agency and informational asymmetry 
problems, which mitigates credit risk.   
We find evidence for a significantly negative relationship between capitalization and credit risk 
for both bank types. However, the effect for community banks is more pronounced suggesting 
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that capitalisation is more effective in reducing credit risk for community banks. This is not 
surprising as previous research has documented an inverse relationship between capitalisation 
and risk (Galloway et al. 1997). This is partially due to the moral hazard hypothesis suggesting 
that thinly capitalized banks respond to moral hazard incentives by taking more risky loans 
(Berger and DeYoung 1997) or by maintaining their loan supply to existing low-quality 
borrowers. A negative relationship between cost inefficiency and credit risk for both bank types 
is also documented. Using commercial banks, (Berger and DeYoung 1997) find mixed 
evidence on the relationship between cost inefficiency and credit risk, suggesting a trade-off 
between operating costs and loan performance. Altunbas et al. (2007) suggest that bank 
efficiency works as an alternative mechanism to capitalisation for credit risk mitigation that 
banks could rely upon. Our results for commercial banks support this contention. However, 
community banks’ credit risk mitigation is primarily affected by capitalisation. By and large, 
income diversification enhances credit risk. This is supported by the positive and significant 
coefficient of non-interest income to total income for both bank types. It is plausible that a bank 
that does not specialise in a particular line of business may be less careful on the credit control 
monitoring. The significant and positive interaction term suggests that community banks’ 
credit risk is particularly affected by income diversification attempts.   
Macroeconomic factors have an important influence on the likelihood that borrowers pay their 
debts. In our analysis, we find evidence for a positive relationship between inflation and credit 
risk which is more pronounced for community banks. Higher inflation weakens the borrowers' 
ability to service debt payments by reducing their real income and increasing economic 
uncertainty; hence increase bank’s credit risk exposure. A slowdown in economic activity 
deteriorates non-performing loan performance whereas an expansion of the economy is 
characterized by lower rates of non-performing loans. 
2.5.4 Results on Liquidity Risk 
Table 2.5 presents the results of the liquidity risk estimation for Models I-IV of section 2.3.2, 
and presents estimated coefficients, robust standard errors and standard goodness-of-fit 
statistics. 
[Table 2.5 around here] 
Results from models I and II at Table 2.5 show that community banks face more liquidity risk 
than their non-community counterparts. The business model of community banks that relies on 
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loan making together with the limited access to capital markets for these banks, makes liquidity 
management a challenge. By contrast, non-community banks are more able to diversify their 
funding sources and hedge against liquidity shortages. Moreover, non-community banks are 
better able due to the size and knowhow to offload their balance sheets from illiquid loans via 
securitisation techniques. This finding is of particular importance due to the increased 
prominence of liquidity risk management following the Basel III implementation.   
Income diversification increases liquidity risk for both bank types, but the effect is less 
pronounced in community banks. This may be plausibly linked to the maturity transformation 
role of banks where non-community banks have a wider array of product maturities to manage 
as opposed to community banks. Our results show a positive relationship between capitalisation 
and liquidity risk for non-community banks. Better capitalized banks are less incentivised to 
withhold liquidity. This may be linked to a perception that capitalisation is the key signal for 
sound bank practices (Vodová 2011). Moreover, banks with high capitalisation need to invest 
in projects with high yield to compete in terms of profitability with the high leveraged banks. 
In particular, De Angelo and Stulz (2015) highlight the competitive pressure that commercial 
banks receive in terms of profitability from the more leveraged shadow banks. As such, it is 
expected that well-capitalised banks would have lower liquidity so as not to miss on forgone 
earnings. By contrast, community banks exhibit a negative relationship between capitalisation 
and liquidity. This may be plausibly linked to the lower competition that these banks face as 
they operate mainly in local areas, and/or often feature objectives outside the traditional profit 
maximisation/cost minimisation dogma. GDP growth has a positive impact on liquidity risk. 
In periods of economic growth banks tend to lend more and thus run down their liquidity 
buffers, whereas in periods of economic downturn when lending opportunities are not as good 
they hold more liquidity  
2.5.5 Robustness Checks 
2.5.5.1 Alternative z-score measures 
The z-score measure used in this paper is one of the most widely used insolvency indicators. 
The z-score combines information on bank profitability (ROA), leverage (Equity/Assets) and 
risk (standard deviation of ROA) to assess bank’s insolvency risk. However, in the empirical 
literature certain variations in the calculation of the z-score exist. Of particular relevance to our 
case where a long time span is used are the concerns on stationarity of the bank returns (Lepetit 
and Strobel 2013). Mare et al. (2017) build on the work of Lepetit and Strobel (2013) by 
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summarizing the current methods for computing the z-score and introducing a novel estimator 
whose aims at capturing nonstationary stochastic returns.  
In table 2.6 the regressions are repeated using a different specification of the z-score, which is 
given in table 2.1. 
Mare et al. (2017) confirm that the effectiveness of this estimator is warranted even when the 
stationarity assumption of returns is violated. We have cross-checked that the stationarity of 
the ROA used in the z-score measure is not violated, and we implement the above z-score 
variant as a further robustness check. We find the results to be consistent with those presented 
in the main part of the paper. In particular, and as Table 2.6 reports, community banks bear 
lower insolvency risk.  
[Table 2.6 around here] 
 
2.5.5.2 Loan specialisation and risk profile 
Over time the community bank lending portfolio has shifted away from retail focus and moved 
towards commercial focus. Therefore, the majority of community banks offer loans in all five 
major categories, namely: Residential Mortgages, Agricultural Loans, Commercial and 
Industrial Loans (C&I), Consumer Loans or Loans to Individuals and Commercial Real Estate 
Loans (CRE). Construction and Development Loans (C&D) represent an important 
subcomponent of CRE loans and for this reason is reported separately (FDIC, 2012).  
In this section we investigate the marginal contributions of each loan category on the bank’s 
risk profile for community and non-community banks. To do so we include the ratio of each of 
the loan categories to the total assets. According to Bhattacharyya and Purnanandam (2011), 
loans associated with inflated assets such as residential mortgages may expose the bank to 
higher failure risk than loans of other categories. Multi-family mortgages are associated with 
higher probability of a bank being insolvent, whereas single-family mortgages are either neutral 
or associated with a lower probability of default (Cole and White 2012). Real estate loans are 
found to be particularly relevant in predicting bank failure (Cole and White 2012). 
We re-estimate equation 2.1 including the loan type contributions as defined above. Table 2.7 
report the estimated coefficients and standard errors for these regressions where the dependent 
variables are the insolvency, credit and liquidity risk respectively. In the first four columns, all 
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banks are pooled together, in the fifth and the sixth only community banks are included and in 
the last two columns only non-community banks. As previously, each panel has a micro and 
macro variant. In addition, the interactions of community bank variable with the loan specialty 
variables are included (Columns 3 and 4). For brevity we only report the explanatory variables 
that are related to the loan type.  
[Table 2.7 around here] 
The sensitivity of the z-score to some loan types appears to be different for community and 
non-community banks. Loans to Individuals appear with a significantly negative coefficient 
for community banks. The result for community banks is similar to the findings of Cole and 
Gunther (1995) who find a significant negative coefficient for this type of loans as a 
determinant of the survival of US banks. Agricultural loans have a significant negative effect 
on stability for both bank groups, a result that is in line again with the findings of Cole and 
Gunther (1995). This may reflect the impact of the continuing decline of small family firms in 
the US since the early 80s. Concentration on commercial and industrial loans has a negative 
effect only on the stability for community banks. 
In terms of credit risk, agricultural loans, commercial and industrial loans and loans to 
individuals are significantly affecting the banks’ credit risk. Higher proportion of agricultural 
loans increases credit risk for both bank types to a similar extent. A higher percentage of 
commercial and industrial loans in the loan portfolio decreases credit risk for non-community 
banks however, it increases risk for the community ones. SMEs make up the majority of 
borrowers for this type of loans because they rely on this type of financing to fund their 
operations and they do not have access to credit markets that large companies have. These firms 
are normally smaller and less established thus making the loans directed to them riskier.  A 
higher percentage of loans to individuals is linked with an increased credit risk for both bank 
types, however the effect in community banks is more muted, perhaps owing to their 
relationship lending approach. 
With respect to liquidity risk, concentration on different loan specializations, apart from 
construction and development loans, have a significant effect on liquidity risk for both bank 
groups. This is to be expected as typically loans in this category come at high maturities; hence 
require the commitment of funds for extended periods of time. Commercial and industrial loans 
increase liquidity risk for both community and non-community banks but for community banks 
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the effect is significantly less pronounced. Similarly, loans to individuals increases liquidity 
risk but for community banks the effect is more muted.  
2.5.5.3 Financial stability and banking crises 
In this section we investigate the effect of banking crises on the comparative risk profile of 
community and non-community banks. The subprime lending crisis began in 2007 and 
interrupted an upward trend in the house prices, the supply of mortgages and consumer loans 
and an expanding residential construction activity. These trends had fuelled the balance sheet 
expansion of both bank types and stimulated economic growth in metro and non-metro areas. 
During periods of distress, community banks were exposed to the same market conditions as 
their counterparts. Given the differences in their business model, it is important to investigate 
how they weathered the crises in comparison with non-community banks. 
Our model is capturing the sensitivities of community and non-community banks' risk to bank-
specific characteristics during periods of banking crises. In order to do so, we use a difference-
in-difference setup with a crisis dummy that takes the value 1 in during the periods of banking 
crises as defined above; zero otherwise. Following Berger and Bouwman (2013) we consider 
the two banking crises that are relevant to our sample. These are: i) the credit crunch of the 
early 1990s (from 1990Q1 to 1992Q4) and ii) the subprime lending crisis (from 2007Q3 to 
2009Q4).  
The rest of the explanatory variables are as defined in the main part of the paper. Of particular 
importance here are the double-interaction terms between the community bank and crisis 
dummies as well as the triple-interaction terms between the community bank, crisis dummies 
and the explanatory variables. Thus, the model is specified as follows: 
 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝐶𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛿𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐶𝐵𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡
+ 𝐶𝐵𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜆𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 × 𝑋𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝜇𝐶𝐵𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 × 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜈𝑖 + 𝑖,𝑡 
(2.2) 
 
where the dependent variable 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 is the insolvency risk, credit risk and liquidity risk proxies 
for bank 𝑖 at period 𝑡; 𝐶𝐵𝑖,𝑡 is the community bank dummy variable. 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 is the crisis dummy 
variable; 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of bank-specific independent variables; 𝐶𝐵𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 is the 
interaction between the community dummy and the crisis dummy; 𝐶𝐵𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 is the interaction 
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between the community dummy and the bank-specific variables; 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 × 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 is the interaction 
between the crisis dummy and the bank-specific control variables; 𝐶𝐵𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 × 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 is the 
triple interaction of the bank and crisis dummy and the vector of bank-specific variables; 𝜈𝑖  is 
the unobserved random effect that varies across banks but not over time;  𝑖,𝑡 is an idiosyncratic 
error term. 
Table 2.8 reports the estimated coefficients and standard errors for the triple interaction terms 
and the interaction between the community bank dummy and the crisis dummy. The dependent 
variables are the insolvency, credit and liquidity risk and are reported in columns 1, 2 and 3 
respectively.8 The parameter of the triple interaction term is masking the change in the effect 
that the explanatory variable has on the risk proxy for community banks during crises i.e. how 
the crisis and the community bank status jointly modify the effect of the independent variable 
on risk.   
[Table 2.8 around here] 
Overall, during banking crises the difference in insolvency risk and credit risk for community 
banks is not significantly different, as evidenced by the statistically insignificant coefficients 
of the interaction term between community bank and crisis dummy (0.0215 and 0.0196 
respectively).  With respect to the bank- specific variables, the negative coefficient of the triple 
interaction of the ratio of Equity to Assets suggests that the beneficiary effect of higher equity 
is less pronounced during turbulent times for community banks. The positive coefficient on 
Loan Loss Reserves reduces the negative effect of this variable on the community bank’s 
stability, which suggests that during non-normal times holding more reserves can offer 
additional protection for the bank. In terms of credit risk, concentration on non-interest income 
in periods of crises suggests higher credit risk for community banks. In the liquidity risk results, 
the coefficient of the interaction between the community bank dummy and the crisis dummy 
manifests higher liquidity risk for this bank group (?̂?𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠×𝐶𝐵 = 0.052
∗∗). There exists a 
change in the effect of loan loss reserves on liquidity risk, from positive in regular time to 
negative during crises. 
 
 
8 Coefficients of the bank-specific variables, the interactions of the bank-specific variables with the 




2.5.5.4 Three-stage least squares 
To eliminate any endogeneity problem from simultaneity bias, we treat all three risks as 
endogenous by developing the following system of equations, in line with the existing literature 
(Tan and Floros 2013;  Mollah and Zaman 2015). The system of three equations is given below: 
 
 𝐼𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑅𝑡−2 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑅𝑡−3 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑅𝑡−4 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐿𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝛸𝑖,𝑡 
(2.3) 
 
 𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑅𝑡−2 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑅𝑡−3 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑅𝑡−4
+ 𝛽5𝐼𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝛸𝑖,𝑡 
(2.4) 
 
 𝐿𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑅𝑡−2 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑅𝑡−3 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑅𝑡−4 + 𝛽5𝐼𝑅𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝛸𝑖,𝑡 
(2.5) 
 
where subscripts 𝑖, 𝑡  index banks and quarters respectively. IR denotes insolvency risk (proxied 
by the Z-score), CR denotes credit risk and LR denotes liquidity risk. CB denotes the 
community bank dummy variable. The bank-level control variables that are included are the 
natural logarithm of total assets, the ratio of Equity/Assets, Loan Loss Allowance/Total Loans, 
Net Loans/Total Assets, ROA, Cost/Income, Non-Interest Income/Total Income and Income 
Diversity.  Year and state fixed effects are included in the model. The system is estimated via 
three-stage least squares (3SLS) with robust standard errors. We use four lags of the dependent 
variable in line with the quarterly data structure and following Imbierowicz and Rauch (2014).   
Table 2.9 presents estimated coefficients and robust standard errors in parenthesis from the 
3SLS estimation. The results confirm that community banks have higher financial stability than 
their non-community counterparts. The direction and the significance levels for key 
explanatory variables remain similar to the results reported in the main analysis. However, 
credit and liquidity risk appear highly interlinked, a result which has also been verified in 
Imbierowicz and Rauch (2014). The 3SLS results reveal that sensitivities to key explanatory 
variables, such as capitalisation and profitability, remain qualitatively similar to the main 
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analysis. However, the community bank dummy fails to reach statistical significance levels. 
We believe this is, in part, driven by two forces. First, community banks are a heterogenous 
mix comprising both small, highly-specialised banks in their lending operations as well as 
large, fairly diversified community banks that resemble commercial banks. Second, credit and 
liquidity risk, although interconnected, share particularly complex relations, as documented in 
the Imbierowicz and Rauch (2014) study where only after several sample classifications a more 
clear relationship has been evidenced.  
The 3SLS analysis also reveals some interesting results between the contemporaneous relations 
of the three types of risk. In particular, higher insolvency risk increases both credit and liquidity 
risk. Higher liquidity risk increases both insolvency and credit risk. Higher credit risk increases 
insolvency risk but reduces liquidity risk. Our findings here are in line with the findings of 
Imbierowicz and Rauch (2014) who suggest that both liquidity and credit risk separately 
increase banks probability of default.  
[Table 2.9 around here] 
2.6 Conclusion 
Evidence suggests that community banks compete effectively with non-community banks. 
They conduct business in ways that are different from those of non-community banks. They 
complement the role of those banks by specializing in relationship banking and providing credit 
to small and medium size businesses. In addition, they serve customers in rural and small metro 
areas that are not served by large banks.  
Our primary aim is to compare the financial risk profile of community and non-community 
banks in terms of insolvency, credit and liquidity risk and to test whether their risk profile 
shows similar sensitivity to key bank-specific, market structure and macroeconomic indicators. 
Our findings corroborate on the different business model that community banks exhibit. The 
sensitivity to financial risk shows variations among the two bank types. Using z-score 
regressions and controlling for both bank-specific and macroeconomic indicators, it is found 
that community banks tend to be more financially stable than non-community banks. More 
specifically, community banks do not derive additional benefit in terms of insolvency risk from 
having a larger asset base. The risk reduction effect of higher capitalisation, better asset quality 
and higher liquidity is more pronounced for community banks. When it comes to the 
macroeconomic environment, inflation and real GDP growth are particularly relevant for the 
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stability of this bank type. In terms of credit risk community banks to outperform their non-
community counterparts. Community banks’ credit risk mitigation is primarily affected by 
capitalisation and income diversification. Their focus on traditional loan making activities and 
limited access to capital markets causes community banks to bear more liquidity risk. Our 
results suggest a negative relationship between capitalisation and liquidity and a positive 
impact of GDP growth on liquidity risk for community banks. Non-community banks have 
always had an advantage against community banks because they have better access to more 
sophisticated financial instruments. This creates additional challenges for community banks 
who need to compete in the same environment with non-community banks. Therefore, the 
implication of any bank policy should take into consideration the distinct risk profile of the two 
bank types. Measuring the effect of bank regulation remains a critical issue that poses 




Figure 2.1 Mean Comparison for the two bank types across time 
Panel A: Total Assets (natural logarithm) Panel B: Equity/Assets 
  
Panel C: Loan Loss Allowance/Total Loans Panel D: Return on Equity 
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Figure 2.1 (continued) 
Panel G: Net Loans/Total Assets Panel H: Z-score 
  
Panel I: Liquidity Risk Panel J: Credit Risk 
  
NOTES: Graphs demonstrate the time evolution of key financial characteristics in community and non-community banks. 















































Table 2.1: Bank insolvency, liquidity and credit risk proxy variables 




and  Hesse, 
2007)   














𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 − 𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑡 − 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡
 










= [(Demand Deposits𝑡  +  Transaction Deposits𝑡  
+  Brokered Deposits𝑡  +  NOW Accounts𝑡  
+  Unused Loan Commitments𝑡)
− (Cash𝑡  +  Currency & Coin𝑡  +  Trading Assets𝑡  
+  Fed Funds Purchased𝑡  +  Commercial Paper𝑡  
+  Securities available for Sale𝑡)
± Net Interbank Lending Position𝑡
± Net Interbank Acceptances𝑡




Values above zero 
imply that the 
bank is ceteris 
paribus not able to 




Z-score (Mare et 
al., 2017)  𝑍 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑡 ≡
𝜇(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑇) + 𝐸𝐴𝑡





NOTES: The table displays descriptions and calculations of the three main proxy variables for bank 
insolvency, liquidity and credit risk, as well as the additional robustness proxy variable for insolvency risk. 
The Z-score is calculated as the sum of the return on assets and the ratio of equity to total assets divided 
by the standard deviation of the return on assets. Because of its high skewness, we use its natural logarithm 
(Laeven and Levine, 2009). It measures a bank’s distance to insolvency and it is inversely related to the 
probability of default. The credit risk proxy is calculated by dividing the net loan charge-offs by the loan 
loss allowance in the previous year. It indicates the degree to which the current period losses were expected 
in the period before. The liquidity risk proxy is standardised by total assets and indicates to what degree 






Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics for the bank- specific variables considered in our analysis 
Variable Obs Mean Median SD Min Max 
Panel A: All banks 
Total Assets (TA) 1,213,125 683185 67488 15500000 113 1990000000 
Equity/Assets 1,213,125 0.1014 0.0907 0.0540 0.0100 0.9986 
Loan Loss Allowance/Total Loans 1,213,125 0.0161 0.0132 0.0173 -0.1041 8.0000 
Net loans/Total Assets 1,213,125 0.5707 0.5866 0.1590 -0.0045 0.9991 
Cost/Income 1,207,006 0.8383 0.8085 1.5946 -143.9091 1470.0000 
Non-Interest Income/Total Income 1,207,006 0.0969 0.0783 0.2928 -85.3597 240.7273 
ROE 1,213,125 0.0370 0.0555 0.7367 -53.5338 394.0194 
Agricultural Loans / TA 1,213,125 0.0512 0.0085 0.0854 0 0.7895 
Commercial & Industrial Loans / TA 1,213,125 0.0717 0.0481 0.0862 0 1.8910 
Commercial Real Estate Loans / TA 1,213,125 0.3307 0.3100 0.1820 0 1.0093 
Construction & Development Loans / TA 1,213,125 0.0314 0.0112 0.0532 0 0.8433 
Loans to Individuals / TA 1,213,125 0.0853 0.0637 0.0892 0 1.2044 
Residential Mortgages / TA 1,213,125 0.1631 0.1358 0.1277 0 1.1449 
Community Bank Share 1,066,649 0.4609 0.4204 0.2346 0.0019 1 
HHI 1,213,125 846.5179 477.2381 1032.4680 72.8941 10000.0000 
z-score 1,156,825 21.2491 20.5727 12.4040 -49.9342 3208.3040 
Credit Risk 1,207,785 0.2519 0.0515 8.3419 -143.0000 6658.0000 
Liquidity Risk 1,213,125 0.3680 0.3043 4.4966 -1.5278 1304.7500 
Panel B: Community Banks 
Total Assets 1,066,649 137466*** 59862*** 299177*** 284 22400000 
Equity/Assets 1,066,649 0.1020*** 0.0922*** 0.0494*** 0.0100 0.9986 
Loan Loss Allowance/Total Loans 1,066,649 0.0157*** 0.0130*** 0.0126*** -0.1041 4.5455 
Net Loans/Total Assets 1,066,649 0.5668*** 0.5816*** 0.1554*** -0.0045 0.9873 
Cost/Income 1,060,850 0.8416*** 0.8097*** 1.6633*** -143.9091 1470.0000 
Non-Interest Income/Total Income 1,060,850 0.0906*** 0.0758*** 0.2908*** -85.3597 240.7273 
ROE 1,066,649 0.0353***   0.0547*** 0.7711*** -53.5338 394.0194 
Agricultural loans / TA 1,066,649 0.0562*** 0.0124*** 0.0888*** 0 0.7376 
Commercial & Industrial Loans / TA 1,066,649 0.0685*** 0.0451*** 0.0837*** 0 1.8910 
Commercial Real Estate Loans / TA 1,066,649 0.3326*** 0.3121*** 0.1803*** 0 0.9892 
Construction & Development Loans / TA 1,066,649 0.0308*** 0.0105*** 0.0530*** 0 0.8433 
Loans to Individuals / TA 1,066,649 0.0790*** 0.0617*** 0.0692*** 0 1.1578 
Residential Mortgages / TA 1,066,649 0.1640*** 0.1365*** 0.1269*** 0 1.1449 
z-score 1,014,292 21.5424*** 20.9167*** 12.3591*** -49.9342 3208.3040 
Credit Risk 1,062,674 0.2339*** 0.0459*** 4.7365*** -143.0000 2863.0000 
Liquidity Risk 1,066,649 0.2950*** 0.3002*** 0.2449*** -0.9861 54.0211 
Panel C: Non- Community Banks 
Total Assets 146,322 4661647 245536 44300000 113 1990000000 
Equity/Assets 146,322 0.0969 0.0789 0.0795 0.0100 0.9985 
Loan Loss Allowance/Total Loans 146,322 0.0190 0.0142 0.0363 0.0000 8.0000 
Net Loans/Total Assets 146,322 0.5988 0.6238 0.1812 -0.0016 0.9991 
Cost/Income 146,007 0.8148 0.7993 0.9576 -116.9213 276.0000 
Non-Interest Income/Total Income 146,007 0.1429 0.1016 0.3036 -26.3399 72.7638 
ROE 146,322 0.0506 0.0639 0.3990 -37.5723 12.8299 
Agricultural loans / TA 146,322 0.0144 0.0004 0.0373 0 0.7895 
Commercial & Industrial Loans / TA 146,322 0.0946 0.0758 0.0992 0 1.0074 
Commercial Real Estate Loans / TA 146,322 0.3166 0.2954 0.1936 0 1.0093 
Construction & Development Loans / TA 146,322 0.0356 0.0168 0.0539 0 0.7019 
Loans to Individuals / TA 146,322 0.1310 0.0863 0.1693 0 1.2044 
Residential Mortgages / TA 146,322 0.1565 0.1305 0.1328 0 1.0083 
z-score 142,380 19.1570 18.5577 12.5142 -6.3905 869.5670 
Credit Risk 144,960 0.3832 0.0954 20.3793 -63.0000 6658.0000 
Liquidity Risk 146,322 0.9004 0.3403 12.9181 -1.5278 1304.7500 
NOTES: This table shows the summary statistics for the bank- specific variables used in the analysis. Bank- specific data are retrieved 
from the WRDS database. Statistics are based on quarterly data from 1984 to 2013. Sample consists of 20,406 banks. Panel A contains 
all banks in the sample, panel B contains only community banks and panel C only non-community. Assets is expressed in millions 
USD. Insolvency risk is proxied by the Z-score. Details on how we calculate Z-score, Credit and Liquidity risk proxies are provided in 




   
 Table 2.3: Regression results (Dependent variable Z-Score) 
  All banks Community Banks Non-Community Banks 










Community Bank 0.001 0.059*** 0.123*** 0.370*     
 (0.374) (0.005) (0.017) (0.116)     
Assets 0.001*** -0.001 0.001** -0.001*** 0.001 -0.001 0.001** 0.001** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Equity/Assets 7.816*** 8.017*** 7.659*** 6.011*** 7.810*** 8.030*** 7.291*** 7.272*** 
 (0.031) (0.037) (0.091) (0.278) (0.031) (0.037) (0.107) (0.113) 




-1.937*** -0.449 -2.341*** -2.510*** -2.294*** -2.362*** 
 (0.078) (0.091) (0.163) (0.852) (0.087) (0.091) (0.185) (0.191) 
Net Loans/Total Assets -0.125*** -0.159*** -0.061*** -0.113*** -0.138*** -0.157*** -0.064*** -0.074*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.010) (0.040) (0.004) (0.005) (0.013) (0.013) 
ROE 0.629*** 0.639*** 
 
0.609*** 0.318** 0.630*** 0.626*** 0.581*** 0.570*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.021) (0.134) (0.009) (0.010) (0.020) (0.021) 
Cost/ Income -0.447*** -0.417*** -0.361*** -0.218** -0.461*** -0.424*** -0.366*** -0.352*** 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.013) (0.087) (0.006) (0.007) (0.018) (0.019) 
Non- Interest Income/Total 
Income 
-0.011 -0.042*** 0.099*** -0.014 -0.037*** -0.045*** 0.110*** 0.111*** 






















Inflation  -0.013***  -0.002  -0.013***  -0.010*** 
  (0.001)  (0.006)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Δ(House Price Index)  0.003***  0.004***  0.003***  0.005*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Real GDP growth  -0.003***  0.005**  -0.003***  -0.002*** 
  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Δ(Oil Price Index)  0.012***  0.075*  0.015***  0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.040) 
 
 (0.001)  (0.003) 
Gvt long term yield  0.011*** 
 
 -0.007  0.009***  0.004*** 
  (0.001)  (0.006)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
HHI  -0.001***  0.001  -0.001***  0.001** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
CB market share  -0.017***  0.037     




















Assets×CB   0.001 0.001***     
   (0.001) (0.001)     
Equity/Assets×CB   0.174* 1.943***     
   (0.092) (0.276)     
Loan Loss Allowance/Total 
Loans×CB 
  -0.401** -2.157**     
   (0.179) (0.839)     
Net Loans/Assets×CB   -0.073*** -0.059     
   (0.010) (0.039)     
ROE×CB   0.024 0.271**     
   (0.023) (0.134)     
Cost/ Income×CB   -0.097*** -0.204**     
   (0.014) (0.085)     
Non- Interest 
Income/Income×CB 
  -0.134*** -0.029     
   (0.023) (0.089)     
Inflation×CB    -0.005     
    (0.006)     
Δ(House Price Index) × CB    -0.001***     
    (0.001)     
Real GDP growth ×CB    -0.009***     
    (0.002)     
Δ(Oil Price Index) × CB    -0.078**     
    (0.039)     
Gvt long term yield×CB    0.011*     
    (0.006)     
HHI×CB    -0.001     
    (0.001)     
CB market share×CB    -0.050     
    (0.032)     
Constant 1.520*** 1.137*** 1.409*** 0.866*** 1.537*** 1.050*** 2.916*** 1.773*** 
 State Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 Robust SEs YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 Adjusted R2 0.3307 0.3496 0.3311 0.3499 0.3473 0.3506 0.2100 0.2147 
 Observations 1,010,684 812,310 1,010,684 812,310 882,765 809,899 127,919 118,575 
 NOTES: Table presents regression results for insolvency risk. Assets are deflated using the GDP deflator following Berger & Bouwman (2009). CB denotes the community bank dummy. The dependent variable is the 
natural logarithm of the Z-score. All variables are lagged one quarter to mitigate endogeneity concerns. Inflation and GDP are lagged by 4 quarters. At each regression we include state and year fixed effects. In the first 
four columns all banks are included, in the fifth and sixth column we include only community banks and in the seventh and eighth column only non-community banks. Bank-specific variables are winsorized at the 1st 





 Table 2.4: Regression results (Dependent variable credit risk) 
  All banks Community Banks Non-Community Banks 










Community Bank -0.020*** -0.040*** -0.047* -0.278***     
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.024) (0.104)     
Assets 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Equity/Assets -0.477*** -0.570*** -0.174*** -0.244 -0.491*** -0.579*** -0.328*** -0.388*** 
 (0.026) (0.032) (0.063) (0.212) (0.028) (0.032) (0.068) (0.071) 
Net Loans/Total Assets 0.292*** 0.278*** 0.282*** 0.284*** 0.303*** 0.273*** 0.220*** 0.195*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.015) (0.048) (0.008) (0.008) (0.018) (0.018) 
ROE -0.954*** -0.974*** -0.884*** -0.681*** -0.957*** -0.977*** -0.771*** -0.743*** 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.023) (0.139) (0.012) (0.012) (0.023) (0.023) 
Cost/ Income -0.135*** -0.112*** -0.188*** -0.0348 -0.115*** -0.113*** -0.0979*** -0.0863*** 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.021) (0.067) (0.008) (0.009) (0.022) (0.024) 
Non- Interest Income/Total 
Income 
0.271*** 0.244*** 0.375*** 0.0772 0.249*** 0.247*** 0.282*** 0.281*** 





















 Inflation  0.048***  0.027***  0.048***  0.036*** 
  (0.001)  (0.008)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Δ(House Price Index)  0.005***  0.005***  0.005***  0.007*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Real GDP growth  -0.016***  -0.023***  -0.016***  -0.019*** 
  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Δ(Oil Price Index)  0.174***  0.109**  0.174***  0.179*** 
  (0.002)  (0.049)  (0.002)  (0.005) 
Gvt long term yield  -0.086***  -0.047***  -0.087***  -0.060*** 
  (0.001)  (0.008)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
HHI  0.001***  0.001  0.001***  -0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
CB market share  0.061***  0.021     




















Assets×CB   0.001*** 0.001***     
   (0.001) (0.001)     
Equity/Assets×CB   -0.340*** -0.325     
   (0.067) (0.212)     
Net Loans/Assets×CB   0.010 -0.006     
   (0.016) (0.048)     
ROE×CB   -0.078*** -0.294**     
   (0.025) (0.139)     
Cost/ Income×CB   0.069*** -0.077     
   (0.022) (0.067)     
Non- Interest 
Income/Income×CB 
  -0.139*** 0.169**     
   (0.036) (0.079)     
Inflation×CB    0.020**     
    (0.008)     
Δ(House Price Index) × CB    -0.001     
    (0.001)     
Real GDP growth ×CB    0.006**     
    (0.002)     
Δ(Oil Price Index) × CB    0.065     
    (0.049)     
Gvt long term yield×CB    -0.039***     
    (0.008)     
HHI×CB    -0.001 
(0.001) 
    
    0.039     
CB market share×CB    (0.037)     
         
Constant 0.446*** 0.468*** 0.473*** 0.152*** 0.437*** 0.546*** 0.171*** -0.198** 
 State Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 Robust SEs YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 Adjusted R2 0.1629 0.1984 0.1631 0.1984 0.1677 0.1982 0.1668 0.1984 
 Observations 1,009,632 811,952 1,009,632 811,952 882,080 809,540 127,552 118,304 
 NOTES: Table presents regression results for credit risk. Assets are deflated using the GDP deflator following CB denotes the community bank dummy. The dependent variable is the 
credit risk proxy. All variables are lagged one quarter to mitigate endogeneity concerns. Inflation and GDP are lagged by 4 quarters. At each regression we include state and year fixed 
effects. In the first four columns all banks are included, in the fifth and sixth column we include only community banks and in the seventh and eighth column only non-community 






 Table 2.5: Regression results (Dependent variable  liquidity risk) 
  All banks Community Banks Non-Community Banks 










Community Bank 0.025*** 0.006** 0.175*** 0.057     
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.022) (0.050)     
Assets 0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Equity/Assets -0.248*** -0.339*** 0.221** -0.083 -0.355*** -0.349*** 0.415*** 0.392*** 
 (0.030) (0.034) (0.092) (0.208) (0.030) (0.034) (0.115) (0.120) 
Loan Loss 
Allowance/Total Loans 
-0.291*** -0.373*** 0.894*** -0.883* -0.489*** -0.293*** 0.733*** 0.647** 
 (0.090) (0.092) (0.254) (0.497) (0.092) (0.093) (0.270) (0.266) 
ROE 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.070*** -0.009 0.016*** 0.024*** 0.020 0.020 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.015) (0.040) (0.004) (0.004) (0.013) (0.012) 
Cost/ Income -0.124*** -0.127*** -0.083*** -0.129*** -0.138*** -0.127*** -0.136*** -0.106*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.021) (0.035) (0.006) (0.007) (0.020) (0.021) 
Non- Interest 
Income/Total Income 
0.272*** 0.251*** 0.265*** 0.355*** 0.237*** 0.254*** 0.390*** 0.421*** 





















 Inflation  0.001***  0.001  0.001***  0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Δ(House Price Index)  0.001***  0.001***  0.001***  0.001** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Real GDP growth  0.001*  -0.001  0.001  0.001*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Δ(Oil Price Index)  -0.001**  0.013  -0.001***  -0.003** 
  (0.001)  (0.021)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Gvt long term yield  0.001***  0.005*  0.001***  -0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
HHI  0.001***  0.001  0.001***  0.001*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
CB market share  0.068***  0.082***     




















Assets×CB   -0.001*** -0.001***     
   (0.001) (0.001)     
Equity/Assets×CB   -0.573*** -0.257     
   (0.094) (0.207)     
LoanLossAllowance 
/Loans×CB 
  -1.384*** 0.515     
   (0.264) (0.498)     
ROE×CB   -0.056*** 0.033     
   (0.016) (0.040)     
Cost/ Income×CB   -0.055** 0.001     
   (0.021) (0.035)     
Non-Interest 
Income/Income×CB 
  -0.001 -0.106*     
   (0.043) (0.058)     
Inflation×CB    -0.001     
    (0.003)     
Δ(House Price Index) 
×CB 
   0.001     
    (0.001)     
Real GDP growth ×CB    0.001     
    (0.001)     
Δ(Oil Price Index)×CB    -0.014     
    (0.021)     
Gvt long term 
yield×CB 
   -0.005     
    (0.003)     
HHI×CB    0.001     
    (0.001)     
CB market share×CB    -0.013     
     (0.015)     
 Constant 0.174*** -0.0449** 0.0593*** -0.109** 0.232*** 0.0685*** 0.377*** 0.205*** 
 State Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 Robust SEs YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 Adjusted R2 0.2699 0.3058 0.2723 0.3057 0.2990 0.3049 0.2349 0.2387 
 Observations 1,010,687 812,310 1,010,687 812,310 882,765 809,899 127,922 118,575 
 NOTES: Table presents regression results for liquidity risk. Assets are deflated using the GDP deflator following. CB denotes the community bank dummy. The dependent variable is the 
liquidity risk proxy. All variables are lagged one quarter to mitigate endogeneity concerns. Inflation and GDP are lagged by 4 quarters. At each regression we include state and year fixed 
effects. In the first four columns all banks are included, in the fifth and sixth column we include only community banks and in the seventh and eighth column only non-community banks. 






 Table 2.6: Regression results (Dependent variable alternative Z-score estimation) 
  All banks Community Banks Non-Community Banks 










Community Bank 0.013 0.017 0.218*** 0.276     
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.077) (0.247)     
Assets 0.001 -0.001 0.001** -0.001** -0.001 -0.001 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Equity/Assets 5.365*** 6.090*** 6.732*** 5.215*** 5.112*** 6.079*** 6.462*** 6.727*** 
 (0.083) (0.099) (0.208) (0.616) (0.089) (0.100) (0.238) (0.249) 
Loan Loss 
Allowance/Total Loans 
-13.890*** -14.770*** -14.670*** -8.9050*** -13.960*** -14.770*** -13.970*** -13.660*** 
 (0.281) (0.319) (0.656) (1.692) (0.310) (0.318) (0.696) (0.716) 
Net Loans/Total Assets -0.503*** -0.546*** -0.653*** -0.587*** -0.519*** -0.550*** -0.530*** -0.535*** 
 (0.018) (0.020) (0.046) (0.083) (0.019) (0.020) (0.050) (0.053) 
ROE 1.620*** 1.712*** 1.467*** 1.870*** 1.655*** 1.713*** 1.399*** 1.433*** 
 (0.022) (0.024) (0.058) (0.223) (0.024) (0.024) (0.056) (0.055) 
Cost/ Income 0.028 0.206*** 0.268*** 0.468** -0.004 0.206*** 0.004 0.058 
 (0.025) (0.031) (0.066) (0.209) (0.027) (0.031) (0.072) (0.076) 
Non- Interest 
Income/Total Income 
-0.587*** -0.551*** -0.824*** -0.748*** -0.564*** -0.550*** -0.682*** -0.709*** 





















 Inflation  0.009***  0.010***  0.009***  0.021*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Δ(House Price Index)  0.001***  0.001**  0.001***  -0.001* 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Real GDP growth  -0.008***  -0.006***  -0.008***  -0.003*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Δ(Oil Price Index)  0.001  0.134  0.001  0.012 
  (0.003)  (0.081)  (0.003)  (0.010) 
Gvt long term yield  0.025***  0.015  0.025***  -0.007** 
  (0.001)  (0.013)  (0.001)  (0.003) 
HHI  0.001***  -0.001  0.001***  0.001** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
CB market share  0.0497***  0.066     




















Assets×CB   -0.001 0.001     
   (0.001) (0.001)     
Equity/Assets×CB   -1.543*** 0.874     




  0.858 -5.842***     
   (0.713) (1.696)     
Net Loans/Assets×CB   0.169*** 0.040     
   (0.047) (0.082)     
ROE×CB   0.189*** -0.139     
   (0.063) (0.224)     
Cost/ Income×CB   -0.270*** -0.256     
   (0.068) (0.209)     
Non- Interest 
Income/Income×CB 
  0.284*** 0.200     
   (0.0898) (0.173)     
Inflation×CB    -0.021***     
    (0.001)     
Δ(House Price Index) × 
CB 
   -0.001***     
    (0.001)     
Real GDP growth ×CB    0.001***     
    (0.001)     
Δ(Oil Price Index) × CB    -0.132     
    (0.081)     
Gvt long term yield×CB    0.015     
    (0.013)     
HHI×CB    0.001**     
    (0.001)     
CB market share×CB    -0.013     
    (0.059)     
Constant 3.229*** 2.314*** 3.062*** 2.079*** 3.289*** 2.420*** 3.034*** 2.663*** 
 State Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 Robust SEs YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 Adjusted R2 0.2142 0.2295 0.2157 0.2296 0.2138 0.2298 0.2075 0.2057 
 Observations 1,010,677 812,309 1,010,677 812,309 882,762 809,898 127,915 118,571   
 NOTES: Table presents regression results for insolvnecy risk. Assets are deflated using the GDP deflator following Berger & Bouwman (2009). CB denotes the community bank 
dummy. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the z-score. All variables are lagged one quarter to mitigate endogeneity concerns. Inflation and GDP are lagged by 4 
quarters. At each regression we include state and year fixed effects. In the first four columns all banks are included, in the fifth and sixth column we include only community banks and 
in the seventh and eighth column only non-community banks. Bank-specific variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. ***, 





 Table 2.7: Regression results on loan specialty 
 Panel A: Dependent variable Z-score 
  All banks Community banks Non- Community Banks 
  Model I Model II Model III Model IV 























































































































    




    




    




    




    




    
 Constant 1.545*** 1.442*** 1.287*** 0.960*** 1.567*** 1.190*** 2.506*** 1.826*** 
 Bank specific YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 Macro specific NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
 State fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 Robust SEs YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 Adjusted R2 0.3295 0.3546 0.3302 0.3549 0.3458 0.3554 0.2146 0.2258 





 Table 2.7 (continued) 
 Panel B: Dependent variable Credit risk 
  All banks Community banks Non- Community Banks 
  Model I Model II Model III Model IV 























































































































    




    




    




    




    




    
 Constant 0.394*** 0.501*** 0.970*** 1.114*** 0.393*** 1.085*** 0.159*** 0.237*** 
 Bank specific YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 Macro specific NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
 State fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 Adjusted R2 0.1628 0.2008 0.1662 0.2030 0.1673 0.2003 0.1788 0.2225 




   
 Table 2.7 (continued) 
 Panel C: Dependent variable Liquidity risk 
  All banks Community banks Non- Community Banks 
  Model I Model II Model III Model IV 























































































































    




    




    




    




    




    
 Constant 0.0312*** -0.137*** -0.143*** -0.248*** 0.123*** -0.0152 0.146** -0.0272 
 Bank specific YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 Macro specific NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
 State fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 Adjusted R2 0.2996 0.3331 0.3089 0.3330 0.3254 0.3319 0.2921 0.3009 
 Observations 1,010,687 847,401 1,010,687 847,401 882,765 844,911 127,922 125,262 
NOTES: Table reports estimated coefficients and robust standard errors in brackets. Further control variables (not shown in the table) are: Community bank dummy, Assets, Equity/Assets, Loan Loss 
Allowance/Total Loans, Net Loans/Total Assets, ROE, Cost/Income, Non- Interest Income/Total Income, Inflation, Δ(House Price Index), Real GDP growth, Δ(Oil Price Index), Gvt long term yield, HHI, CB 
market share  ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level respectively; Assets is expressed in millions USD. CB denotes a community bank.  Inflation and GDP have been lagged by 4 







Table 2.8: Regression results for the performance of community banks during crises 
Dependent variable: Z-score  Dependent variable: Credit Risk  Dependent variable: Liquidity Risk 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
Crisis×CB 0.021  Crisis×CB 0.019  Crisis×CB 0.052** 
 (0.033)   (0.044)   (0.025) 
Assets×CB×Crisis -0.001*  Assets×CB×Crisis 0.001***  Assets×CB×Crisis 0.001*** 
 (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001) 
Equity/Assets×CB×Crisis -0.236**  Equity/Assets×CB×Crisis 0.345***  Equity/Assets×CB×Crisis 0.428*** 
 (0.110)   (0.112)   (0.097) 
Loan Loss Allowance/Total 
Loans×CB×Crisis 
0.495*  — —  Loan Loss Allowance/Total 
Loans×CB×Crisis 
-0.804*** 
 (0.296)      (0.305) 
Net Loans/Total Assets×CB×Crisis 0.041***  Net Loans/Total Assets×CB×Crisis -0.057**  — — 
 (0.013)   (0.024)    
ROE×CB×Crisis -0.001  ROE×CB×Crisis -0.066  ROE×CB×Crisis 0.010 
 (0.049)   (0.059)   (0.026) 
Cost/Income×CB×Crisis -0.007  Cost/Income×CB×Crisis -0.061  Cost/Income×CB×Crisis -0.006 
 (0.028)   (0.042)   (0.026) 
Non-Interest Income/Total 
Income×CB×Crisis 
-0.066**  Non-Interest Income/Total 
Income×CB×Crisis 
0.144***  Non-Interest Income/Total 
Income×CB×Crisis 
0.113*** 
 (0.029)   (0.053)   (0.043) 
Constant 1.383***   0.517***   0.0630*** 
Adjusted R2 0.3314   0.1645   0.2732 
State and Year fixed effects YES   YES   YES 
Robust SEs YES   YES   YES 
Observations 1,010,684   1,009,632   1,010,687 
NOTES: Table reports estimated coefficients and robust standard errors in brackets. Interactions with the crisis dummy variables are also included but not reported for 
brevity. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level respectively; Assets is expressed in millions USD. CB denotes a community bank. Coefficients 
of the bank-specific variables, the interactions of the bank-specific variables with the community bank dummy and the crisis dummy are included in the model but are not 





Table 2.9: 3SLS Model 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Insolvency Risk Credit Risk Liquidity Risk 
Insolvency Risk — -0.001*** -0.001***   
(0.001) (0.001) 




Liquidity Risk -0.278*** -0.012*** —  
(0.009) (0.001) 
 
Community Bank 0.048*** -0.001 -0.001  
(0.006) (0.001) (0.001) 
Assets 0.029*** 0.001*** -0.001***  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Equity/Assets 7.315*** -0.207*** -0.001  
(0.061) (0.009) (0.002) 




Net Loans/Total Assets 0.366*** 0.076*** —  
(0.013) (0.001) 
 
ROE — -0.993*** 0.057***   
(0.004) (0.001) 
Cost/Income -1.993*** -0.300*** 0.026***  
(0.016) (0.002) (0.001) 
Non-Interest Income/Total Income 0.930*** 0.192*** 0.020***  
(0.027) (0.004) (0.001) 
Constant 1.331*** 0.486*** -0.0129***  
(0.030) (0.005) (0.001) 
Observations 1,120,374 1,120,374 1,120,374 
Year Fixed Effects  YES YES YES 
R-squared 0.971 0.426 0.926 
Chi2 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Akaike's information criterion 1811072 
NOTES: Table reports   the regression results from a system of structural equations estimated via three-stage least squares. ***, 
**, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level respectively. Further control variables are the first four lags of the 
dependent variable (not shown in the table). Assets are deflated using the GDP deflator following Berger & Bouwman (2009). 




FDIC COMMUNITY BANK DEFINITION 
EXCLUDE: INCLUDE: 
Organizations with: Remaining organizations with: 
• 50% or more of their Assets within a 
specialty organization such as: 
o Credit card specialists 
o Consumer nonbank banks 
o Industrial loan companies 
o Trust companies 
o Banker’s banks 
• Loans/Assets > 33% 
• Core Deposits/Assets > 50% 
• At least one office but fewer than an 
indexed maximum number of offices* 
• Offices in no more than 3 states and no 
more than 2 large metropolitan areas 
• No single office with deposits above an 
indexed maximum deposit size* 
• Foreign assets ≥ 10% of Total assets • Total Assets < indexed size threshold* 
• No loans or no core deposits *Adjusted over time 
▪ The maximum number of offices 
was 40 in 1985 and 75 in 2010. 
▪ The maximum deposit size per 
branch was $1.25 billion in 1985 
and $5 billion in 2010. 
▪ The assets size threshold was 
$250 million in 1985 and $1 
billion in 2010. 
NOTES: Source: FDIC.  Aggregate charter-level data at banking organization level. If a banking organization 





DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES USED IN THE ANALYSIS 
Variable Definition Type 
Community Bank Binary variable, equals 1 for community banks; 0 
otherwise 
Qualitative 
Assets Logarithm of total assets Balance sheet 
Equity/Assets Ratio of equity capital to total assets Financial Ratio 
Loan Loss Allowance/Total 
Loans 
Ratio of loan loss allowance to total loans & leases Financial Ratio 
Net loans/Total Assets Ratio of Gross Loans minus Loan loss allowance 
minus unearned interest to total loans & leases 
Financial Ratio 
ROE Ratio of net income to equity capital Financial Ratio 
Cost/Income Ratio of operating expenses, the mail component of 
which is salaries to operating income plus interest 
income 
Financial Ratio 
Non- Interest Income/Total 
income 
Ratio of noninterest income to total operating income Financial Ratio 
Community bank Share Ratio of total loans held by Community banks to total 
banking loans per state and quarter 
Market Structure 
HHI Index Computed as the sum of squared market shares (in 
terms of total loans) per state and quarter 
Market Structure 
Agricultural Loans Ratio of agricultural loans to total assets Financial Ratio 
Commercial & Industrial Loans 
(C&I) 
Ratio of commercial & industrial loans to total assets Financial Ratio 
Commercial Real Estate Loans 
(CRE) 
Ratio of real estate loans to total assets Financial Ratio 
Construction & Development 
Loans (C&D) 
Ratio of loans for construction & land development 
to total assets 
Financial Ratio 
Loans to Individuals Ratio of loans to individuals to total assets Financial Ratio 
Residential Mortgages Ratio of mortgages secured by 1-4 family residential 
mortgages to total assets 
Financial Ratio 
Real GDP growth Quarterly growth of real gross domestic product  Macroeconomic 
Inflation Implicit price deflator, change period over period Macroeconomic 
Oil Price Index Quarterly growth of crude oil index Macroeconomic 
House Price Index House price index Macroeconomic 
Gvt. Long-Term Yield Long-term government bond yield Macroeconomic 
NOTES: Table displays names, definitions and types of the analyzed variables and ratios of the paper’s analyses. 
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Chapter 3 - The efficiency of US community banks 
 
3.1. Introduction 
During the 2007 global financial crisis alone, more than 500 US banks failed or received 
financial support to keep them afloat (Berger and Roman, 2015; Cornett et al., 2013). The vast 
majority of these banks had less than $10 billion in assets and are commonly referred to as 
“community banks”. The structural changes that the US banking sector has undergone as a 
result of increasing regulation, uncertainty, integration and financial innovation, have exposed 
community banks to increased competition (DeYoung et al., 2004). Is the traditional banking 
model of deposit-taking/loan-making, notably represented by the community banks on the 
brink of extinction? Or are these “die hard” community banks super-efficient in practicing 
traditional banking, thus able to stay in the game? The most recent research suggests that users 
of the traditional banking model are rewarded with a higher propensity to survive against their 
competitors (Chiorazzo et al., 2018). In this paper we capitalise on these recent findings and 
push further to investigate the efficiency differences that traditional banking model users enjoy, 
and how this may explain the enduring presence of the community banks. Ongoing changes in 
real economy and financial systems highlight the need to adapt regulation accordingly 
(Claessens, 2017). On the one hand, the increasing regulation is directly related with 
compliance costs that are a heavy burden on the smallest financial institutions. In particular, 
sophisticated yet complex in their construction, liquidity ratios mandated under Basel III are 
becoming the norm, while extra attention is devoted to a special class of financial institutions 
that are systemically important (SIFIs). On the other hand, despite the transformations that have 
characterised the US banking industry since the 1980s (i.e., failures, mergers and acquisitions, 
the shift in banking activities, the opening of interstate branching) and slashed the community 
banking sector by around 50 percent, community banks still account for the majority of 
financial institutions (Jacewitz and Kupiec, 2012). Indeed, community banks are the only 
banking option in many of the under-banked areas of the country (McKee and Kagan, 2018). 
Moreover, several measures are taken to reduce the ever-increasing regulatory burden of 
community banks, including simplifying capital requirements and postponing the most 
sophisticated of the Basel requirements, in light of the prominent role these banks play in their 
local economies (Bonilla et al., 2018). 
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Extant research has defined community banks using a single criterion: asset-size. Typically an 
upper limit of $1 billion in total assets has been used (Feng and Zhang, 2012), while more 
recently this has been raised to $10 billion to account for technological advances, inflation and 
the consolidation process (Bonilla et al., 2018; Chiorazzo et al., 2018).9 However, only defining 
community banks by a single asset size criterion has several drawbacks. First, community 
banks are traditional deposit-taking/loan-making financial institutions that abstain from 
complex financial derivative structures and other exotic investments and focus their operations 
to the real economy.10 They are, perhaps, best known for being proponents of “relationship 
lending” practices. Community bankers have an intimate knowledge and feel of the local 
community that gives them detailed, soft information on particular aspects of their customers, 
such as managerial skill and reputation. Central in the production and utilisation of soft 
information is the role of the loan officer, in part because the quality of soft information 
deteriorates when transmitted within the financial institution (Becker and Murphy, 1992; 
Garicano, 2000; Radner, 1993). Because of the complexity entailed in handling soft 
information, larger and typically non-community banks focus on hard information only (e.g., 
financial statement lending, fixed asset lending, credit scoring), which can be both easily 
processed within computer systems and outsourced. Yet, computer-generated credit reports 
may be overlooked at particular occasions, and more emphasis placed on soft information; thus, 
affecting loan decisions in a community bank (Liberti and Petersen, 2019). Hence, community 
banks have more flexibility in their decision making that may give them an advantage in 
particular lines of business such as agricultural and small-business loans.11 Due to the 
differences in the lending technology, community banks may be more likely to maintain such 




9 It has been argued that economies of scale are of little importance to the community banking model 
specifics, with the optimal bank size in the region of only $100-$500 million (Jacewitz and Kupiec, 
2012). 
10 For example, only 10% of the US banks with assets between $100 million and $1 billion (i.e., 
community) used interest rate derivatives (Carter and Sinkey, 1998).  
11 Community banks provide the majority of financing in these categories. Agricultural lending requires 
knowledge of farming, often very specific to the region, to the farm or to the farmer, and a longer-term 
perspective as agricultural cycles are fairly long. Relationship lending practices are more relevant in 
financing of start-up and/or small-businesses where proven track records and collateralizable assets may 
be hard to come by (Avery and Samolyk, 2004; Holod and Torna, 2018). Real estate lending, 
particularly for housing, is another business where knowledge of local conditions and borrowers is 
necessary.  
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Second, on the funding side community banks are likely to instil a certain loyalty to their 
depositors who may be less willing to shift to another bank12, even if their remuneration is 
below the market rate, as depositors may be attracting a kind of “emotional dividend” from this 
banking relationship.13 By contrast, non-community banks have ready access to capital 
markets, rely largely on fee-based income (e.g., securities brokerage, investment banking, 
consultancy, underwriting), and operate on the basis of a high volume-transactions based 
banking model.  
Third, it does not capture differences in the geographic scope of operations. Increased 
geographical distance between firm and bank decreases the likelihood of lending, which is 
particularly relevant within small business financing (Brevoort et al., 2006; Degryse and 
Ongena, 2004). Yet research shows that specialised banks may command a certain degree of 
protection against geographical distance, with customers willing to go that extra mile for peace 
of mind (Beck et al., 2019).  
Fourth, as community banks are often the only banking option outside metropolitan areas they 
may be better suited to earn high monopoly rents, which can reduce bank risk taking (Keeley, 
1990). As far as community banks are not perceived as financially/systemically important they 
would be less likely to receive too-big-to-fail type of support that may potentially limit their 
risk taking. However, as they are perceived as economically important for the regions in which 
they operate, they enjoy preferential access to emergency lending facilities.14  
Fifth, a single size asset criterion used across a long time span may not properly account for 
factors such as inflation, economic growth or the size of the banking industry at every point in 
time. Moreover, bank-type rigidities, differences in adaptation rates to economic environment 
changes, different goals and priorities can have diverse effects on financial aspects of the two 
bank types (Kroszner and Strahan, 2014). Consequently, community and non-community 
 
 
12 Other alternative banking models are known to instil a particular behaviour in their clients, which has 
been linked with lower loan default rates (Baele et al., 2014) and loyalty (Beck et al., 2019). 
13 The fact that investors appreciate attributes outside the risk/return dogma, such as social ones is not 
new – see for example Riedl and Smeets (2017) and references therein. 
14 Ashcraft et al. (2010) present evidence on the role of the Federal Housing Lending Bank (FHLB) in 
providing liquidity during the global financial crisis both for small and large banks. Banks can opt for 
FHLB membership and community banks receive certain exemptions on the membership requirements 
(e.g., a 10 percent rule on residential mortgage loans) 
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banks share very different business models making it important to comprehensively control for 
these differences.  
To capture the differences in the business models of the two bank types the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) proposed a new research definition for community banks. This 
definition goes beyond the single size criterion and captures differences associated with the 
geographic scope of operations, the access to capital markets, too big to fail subsidies, lending 
opportunities and lending technology between community and non-community banks. Thus, 
an array of business model criteria can drive differences in the outcomes. As far as we are 
aware this is the first study to make use of this new definition to capture the differences in the 
business model of community and non-community banks.15 
Building upon this argument, in this study we focus on the business model used by US 
community banks and compare cost efficiency of community and non-community banks. 
Banking efficiency studies have long been of interest to a variety of stakeholders.16 At a macro 
level, there is some evidence that economic growth is significantly and positively related to 
banking sector efficiency (Berger et al., 2004). At a micro level, efficiency studies can provide 
benchmarking information that will be of interest to bank managers and policy makers in order 
to improve banks’ performance. Our approach relies on the Kumbhakar et al. (2014) model, 
which accounts for unobserved heterogeneity at the bank-level, thereby avoiding the 
confounding of latent heterogeneity with efficiency. We innovate methodologically by 
decomposing the cost efficiency into a persistent and a residual component. The cost efficiency 
decomposition is important by allowing persistent efficiency to reflect market structure, 
regulatory and supervisory changes across our long observation period, while the residual 
efficiency captures the usual managerial performance.17 In addition, we explore the bank 
 
 
15 Chiorazzo et al. (2018) construct a traditional index variable that is similar to the FDIC approach. 
However, they compare survival probabilities within a community bank sub-sample (i.e., all banks are 
below $10 billion). 
16 The number of citations to Berger and Humphrey (1992) and Berger and Mester (1997), two seminal 
reviews on banking efficiency, are around 4,200 and 2,600 respectively. 
17 In terms of regulatory changes across our long observation period there are subperiods prior to the 
Basel Accord, and subperiods when the Basel I/II is in place. An alternative approach of splitting the 
sample is challenging in terms of identifying which regulation is applicable at each point in time to the 
community banks given their preferred treatment by the Fed, so as to come up with comparable samples 
of community and non-community banks. For instance, the capital requirements imposed by Basel II 
stopped being applied to community banks after the Federal Reserve’s proclamation that only the largest 
US banks would be subject to Basel II and community banks would be subject to Basel I. 
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specific, macroeconomic and market structure factors that explain differences in the bank 
efficiency between the two bank types. Disentangling between persistent and residual 
efficiency and thus identifying the sources of efficiency for US banks can help to select the 
appropriate course of action. This is important in cases of long time periods, as changes in 
regulation and market structure typically follow long cycles. Low persistent efficiency may 
arise from the presence of structural and/or regulatory issues affecting the bank. Enhancing 
persistent efficiency follows from structural changes in overall banking management practices 
(i.e., structural reforms) or in the environment where it operates (i.e., government policy or 
regulatory changes). By contrast, low residual efficiency arises from time-varying factors, such 
as temporary changes in the economic environment. This type of efficiency is more of a 
concern at the individual bank-level as it can be increased with short-term adjustments or 
temporary policy measures.  
Our findings reveal that community banks are more cost efficient than their non-community 
counterparts in terms of overall efficiency and both its components. Community banks have 
consistently outperformed non-community by 4.91% in overall efficiency, 0.69% in residual 
efficiency and 4.92% in persistent efficiency across the time span of the study. The managerial 
skills reflected in residual efficiency are significantly higher in community banks, with the gap 
to non-community banks closing prior to periods of crisis; possibly reflecting that non-
community banks are more susceptible to cost “skimping” behaviour (Berger and DeYoung, 
1997). The substantial difference and gradual rise of persistent efficiency for community banks 
over time is traced to bank- specific developments in the sector, such as the Fed imposing less 
stringent capital and regulatory requirements for these banks. With regards to key determinants 
of efficiency we find a negative link between bank size and cost efficiency, with the magnitude 
being stronger for community banks suggesting that these banks perform better when they are 
small in size. Non-community banks that are part of a bank holding company exhibit higher 
cost efficiency, which is linked to the shared economies of scale and scope. By contrast, 
community banks that participate in bank holding companies exhibit lower cost efficiency, 
which is plausibly related to the different objectives these banks may be forced to pursue 
therein. Higher liquidity creation is associated with lower cost efficiency for the community 
banks; however, the two output measures are positively related for the non-community banks. 
Financial institutions may maximise cost efficiency for reasons related to combat increasing 
competition, capitalisation requirements and performance. By contrast, pursuing a strategy that 
maximises liquidity creation may be more desirable as it would be channelling more funds into 
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the real economy. An implication of our results is that any regulation should take into account 
the liquidity creation measure besides cost efficiency particularly for community banks. 
Inflation has a significant effect only for community banks, suggesting that fluctuations in the 
economic activity affect community banks’ efficiency. We repeat our analysis with sample 
splits based on asset size and financial stability, and our result of higher cost efficiency for 
community banks remains robust, with the large community banks driving the difference. 
Further, a positive relation between capitalisation and efficiency is documented for the 
community banks across both size and risk splits, suggesting that moral hazard behaviour is 
minimal in these banks. Our results are robust to an alternative specification of cost efficiency, 
two matching techniques (i.e., k-means nearest neighbour matching and propensity score 
matching) and different classification of the community banks. The results also hold when we 
split our sample in four different supervisory regimes that our sample covers. 
Our study offers three key contributions to the comparative community and non-community 
banking literature and the banking efficiency literature. First, the comparative efficiency 
literature for US community and non-community banks has not comprehensively accounted 
for the distinct traditional business model in defining community banks. Feng and Zhang 
(2012) define community banks purely by size, using a $1 billion in assets threshold, while 
other thresholds have also been used. However, a community bank based on the FDIC 
definition could be much larger and/or substantially different in operations. Effectively some 
banks that are classified as community banks under the FDIC are not part of the sample in 
earlier studies, which limits the generalisation of their findings to the specific business model 
of relationship lending that community banks practice. Second, we contribute to the US 
banking efficiency literature by offering the first study to decompose cost efficiency into 
persistent and residual. Thus, we can disentangle cost efficiency differences related to 
policy/regulatory/structural changes from managerial capabilities. Most importantly, the 
decomposition corrects the efficiency estimates for regulatory differences; hence allows us to 
use a long time span. Third, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that investigates 
the impact of liquidity creation, credit and liquidity risk on cost efficiency. Liquidity creation 
may be viewed as an alternative output of a financial institution and has been argued to be 
beneficial to the economy as it allows banks to divert funding to productive uses (Berger and 
Bouwman, 2009). By investigating in detail the relationship between cost efficiency, credit and 
liquidity risk in community banks we address the research gap identified by the Fed with 
regards to the regulatory challenges of these institutions (Bonilla et al., 2018).  
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The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 discusses the related literature. 
Section 3.3 presents the methodology used in this study. Section 3.4 describes our data. Section 
3.5 presents the results on efficiency estimates. We test the robustness of our results in section 
3.6. Finally, section 3.7 concludes the paper. 
3.2 Related Literature 
The regulatory changes (e.g., the removal of interstate branching restrictions with the 1994 
Riegle-Neal Act), macroeconomic cycles and technological innovations have spurred academic 
interest in efficiency studies over a changing US banking sector (Berger et al., 1995; Berger 
and DeYoung, 1997; Evanoff and Ors, 2008).18 The importance of the consolidation in the US 
banking sector is apparent in the studies dealing with the efficiency of such institutions over 
the past few decades. The 1980s consolidation wave showed no efficiency gains for the 
acquirer banks, while little such gains were evidenced for the acquiring banks (Peristiani, 
1997). This may be partially explained by the fact that US banks appear to operate in the 
optimal size with regards to scale economies (Rangan et al., 1988). Yet, there is evidence that 
efficiency increases with bank size, albeit at a decreasing rate, which may act as a catalyst 
towards more consolidation, but at the same time suggests that past a certain bank size, 
efficiency gains may be negative (Miller and Noulas, 1996). Technological progress that had 
been ongoing since the mid-1980s gave large banks an advantage over the competition as they 
could increase quantity and quality of offered services (Berger and Udell, 2002; Elyasiani and 
Mehdian, 1990). Around this time important is the inclusion of non-traditional activities as an 
output in the examination of bank efficiency, which had started to become more prominent 
(Rogers, 1998). It may be plausible that consolidation at this time helped to remove some of 
the operational inefficiencies (e.g., regulatory rigidities and market structure) that banks were 
facing (Berger and Humphrey, 1991). The importance of efficiency to the regulators is 
highlighted in the seminal paper of Eisenbeis et al. (1999) that documents a strong correlation 
between efficiency and risk taking at the bank level. The study of Altunbas et al. (2007) further 
suggests that regulators should calibrate the control mechanism so as to take into account the 
efficiency of individual banks. 
 
 
18 Other studies have investigated the impact of this deregulation process on bank risk (Beck et al., 
2010; Goetz, 2018; Goetz et al., 2016; Jiang et al., 2017). 
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Several studies within the banking efficiency literature have compared the efficiency of banks 
operating under different ownership statuses, and the majority of the results suggest that state-
owned banks exhibit lower efficiency scores compared to foreign and/or private banks across 
both developed and developing economies, such as the US (Mahajan et al., 1996), Australia 
(Sturm and Williams, 2004), Spain (Garcia-Cestona and Surroca, 2008), Turkey (Isik and 
Hassan, 2003), China (Ariff and Can, 2008; Fungáčová et al., 2020) and Taiwan (Chen and 
Yeh, 1998). Only a few studies contradict this result. For example, DeYoung and Nolle (1996) 
compare foreign-owned to local-owned banks in the US during the 1985-1990 period finding 
the latter to exhibit higher efficiency. Hauner (2005) finds German and Austrian state-owned 
banks to be more cost efficient than private banks. The German banking system is known for 
its uniqueness as government involvement ensures that banks are oriented towards boosting 
the local and national economy, instead of being purely profit-driven (Behr and Schmidt, 
2015). In addition, German universal banks would traditionally offer commercial and 
investment products under one roof, and also maintain close ties with their largest clients (e.g., 
house-banks) often through cross-board membership (Elsas and Krahnen, 2003).19 By contrast, 
it has been argued that US banks are largely profit-driven and plausibly face significant 
shareholder pressure to eliminate inefficiencies, which may in part explain the higher efficiency 
of the US-local banks compared to foreign ones (Altunbas et al., 2007). 
A number of studies has also investigated the banking efficiency across the stages of European 
market integration with mixed findings (Casu and Girardone, 2010; Casu and Molyneux, 2003; 
Lozano-Vivas et al., 2002). Another strand of research in the banking efficiency literature 
examine the efficiency based on the nature of the bank; whether it is small or large, specialized 
or diversified, retail or wholesale (Kwan, 2006). For example, comparison of cost and profit 
efficiency of financial conglomerates and universal banks in Europe suggests that the universal 
banks outperform other bank types (Vennet, 1998). Other studies have assessed the 
performance of Islamic versus conventional banks where the restrictions of the business model 
in the former adversely impact their efficiency (Johnes et al., 2014). 
Although banking efficiency in the US has attracted significant academic attention, little 
research focuses in community banks even though the variations between the two business 
 
 
19 The dominant view is that government involvement in banking leads to inefficiencies due to agency 
problems, corruption and fraud (Carvalho, 2014; La Porta et al., 2002). 
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models could suggest significant differences.20 Indeed, the relative performance of community 
and non-community banks has evolved differently over time (Hassan and Hippler, 2015). Cole 
et al. (2004) provide evidence for organizational and operational differences between small and 
large banks ($1 billion or more in assets) with respect to lending. Large banks rely on hard 
information- based production technologies whereas small banks tend to rely on soft 
information-based production technologies and they are often opaque in terms of quantifiable 
information. For these businesses the relationship lending approach employed by community 
banks is their main way to get access to credit. In terms of real effects, during periods of crisis, 
banks that have stronger lending relationships with firms, offer them more favourable 
continuation conditions and those terms translate into stronger investment and employment 
growth for the firms (Banerjee et al., 2017). Relationship lending is a key attribute of 
community banks as the agency problem is more easily resolved by this bank type (Berger and 
Udell, 2002). Similarly, Berger et al. (2005) suggest that small banks exploit an advantage in 
soft information production. This advantage may be traced to the incentives that loan officers 
in such institutions obtain by being able to control and oversee the whole information collection 
and loan generation and monitoring process (Liberti and Mian, 2008; Stein, 2002).  
Feng and Zhang (2012) compare the productivity and efficiency of large banks and community 
banks in the US over the period 1997 to 2006 by estimating a Bayesian true random effects 
stochastic distance frontier analysis. Their results indicate higher productivity growth for large 
banks compared to community banks since this bank group has experienced much higher 
technical change. They also find that large banks and large community banks exhibit constant 
returns to scale whereas small community banks exhibit decreasing returns to scale, suggesting 
that large community banks and non-community banks have been operating at optimal scales, 
whereas small community banks have not. However, in their analysis they classify community 
banks as those with assets less than $1 billion so any difference in efficiency performance is 
really size difference, rather that business model difference. McKee and Kagan (2018) measure 
the technical efficiency only for community banks and distinguish between small and other 
community banks; again relying solely on asset size for these classifications. Their findings 
suggest that in these banks the efficiency is inversely related to the bank size, while key drivers 
 
 
20 Virtually no research exists that compares the community banks that rely on the traditional bank 
business lending model to their counterparts. That is, the majority of the studies arbitrarily define 
community banks as the smallest of banking institutions.  
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of efficiency are capitalisation, liquidity and credit risk. Chiorazzo et al. (2018) focus on 
community banks (i.e., banks with $10 billion or less) and find that those with a more 
traditional banking model exhibit high survival probabilities. 
 
3.3 Methodology 
Efficiency can be measured either by using traditional financial ratio analysis (FRA) or by 
frontier estimation methods. A drawback of financial ratios is that they do not take into 
consideration the input prices and the output mix and weights of the ratios are selected 
subjectively (Berger and Humphrey, 1992). Within frontier estimation methods a bank’s 
observed production point is compared with a production frontier that denotes best practice, 
with data envelopment analysis (DEA) and stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) being the two 
principal methods used to estimate the production frontier. Contrary to FRA, the frontier 
techniques produce an objectively determined efficiency score and accommodate multiple 
inputs/outputs; thus being better suited to capture the activities of a complex financial 
institution (Thanassoulis et al., 1996). Central to efficiency studies is the type of the production 
function, with the majority of studies opting for an intermediary role of the bank, which 
assumes they act like a wedge between fund surplus and deficit units (Sealey and Lindley, 
1977). Technical efficiency is associated with the bank’s ability to obtain maximum output 
with a given set of inputs, allocative efficiency is associated with the bank’s ability to use the 
optimal inputs mix given their prices, whereas cost efficiency is the product of technical and 
allocative efficiency.21  
Stochastic Frontier Analysis is particularly well suited to deal with panel data and allows for 
stochastic errors. A pertinent issue within SFA analysis has been on an appropriate formulation 
that would on the one hand control for unobserved firm-effects, but on the other hand not 
confound them with the efficiency estimate. Some models allowed the decomposition of 
efficiency into two components – a persistent and a residual (Kumbhakar and Heshmati, 1995). 
However, the unobserved fixed effects were confounded with the persistent, but not the residual 
 
 
21 Both technical and cost efficiency measures have been central to several papers (Altunbas et al., 2007; 
Berger and DeYoung, 1997; Casu and Girardone, 2010; Drake et al., 2006; Lozano-Vivas et al., 2001; 
Mamatzakis et al., 2015).  
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efficiency. The Kumbhakar et al. (2014) model decomposes the unobserved fixed effects from 
the persistent efficiency, while maintaining the residual efficiency component of the earlier 
models. This essentially allows for a persistent component of efficiency that affects all banks 
in the sample, while a residual component identifies deficiencies in specific banks. As such, 
the persistent efficiency is associated with factors that are relatively constant over short time 
spans, such as structural inflexibilities or regulatory restrictions. The residual component 
reflects the usual managerial efficiency. However, it allows a bank’s efficiency to adjust over 
time as the bank may eradicate some of the short-term rigidities. Bank heterogeneity, which 
could be due to different business models and practices, is captured by the firm effects. The 
model has been adopted by several studies, although not for the US banking sector (Badunenko 
and Kumbhakar, 2017; Fungáčová et al., 2020; Kumbhakar and Tsionas, 2016). 
3.3.1 Cost efficiency estimation 
To obtain estimates of cost efficiency we adopt the Kumbhakar et al. (2014) model for three 
reasons. First, it takes into account the panel nature of the dataset. Second, by including random 
effects it accounts for unobserved heterogeneity at the bank-level, thereby avoids the 
confounding of latent heterogeneity with efficiency. Third, the model decomposes cost 
efficiency into a persistent and a residual component. Persistent efficiency may be attributed 
to factors that remain relatively constant on a short time- period, such as regulatory changes, 
structural rigidities, and business/management practices. These are factors that need to be 
accounted for when long time periods are concerned. Additionally, due to the closeness of 
community banks to the local community they may be pursuing goals outside the strict profit-
maximisation/cost-minimisation dogma. Residual efficiency captures the time-varying 
efficiency that is specific at the bank level.   
We start with a standard cost function that in a panel data specification may be specified as: 
 ln 𝑐𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0
∗ + 𝑓 (𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑤𝑖𝑡;  𝛽) + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡 
 
(3.1) 
where 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁 denotes the bank and 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇𝑖 denotes the time period during which bank 
𝑖 is observed, 𝑐𝑖𝑡 are the total costs, 𝑦𝑖𝑡 the vector of outputs, 𝑤𝑖𝑡 the vector of input prices, 
𝑓(·) the cost function, 𝛼𝑖 is the random effect for bank 𝑖 and 𝑖𝑡 is the stochastic error term for 
bank 𝑖 at time 𝑡. In addition, the following quantities are defined:  
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the constant is 𝛼0
∗ =  𝛼0 − 𝐸( 𝑖) − 𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡); the 𝛼𝑖 = 𝜇 − 𝑖 + 𝐸( 𝑖);  and the 𝑖𝑡 = 𝜈𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡 +
𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡). This ensures that 𝛼𝑖 and 𝑖𝑡 have zero mean and constant variance.  
The Kumbhakar et al. (2014) model splits the error term into four components, taking this way 
into account different factors affecting the output given the inputs. The first component is 
firm’s latent heterogeneity which is disentangled from the inefficiency effects, the second 
captures time-varying inefficiency, the third is time invariant inefficiency and the last 
component captures random shocks. The model may be rewritten as: 
 ln 𝑐𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝑓 (𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑤𝑖𝑡;  𝛽) + 𝜇𝑖+𝜈𝑖𝑡 − 𝑖 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
 
(3.2) 
This model has four components, 𝑖 > 0 and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 > 0 are inefficiency and 𝜇𝑖 and 𝜈𝑖𝑡 are bank 
random effects and noise respectively.  
To estimate the model in (3.2) we follow the three-step procedure. In the first step a standard 
panel random effects regression is used to estimate ?̂? from equation (3.1) and the predicted 
values ?̂?𝑖 and ?̂?𝑡. In the second step estimates of time-varying cost efficiency (𝑢𝑖𝑡) are obtained 
via a standard SFA on 𝑖𝑡 of step 1. Specifically, we estimate the equation outlined below as a 




 𝑖𝑡 = 𝜈𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡)  
 
(3.3) 
This step gives prediction of the time-varying residual cost inefficiency components û𝑖𝑡. In 
step 3 estimates of the persistent cost efficiency 𝑖 are obtained via a standard SFA on 𝛼𝑖 of 





 𝛼𝑖 = 𝜇𝑖𝑡 − 𝑖 + 𝐸( 𝑖) 
 
(3.4) 
Finally, the overall cost efficiency is calculated as the product of persistent and residual cost 
efficiency, namely: 𝑂𝐶𝐸 =  𝑃𝐶𝐸 × 𝑅𝐶𝐸. For the cost function we adopt the following 





































𝜇𝑖+𝜈𝑖𝑡 − 𝑖 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
 
(3.5) 
This model builds upon previous panel data models in numerous ways. First, it captures factors 
with permanent effects on efficiency by including the persistent component. Second, previous 
models assume that a firm’s efficiency at any particular point in time does not depend on its 
previous level of efficiency. However, some factors affecting efficiency can stay with the firm 
over the long run while others can be removed in the short run. These are captured by the 
residual component and the persistent component. Third, it improves upon previous models 
(Chen et al., 2014) by distinguishing between firm heterogeneity and long-run inefficiency 
(Kumbhakar et al., 2015). We include time dummies to capture technological progress and 
varying business cycle conditions. We estimate a pooled frontier to ensure a level playing field 
for both banks types, since both banks operate in the same market and compete for the same 
clients. 
3.3.2 Second-stage regression 
In a second stage we explore the determinants of cost efficiency in community and non-
community banks. To do so we regress cost efficiency on a set of bank-specific, market-
structure and macroeconomic variables. Using the overall cost efficiency measures derived 
from the previous stage as the dependent variable, we then estimate the following equation:  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐶𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝛸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝛭𝑖𝑡 + 𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝐶𝐵𝑖𝑡 × 𝛸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆𝐶𝐵𝑖𝑡 × 𝛭𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝐶𝐵𝑖𝑡 × 𝑍𝑖𝑡
+ 𝑖𝑡 
(3.6) 
where i indexes banks, and t indexes the time period. The dependent variable, y is the overall 
cost efficiency score derived from the first step. 𝐶𝐵𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable that takes the value 
of 1 if the bank is a community bank at time t and 0 otherwise. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a matrix of bank-specific 
independent variables; 𝑀𝑖𝑡 is a matrix of variables capturing the market structure; 𝑍𝑖𝑡 is a vector 
of variables that capture the macroeconomic environment; 𝐶𝐵𝑖𝑡× 𝑋𝑖𝑡  is the interaction between 
bank-specific variables and the community bank dummy; 𝐶𝐵𝑖𝑡× 𝑀𝑖𝑡 is the interaction between 
macroeconomic variables and the community bank dummy; 𝐶𝐵𝑖𝑡 × 𝑍𝑖𝑡 is the interaction of the 
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community bank dummy and the economic environment variables; 𝑖𝑡 is an idiosyncratic error 
term.  
We estimate equation 3.6 using Tobit regression and we include state and time fixed effects. 
The use of Tobit is appropriate due to the fact that efficiency scores are bounded between zero 
and one, so the use of a limited dependent variable model is required. Huber/White standard 
errors and covariances are calculated to account for heteroscedasticity. The sign of the 
coefficients indicates the direction of the influence. We allow for two formulations of the 
model, hereafter referred to as Models I and II, with the first controlling for bank-level 
characteristics while the second adding market structure and macroeconomic variables. Both 
models are fitted on all banks, using a community bank intercept and slope dummies, and 
separately on community and non-community banks.  
 
3.4 Data and variables 
3.4.1 Data sources, inputs and outputs definitions 
We use quarterly data starting from 1984Q1 to 2013Q4, extracted from the Call Reports of US 
banks. The Community bank dummy is taken from the FDIC and is matched to the Call Reports 
using the FDIC certificate number, which uniquely identifies every bank in our sample. By the 
FDIC classification, the focus of a community bank is upon traditional activities, most 
obviously that of making loans and taking deposits. A community bank must have respectively 
33% and 50% or more of its assets within Loans/Assets and Core Deposits/Assets ratios. A 
community bank cannot hold 50% or more of its assets with specialty organizations, such as 
credit card specialists, industrial loan companies and trust companies; it cannot be a bankers’ 
bank; and it cannot hold 10% or more of its assets in foreign offices. A community bank’s 
offices must be located in no more than three states and two large metropolitan areas; and the 
activity of any given branch is constrained by a time-adjusted upper limit of deposits.22 We 
exclude those banks where no data are available for the efficiency estimation. We include banks 
with a minimum of 3 years of information in line with Beck et al. (2013a). Our combined 
 
 
22 The full FDIC Community bank definition is given in the appendix table A3.1. 
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dataset is an unbalanced panel dataset consisting of 20,099 banks and over one million bank-
quarter observations.  
We assume the banks act as intermediaries between fund surplus and deficit units and assumed 
to produce loans (y1) and securities (y2) that constitute the outputs. The input variables are the 
price of labour (p1) defined as the salaries and employee benefits over the number of full-time 
equivalent employees, the price of capital (p2) defined as expenses on premises and fixed assets 
over premises and fixed assets and the price of funds (p3) defined as total interest expenses 
over total deposits. We define total cost as the sum of total interest expense and total non-
interest expense.23 All monetary variables have been deflated using the GDP deflator.  
Table 3.1 summarises the main descriptive statistics for the input and output variables used in 
the analysis, for the full sample (Panel A), community banks (Panel B) and non-community 
banks (Panel C). Differences in the choices of input mix are reported between the two bank 
types. The average price of labour takes the value of 23.892 for community banks and 25.212 
for non-community. The average price of capital takes the value of 0.269 for community banks 
and the value of 0.559 for non-community banks. Referring to the output prices, the average 
values for both outputs are significantly higher for non-community banks, with the average 
price of loans being 31 times larger for non-community banks and the average price of 
securities 22 times larger for non-community.  
[Table 3.1 around here] 
3.4.2 Second-stage variables 
We investigate the determinants of community banks’ efficiency in a second-stage analysis24. 
We employ both bank-specific, market structure and macroeconomic variables. Specifically, 
we include the natural logarithm of bank assets to account for bank size differences as 
community and non-community banks are significantly different in terms of size. Research so 
far has found inconclusive results on the relationship between bank size and efficiency, so no 
a priori hypothesis is formed (Bonin et al., 2005; Hauner, 2005; Kwan, 2006). Large banks 
 
 
23 The choice of input and output variables is in line with the literature in this field (Casu and Girardone, 
2010; Casu and Molyneux, 2003; Drake et al., 2006; Fukuyama and Matousek, 2017; Johnes et al., 
2014; Matousek et al., 2015). 
24 We include in our analysis explicitly banks with more than three years of data. Hence, the minimum 
number of years that a bank exists in our sample is 3 and the maximum is 30.   
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may exhibit superior cost efficiency because they exploit economies of scale and scope. Small 
banks may be more flexible in their operations; hence more cost efficient. The link between 
efficiency and bank size is also argued to be non-linear in alternative types of banks. For 
example, Johnes et al. (2014) find that Islamic banks outperform their conventional 
counterparts in terms of efficiency when they are small, but once they grow past a certain size, 
differences are no longer significant. 
We proxy for the bank’s funding mix by including the ratio of total deposits to total assets. 
Deposits are a central component of the traditional banking model. Community banks are 
particularly reliant on deposits due to their local operations, size and limited financial expertise. 
Relatedly, Kwan (2006) finds a negative relationship between technical efficiency and deposit 
to assets, but the relationship is significant only for small banks.  
To account for differences in assets quality we include the ratio of loan loss allowance to gross 
loans. The quality of a bank’s loan portfolio may affect bank performance. Banks that provide 
more loans are exposed more heavily to credit risk, thus an inverse relationship between this 
variable and efficiency is expected. To proxy credit risk we use the respective measure of 
Imbierowicz and Rauch (2014). The credit risk proxy measures the unexpected loan default 
ratio of the bank and is calculated by dividing the average net loan losses (loan charge-offs 
minus loan recoveries) in the current year by the average loan loss allowance in the previous 
year. This measure captures the current riskiness of a bank’s loan portfolio and the ability of 
the bank’s risk management to anticipate near-term future loan losses. High values of the credit 
risk ratio suggest high credit risk for the particular bank; thus we expect a negative relationship 
between this variable and efficiency. 
As common for banking studies we measure capitalization by equity to assets. We expect a 
positive relationship between capitalization and efficiency because lower capital could lead to 
higher risk-taking and greater leverage, thus lower efficiency (Casu and Molyneux, 2003). To 
proxy for liquidity risk we use the respective measure of Imbierowicz and Rauch (2014). The 
intuition behind this ratio is that in case of sudden withdrawals from the bank, the full volume 
of liabilities may not be liquidated at short notice and/or without substantial cost. Hence the 
liquidity risk variable subtracts the volume of all assets that the bank can at short-time and low-
cost turn into cash from the volume of liabilities that can be withdrawn from the bank on short 
notice. It takes into account the bank’s exposure to the interbank lending market and derivatives 
market as well as off-balance sheet liquidity risk positions though, for example, unused loan 
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commitments. The ratio is standardised by total assets with higher values of the liquidity risk 
ratio indicating a bank that is in worse situation to meet unexpected liquidity demand. 
Profitability is proxied by the return on equity (ROE) ratio. More efficient banks earn higher 
profits so we expect a positive relationship between this variable and efficiency (Mester, 1996).  
To proxy financial stability, we employ the z-score that is commonly used in the banking 
literature, see for example Laeven and Levine (2009). In principle the z-score calculates the 
number of standard deviations that the bank’s return on assets (ROA) must fall below its mean 
in order to deplete equity. The z-score increases with higher profitability and capitalization 
levels and decreases with volatile earnings. Therefore, high values of the z-score indicate more 
financially stable banks and thus we expect a positive link between this variable and efficiency. 
In our study we use the Hesse and Cihak (2007) variant, where the z-score considers only the 
last period value for the Equity/Assets and the ROA, while it computes 𝜎(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝛵) over the 
whole sample period. As the z-score exhibits high skewness we use the natural logarithm 
transformation, in line with Laeven and Levine (2009).25  
The cost to income ratio is often regarded as a proxy for cost efficiency, alternative to the 
frontier estimation techniques, with a key characteristic being that the ratio relies solely on 
income statement information.26 Consequently, cost to income is expected to be negatively 
related to cost efficiency, as high values of the ratio denote a more inefficient bank.27  
Cost efficiency has been a well-established measure of bank performance, capable of capturing 
the complex structure of financial institutions. However, cost efficiency does not take into 
account the liquidity transformation process in which a financial institution engages, whereby 
transforming liabilities to assets. The liquidity creation measure (Berger and Bouwman, 2009) 
may, therefore, be viewed as an alternative output measure that acknowledged this important 
process of a financial institution. Berger and Bouwman (2015) argue that two equally sized 
financial institutions may have different priorities; one directing its output towards securities, 
the other towards loans. The liquidity creation measure would favour the latter due to the fact 
 
 
25 In practice, there are several alternative definitions of the z-score, see Mare et al. (2017) for a 
comprehensive review. As a robustness we compute alternative z-score measures and the results remain 
qualitatively similar. 
26 See for example Beck et al. (2013b) for a financial ratio application that proxies for cost efficiency.  
27 Table A3.2 in the appendix summarises the formulas for credit risk, liquidity risk and financial 
stability proxies. 
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that it would be directing more liquidity into the real economy. We are looking at whether and 
how the amount of liquidity created by the bank affects the cost efficiency. To do so, we employ 
the “catfat” measure of liquidity creation, as developed by Berger and Bouwman (2009). This 
measure classifies assets based on their liquidity attributes and includes off-balance sheet 
activities in its calculation. 
As community banks are primarily loan makers, we investigate the impact of the loan portfolio 
composition on the cost efficiency by including the ratio of the six main loan categories to total 
assets; namely i) residential mortgages; ii) agricultural loans; iii) commercial and industrial 
loans (C&I); iv) loans to individuals; v) commercial real estate loans (CRE); and vi) 
construction and development loans (C&D). Most community banks hold diversified loan 
portfolios with engagement in more than one of these loan sub-categories. By including these 
sub-categories, we gain useful insights as to how the different lending strategies employed by 
community banks affect efficiency performance. 
Community banks provide financial services to a market segment with limited financial 
opportunities. Changes in the macroeconomic environment that impact the banking sector may 
have a more pronounced effect in geographical locations with high presence of community 
banks, which are known to be particularly affected by inflation dynamics (Bonilla et al., 2018). 
This raises the question of how community banks respond to macroeconomic instability and 
regulatory changes compared to non-community banks. To account for the overall economic 
activity, we include the real GDP growth and inflation. Changes in the macroeconomic 
performance can influence banks differently depending on their cost structure. Banks with 
higher ratio of interest expenses are more likely to incur losses during economic downturns 
(Hauner, 2005). 
We take into account periods of crisis by including a crisis dummy that takes the value 1 during 
periods of banking crises as defined above; zero otherwise. Following Berger and Bouwman 
(2013) we consider the two banking crises that are relevant to our sample. These are: i) the 
credit crunch of the early 1990s (from 1990Q1 to 1992Q4) and ii) the subprime lending crisis 
(from 2007Q3 to 2009Q4). 
Uncertainty characterises a wide array of decisions including consumer spending and saving 
patterns, firm expansionary projects, investment decisions and asset allocation, and 
government policies. Early studies (Bernanke, 1983; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) identified that 
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imprecisions in forecasting future events are inherent in financial market operations, and may 
echo in the real economy through the dampening of the general investor confidence; thus, 
further aggravating the crisis – an effect particularly pronounced during the 2008 Global 
Financial Crisis (GFC). A new category of uncertainty indicators that emerged, in part aided 
by these financial crises, aims to capture unique aspects of the economic system that relate to 
the, typically latent, uncertainty factor. The news-based Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) 
index is constructed using textual analysis on a wide range of newspapers for a variety of terms 
that relate to economic news (Baker et al., 2016).28 We take the natural log of the EPU index, 
with higher values suggesting greater uncertainty. 
3.4.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics of the bank financial characteristics are reported in Table 3.2. The average 
value of bank assets (in natural logs) is 11.095 for the community banks and 12.743 for the 
non-community; a significant size advantage for the non-community banks that is in line with 
our expectations. Deposits to assets are at 86% for the community banks and 79% for the non-
community banks, corroborating the view that the former are more reliant on deposit funding, 
with the latter capable to attract more funding from capital markets. With respect to 
profitability, the mean value of ROE is significantly higher for the non-community banks 
compared to the community (5% against 3% respectively), which conforms to our expectations 
that the latter are not primarily focused on profit maximisation. Community banks are 
significantly more capitalised compared to the non-community counterparts (10.2% against 
9.7% in Equity/Assets respectively).  
In terms of financial stability, community banks appear to perform better, with the average 
value of z-score around 2.91, significantly higher compared to the non-community banks, 
which stand at 2.76, on average. In addition, community banks have significantly lower credit 
risk compared to the non-community banks (0.23 against 0.36 respectively), plausibly due to 
their relationship lending approach that is known to reduce moral hazard and adverse incentives 
(Boot, 2000). Liquidity risk is lower in community banks compared to the non-community 
(0.29 against 0.90 respectively), which may be linked to the fact that the former have limited 
 
 
28Information on how policy uncertainty index is constructed can be found here 
http://www.policyuncertainty. com/methodology.html 
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access to money markets to attract emergency funding; hence are required to rely more on 
internal mechanisms for liquidity management. 
The cost/income ratio is significantly higher for community banks, which may be reflective to 
the proportionally higher personnel costs of these banks as they rely on expensive labour to 
carry out credit checks and loan monitoring, whereas the larger non-community banks have 
turned to a mix of computers/low-skilled personnel. Substantial differences exist between the 
loan portfolios of the two bank types. Commercial real estate loans constitute the highest 
proportion of the loan portfolio for both bank types (33% for community banks and 32% for 
non-community). Commercial and industrial loans account for 6% on average of the 
community banks’ portfolio and 9% for that of the non-community.  
[Table 3.2 around here] 
3.5 Empirical results 
3.5.1 Cost efficiency results 
Estimates of the overall cost efficiency and the two decompositions, persistent and residual, 
are presented for community and non-community banks in Table 3.3 alongside the usual 
statistical tests.29 Figure 3.1 presents visually the time evolution of overall, residual and 
persistent cost efficiencies for the two bank types. 
[Table 3.3 around here] 
[Figure 3.1 around here] 
Community banks exhibit superior cost efficiency over the full sample period by around 5% 
compared to the non-community banks. In addition, community banks have been consistently 
featuring higher cost efficiency across all years compared to the non-community banks. The 
cost efficiency estimates span from the low of 70.5% in 1986 to the high of 77.7% in 2005. For 
non-community banks the lowest cost efficiency estimate is observed in 2013 (69.2%), while 
the highest is in 2005 (73.8%). The spike of cost efficiency in the years prior to the global 
financial crisis may be linked to the rapid expansion of financial products and practices that, a 
posteriori, have been put under the microscope for aggravating the crisis (Martin-Oliver et al., 
 
 
29 The estimated coefficients for the cost frontier are presented in table A3.3 in the appendix. 
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2013). A similar conclusion is reached in Alexakis et al. (2019) for a cross-country study, 
suggesting that the main driver for efficiency spikes observed before a financial crisis is the 
positive technology change reflective of the expansion in product availability; a fact that is less 
pronounced in the more traditional bank type of the sample. Qualitatively our results are in line 
with Feng and Zhang (2012) who find higher technical efficiency score for small and large 
community banks during the period 1997 to 2006. 
Delving into the cost efficiency decompositions, we find the community banks to exhibit higher 
residual and persistent efficiency compared to the non-community banks. In particular and for 
the full sample, the managerial skills reflected in residual efficiency are higher in community 
banks by approximately 0.70%. The dynamics of residual efficiency provide interesting 
insights. In particular, the difference between the two bank types appears relatively constant in 
the period between the early 90s bank crisis and the global financial crisis, with the exception 
of the years immediately prior to the global financial crisis where the gap is diminished. The 
trade-off between risk and efficiency, where short-term reductions in credit checks and loan 
monitoring may materialise in an artificial rise in cost efficiency, referred to as cost “skimping” 
may be partially driving the surge in residual efficiency of non-community banks (Berger and 
DeYoung, 1997). A divergence in residual efficiency between the two bank types is observed 
after the global financial crisis as the community banks widen the gap to the non-community 
ones with the difference reaching to 1.80%. 
The difference in persistent efficiency between the two bank types over the full sample finds 
the community banks on top by around 4.90%, which increases to over 5.10% in the years 
following the global financial crisis. The gradual rise of persistent efficiency for community 
banks over time may be traced to bank- specific developments in the sector. For example, the 
Federal Reserve have typically waved consolidated capital requirement for the majority of 
community banks (e.g., below $500 million), simplified capital standards and documentation 
for commercial real estate (CRE) loans, and delayed implementation of accounting rules 
changes (Bonilla et al., 2018). In recognising the catalytic role of community banks to the local 
economy, customised supervisory procedures are being developed, to strengthen the 
community banking institution. 
Decomposing overall efficiency into its components allows us to test whether the higher overall 
cost efficiency score of community banks is economically significant. The 5% difference in 
the overall efficiency scores between the two groups in mostly driven by difference in the 
83 
persistent efficiency rather than residual efficiency where the magnitude of the difference is 
very small (4.90% versus 0.70%). So, higher persistent efficiency is the source of better overall 
efficiency performance of community banks. This result is anticipated since it is related to 
institutional and regulatory factors that are tailored for community banks. Community banks 
benefit from a friendlier regulatory environment. Dodd-Frank regulations have been pushed 
back for community banks including the simplification of capital requirements. This regulatory 
relief has positive implications for their efficiency and eventually translates into higher overall 
efficiency for this bank group.  
Table 3.4 presents average efficiency results for the two bank types per state. In terms of overall 
cost efficiency community banks in Iowa (IA), Minnesota (MN), North Dakota (ND) and 
Nebraska (NE) have the higher efficiency scores – close to 80%, whereas community banks in 
Hawaii (HI) the lowest (68.9%). This holds true for persistent efficiency as well. Iowa (IA), 
Minnesota (MN) and North Dakota (ND) are the states where both community and non-
community banks have the highest overall and persistent efficiency scores. Non-community 
banks operate under the lowest efficiency in Delaware (DE) and South Dakota (SD); 62.9% 
and 62.4% respectively. Figure 3.2 depicts efficiency scores in maps for the two bank groups. 
Community banks with the highest overall and persistent efficiency scores are concentrated in 
the North and mid- North part. Non-community banks in the mid- West and South have the 
lowest overall efficiency scores whereas non-community banks located in the East have the 
highest residual efficiency. 
[Table 3.4 around here] 
[Figure 3.2 around here] 
3.5.2 Determinants of cost efficiency 
In this section we present the results of the second stage analysis on the determinants of 
efficiency. Table 3.5 presents estimated coefficients, robust standard errors and standard 
goodness-of-fit statistics of equation 3.6. Model I includes only bank-specific variables, model 
II includes both bank-specific, market structure and macroeconomic variables and intercept 
and slope CB dummies. Models I and II are repeated for community and non-community banks 
separately.  
[Table 3.5 around here] 
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Of primary interest is the coefficient of the community bank binary variable. The results of all 
three models suggest that community banks are more cost efficient than non-community banks, 
as evident by the significant and positive coefficient of the community bank dummy. Based on 
models I and II community banks outperform their non-community counterparts. This result is 
in support of our earlier, unconditional findings. Our finding is in line with Elyasiani and 
Mehdian (1995) that compare the performance of very small US banks (less than $50 million 
in assets), mid-size and large banks (more than $400 million in assets) and find that small banks 
were more efficient than large banks. 
The coefficient for bank size is significantly negative for the full sample and for the community 
and non- community sub samples, suggesting that large banks exhibit lower cost efficiency 
possibly due to diseconomies of scale, a finding in line with Kwan (2006). The interaction with 
the community bank dummy further suggests that the negative size effect on cost efficiency is 
more pronounced for the community banks. Smaller banks can be more efficient in exploit 
niche opportunities, in small business lending in particular, as they have a competitive 
advantage over the information opacity of these firms. McKee and Kagan (2018) claim that as 
community banks increase their asset base, efficiency drops as a result of the bank’s 
incapability to translate elevated assets into loans. This finding is also in line with Berger et al. 
(2005) suggesting that small banks have an advantage in producing and using “soft” 
information in providing lending to SMEs. These can be businesses with high growth potential 
that depend on bank lending before going public and gain access to capital markets. Relatedly, 
Jacewitz and Kupiec (2012) suggest that the lending specialisation of community banks does 
not benefit from bank sizes in excess of $500 million; in part due to the exemption from the 
certain regulatory requirements these banks enjoy. 
In terms of ownership structure, community banks that are part of bank holding companies 
exhibit lower cost efficiency; the opposite being true for non-community banks. For the non-
community banks, higher cost efficiency may be related to the economies of scale and scope 
brought about by their participation in a bank holding company. However, as community banks 
may be pursuing goals other than profit maximisation, being part of a bank holding company 
may change their focus and dilute their distinct character; thus, affecting their performance. 
The community bank results are in line with Akhigbe and McNulty (2005) who suggest that 
small banks that are independent of bank holding company are more profit efficient. 
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A high deposit to assets ratio is negatively associated with cost efficiency, suggesting that the 
banks that fund their assets primarily via deposits tend to be less efficient. The effect has the 
same direction for both bank types, but is, on average across the two specifications, more 
pronounced for the community banks. Bank funding is typically done either via deposits and/or 
through securities and capital markets. Attracting funding via the latter is likely to be a 
competitive process on behalf of the bank, and inaccessible (or prohibitively costly) to the 
smallest of banks. By contrast, the small community banks are local in their operations, and 
often without tough competition with regards to deposit taking from the public. Hence 
community banks may not have to work as hard to attract deposits as non-community banks 
do, simply because they may be the only bank in the vicinity.30 
In terms of profitability, a positive link is found between ROE and efficiency for community 
banks suggesting that more profitable community banks tend to be more efficient. On the other 
hand, the effect of profitability on efficiency is negative for the non-community banks. This 
may be explained by the moral hazard/agency problems that non-community banks may face 
and/or bad management (Berger and DeYoung, 1997). These banks in pursuit of higher 
profitability may reduce credit monitoring of investments (bad management) and/or engage in 
high risk projects (moral hazard); thus, increasing bank risk taking and negatively affecting 
efficiency. By contrast, the community banks’ relationship lending approach may be 
particularly effective in reducing moral hazard. 
Regarding the relationship between cost efficiency and liquidity creation, the results show that 
higher liquidity creation is associated with lower cost efficiency for the community banks, 
while the opposite is true for the non-community ones. While both measures may be considered 
as performance benchmarks, their focus is different. Financial institutions opt to maximise cost 
efficiency for several reasons, such as a response to increasing competition (Fiordelisi et al., 
2011) or a softer regulatory touch (Altunbas et al., 2007) among others. By contrast, pursuing 
a strategy that maximises liquidity creation may not be as straightforward. By creating more 
liquidity for the economy, the bank makes itself more illiquid in the process and could be more 
vulnerable to non-performing loans or higher liquidity risk due to asset-liability duration gap. 
However, as community banks specialise in loan making operations for the local economies, 
 
 
30 The FDIC estimates that a significant part of the US population lives in underbanked environments, 
often only served by a few community banks. 
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liquidity creation may be a more suitable objective for them. For community banks the risk of 
having to “fire-sale” assets in order to meet liquidity shortages could be significant since they 
lack the sophisticated financial instruments and access to capital markets to do so. In addition, 
the inverse relationship between cost efficiency and liquidity creation for community banks 
may suggest that pursuing a liquidity creation maximisation strategy may not be aligned with 
maximising cost efficiency, possibly due to the highly human intensive loan making and credit 
checking mechanisms that community banks employ (Feng and Zhang, 2012; McKee and 
Kagan, 2018). Our results imply that regulation for community banks should take into account 
the liquidity creation besides cost efficiency. In particular, policies aimed to increase cost 
efficiency in financial institutions may be disadvantageous for community banks, as for these 
banks cost efficiency and liquidity creation are inversely related. 
With respect to the different loan categories, agricultural, commercial real estate, and 
commercial and industrial loans have a significantly positive effect on cost efficiency for both 
bank types. Higher volumes of construction and development loans, and loans to individuals 
increases the cost efficiency of community banks only, possibly a reflection of the superiority 
of these banks in handling agency issues. Contrarily, higher volumes of residential mortgages 
translates into higher efficiency for non-community banks.  
With respect to the environmental variables, inflation is positively linked to efficiency for 
community banks, while the opposite direction is observed for the non-community banks. The 
positive relation between inflation and efficiency for community banks is in line with findings 
documented elsewhere about concerns of these banks for periods of sustained low inflation 
(Bonilla et al., 2018). The impact economic uncertainty is also reflected in the positive and 
significant coefficient of the policy uncertainty index for community banks only. Taken 
together it suggests that the banking model of community banks renders them robust against 
economic uncertainty. The coefficient on the crisis binary variable shows a significant negative 








3.5.3 Robustness tests 
We test the robustness of our results against developments in the regulatory/supervisory 
framework by splitting the sample into four distinct time periods, namely : i) Pre-1991, i.e., 
pre-Basel Ⅰ and pre-FDIC Improvement Act; ii) between 1991 and 1999, i.e., pre-Financial 
Modernisation Act; iii) between 2000 and 2010, i.e., pre-Basel Ⅲ and pre-Dodd-Frank Act; iv) 
post 2011, i.e., post Dodd-Frank Act. These results do not challenge the main findings of the 
paper and are provided in table A3.4i-iv in the appendix 3.1. We also test the robustness of our 
results by only including banks that have financial information across the full time span of our 
study (this leaves us with 2,226 community banks and 154 non-community banks). Our results 
confirm the main results of the paper, most notably the efficiency advantage of community 
banks, and are provided in table A3.5 in the appendix 3.1. We also use an alternative definition 
of community banks that relies solely on bank size. In particular, we use $2 billion in total 
assets as the size cut-off for community banks and we eliminate banks over $10 billion from 
the sample in line with (Chiorazzo et al., 2018). The results from this analysis remain 
qualitative the same and suggest that community banks are more efficient than their 
counterparts. However, when using this size-based definition, the magnitude of the effect of 
the community bank dummy on the efficiency score is approximately 3 times larger than when 
using the FDIC definition. Furthermore, using both community bank definitions (e.g., the FDIC 
one and the size-based one) shows that the efficiency advantage associated with the 
Community bank type comes both from size and business model attributes. These results are 
provided in the appendix 3.1, see Tables A3.6 and A3.7.   
3.6 Further analysis 
3.6.1 Size and stability sample splits 
In this section model II is repeated with a sample split based on bank size and stability. These 
results are presented in table 3.6. The splits are based on the median values of total assets for 
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size and the median value of z-score for stability. Median values are calculated for each group 
(i.e., all banks, community and non-community banks) separately for the full sample.32 
[Table 3.6 around here] 
Our primary interest focuses on the coefficient of the community bank dummy, which is 
significantly positive and supports the main results of the paper. In addition, the large 
community banks are significantly more efficient than the small community banks; the latter 
being arguably too small to reap any scale economies (DeYoung and Torna, 2013). However, 
the negative coefficient on assets for both groups of community banks suggests that the lending 
specialisation of these banks shows limited benefits through economies of scale. The financial 
stability split suggests that the superior efficiency profile of community banks is mainly driven 
by the least financially stable.  
The effect of capitalisation on the efficiency of financial institutions is positive for the 
community banks, and of higher magnitude for small rather than large community banks. 
Likewise, the split by financial stability shows that community banks exhibit a positive 
relationship between capitalisation and efficiency. By contrast, for the non-community banks 
the relationship between capitalisation and efficiency changes with size. For the large non-
community banks we find evidence of a negative relationship. Similarly, a particularly strong 
negative relationship between capitalisation and efficiency for the non-community banks in the 
low financial stability category is documented. This negative relationship may imply that banks 
with lower capital levels may be susceptible to a moral hazard behaviour, whereby bank 
managers are likely to take on risky projects when the capital is low (Berger and DeYoung, 
1997). The bank management engages in riskier investments/practices in an attempt to 
artificially boost efficiency in the short-run; a practice referred to as cost skimping (Berger and 
DeYoung, 1997).  
The impact of credit and liquidity risk on efficiency by bank type, size and/or financial stability 
provides interesting reading. By and large our results here confirm the main part of the paper, 
whereby both credit and liquidity risk have a negative impact on banking efficiency. The size 
splits shown here suggest that the efficiency of the small community banks is the least affected 
 
 
32 The median values for the size splits are: 68,209 (All banks); 60,688 (CBs); 255,644 (non-CBs). The 
median values for the risk splits are: 20.768 (All banks); 21.040 (CBs); 19.096 (non-CBs). 
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by variations in either credit or liquidity risk. Further, the risk splits suggest minimal variation 
in the marginal effects for the community banks between the high/low financial risk groups. 
This plausibly suggests a homogenous risk profile of the community banks. By contrast, the 
marginal effects corresponding to the high/low risk group of the non-community banks show 
high variation, possibly driven from the wider disparity of these banks in terms of products, 
clientele and practices.   
The relation between efficiency and liquidity creation is largely negative as in the main results 
of the paper, however the magnitude becomes stronger in small and community banks. This 
corroborates the main policy implications around the need for the liquidity creation and the 
efficiency to be viewed complementary performance measures for community banks.  
3.6.2 Comparison with a basic cost efficiency analysis 
In this section we employ the maximum likelihood approach to estimate a basic cost frontier 
model following Kumbhakar et al. (2015).33 The average overall efficiency score for 
community banks over the whole sample period is 77.8%, ranging from 71.9% during 2013 to 
79.9% in 1994. Community banks are about 3% more efficient. However, this particular cost 
efficiency analysis would incorrectly classify the efficiency benefit of community banks as 
solely coming from their managerial superiority. For non-community banks it is 74.9%, 
ranging from 66.4% in 2013 to 78.0% in 1994. Again, we notice that community banks in Iowa 
(IA) operate under the higher efficiency scores (83.2%) and non-community banks operating 
in South Dakota (SD) have the lowest average scores (60.9%). We repeat the second stage 
regressions using as dependent variable the efficiency scores derived from the model specified 
before and the results are consistent with the main part of the paper. In particular, community 
banks have around 1.2% higher efficiency scores, ceteris paribus. The coefficients for the rest 
of the variables of interest remain the same.34 
[Table 3.7 around here] 
[Table 3.8 around here] 
 
 
33 More details on how we calculate the cost frontier are given in Appendix 3.2. 
34 The tables 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9 report efficiency scores by year, by state and bank type as well as the 
second-stage regression results. 
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[Table 3.9 around here] 
 
3.6.3 Matching analysis of community and non-community banks 
In our main analysis we have assumed level and slope differences between the two bank types. 
However, this technique leads to a large number of parameters to estimate. An alternative 
approach would be to utilise matching techniques, such as the k-means nearest neighbour 
matching and the propensity score matching. We refer to “matching” broadly as any method 
that equates the distribution of covariates in the treated and control groups. The k-means nearest 
neighbour matching is a non-linear, non-parametric technique that clusters together banks with 
similar financial characteristics. The advantage of this technique is that it does not rely on a 
formal model, like propensity score, thus it is more flexible. Instead, the k-means relies on 
some distance function.35 
We match community and non-community banks on the following bank-specific 
characteristics: the natural logarithm of asset size, deposit to asset ratio, credit risk proxy, loan 
loss allowance to total loans, equity to assets, liquidity risk proxy, return on equity, natural 
logarithm of the z-score, cost to income ratio, liquidity creation and whether they are part of 
bank holding company. The coefficient is 0.024 and significant at 1% level, suggesting that 
community banks are around 2.4% more efficient. We get the same result (coefficient is 0.022 
significant at 1%) when we include in the matching process bank- specific, macroeconomic 
and economic environment variables (e.g., GDP, inflation, crisis dummy and the political 
uncertainty index).36 
3.7 Conclusion 
Community banks do business in ways that are different from non-community banks. They 
specialize in relationship banking, are the main source of credit to small and medium size 
businesses, and play a prominent role in their local economies. Despite the consolidation in the 
 
 
35 Appendix 3.2 gives more details on this approach. 
36 We also do propensity score matching and get a significant positive coefficient of 0.024, which 
verifies that community banks have higher overall efficiency than their non-community counterparts. 
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US banking sector, community banks are still a key part of the US financial system and seem 
to retain their unique characteristics against non-community banks.  
In this chapter we examine the efficiency dynamics between the two bank types over a long 
time period, spanning over thirty years and two periods of economic turmoil. Previous research 
in community banks has used a single criterion to define them, namely asset-size. We innovate 
by using the novel FDIC definition that separates community banks via a comprehensive range 
of financial and business type screening criteria; thus allowing us to separate any effect from 
the “relationship banking” approach that community banks prescribe to from pure size effects. 
For the cost efficiency estimation we rely on the Kumbhakar et al. (2014) model, which we 
tailor to our research requirements, as it allows the decomposition of cost efficiency into a 
residual and a persistent component that captures managerial deficiencies and market 
structure/regulatory rigidities respectively. In a second stage, we compare and contrast the 
determinants of cost efficiency across the two bank types, across a wide array of explanatory 
variables capturing bank-specific, macroeconomic and market structure characteristics. 
Our findings reveal that community banks exhibit superior cost efficiency than their non-
community counterparts, consistently across the years of the study. The managerial skills 
reflected in residual efficiency are higher in community banks, with the gap to non-community 
banks closing prior to periods of crisis. The largest part of the cost efficiency gap between the 
two bank types stems from differences in persistent efficiency that may be traced to bank- 
specific developments in the sector, such as the Fed imposing less stringent capital and 
regulatory requirements for community banks. 
With regards to key determinants of efficiency we find a negative link between bank size and 
cost efficiency, with the magnitude being stronger for community banks suggesting that these 
banks perform better when they are small in size. A related finding is that community banks 
that are part of a bank holding company have significantly lower cost efficiency scores, 
possibly due to differences in objectives and goals that exist between community and non-
community banks, most notably as community banks do not solely focus on profit 
maximisation. Higher liquidity creation translates into lower cost efficiency for community 
banks but higher for non-community. Financial institutions may maximise cost efficiency for 
reasons related to combat increasing competition, capitalisation requirements and performance. 
Maximising liquidity creation may be more desirable for community banks as they engage 
more into loan making activities to the real economy. An implication of our results is that any 
92 
regulation should take into account the liquidity creation measure besides cost efficiency, 
particularly for community banks. With respect to the macroeconomic environment, inflation 
has a significant effect only for community banks. 
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Figure 3.1: Cost efficiency scores across time. 
Panel A: Overall Cost Efficiency 
 
Panel B: Residual Cost Efficiency 
 
Panel C: Persistent Cost Efficiency 
 
NOTES: Figure reports the mean efficiency scores for overall (Panel A), residual (Panel B) and persisitent 
(Panel C) cost efficiency scores acrosss time. Recession marks the credit crunch (1990Q1-1992Q4) and the 
subprime lending crisis (2007Q3-2009Q4) following Berger and Bowman (2013). The average overall cost 
efficiency score is 75.5% for the full sample, 76.2% for community banks and 71.2% for non-community banks. 
The average residual efficiency score is 89.5% for the full sample, 89.6% for community banks and 88.9% for 
non-community banks. The average persistent efficiency score is 84.3%   for the full sample, 84.9% for 
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Figure 3.2: Efficiency scores by state. 










































NOTES: Maps show average efficiency scores for the two bank groups per state for overall, residual and persisitent efficiency. 
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics for cost, outputs and input prices. 
Variable Obs Mean Median SD Min Max 
Panel A: All Banks 
Total Cost 1,031,306 30,963.08 3,566.018 529975.2 -139,916.6 71,300,000 
Loans (y1) 1,031,307 499,927.9 54,945.65 8,442,200 1.324 752,000,000 
Securities (y2) 1,031,307 157,079.6 23,883.69 2,953,581 0.009 353,000,000 
Price of Labour (p1) 1,212,015 24.050 19.9 21.322 -368 11018 
Price of Capital (p2) 1,207,086 0.303 0.157 9.887 -54 9810 
Price of Funds (p3) 1,213,125 0.090 0.020 6.967 0 4068.5 
Panel B: Community Banks 
Total Cost 900,648 6,238.632 3,157.566 11,850.29 -37.959 1,072,341 
Loans (y1) 900,649 102,387.9 48,658.16 193,514 23.694 12,900,000 
Securities (y2) 900,649 41,926.14 21,721.29 85,919.53 0.009 7,244,442 
Price of Labour (p1) 1,066,012 23.892   20 19.745 -42 11018 
Price of Capital (p2) 1,062,390 0.269 0.156 1.295 -2 520 
Price of Funds (p3) 1,066,649 0.025 0.020 0.340 0 182.111 
Panel C: Non-Community Banks 
Total Cost 130,578 201,485.6*** 13,347.55*** 1,477,860*** -139,916.6 71,300,000 
Loans (y1) 130,578 3,241,974*** 204,084.8*** 23,500,000*** 1.324 752,000,000 
Securities (y2) 130,578 951,335*** 66,515.14*** 8,253,881*** 0.009 353,000,000 
Price of Labour (p1) 145,850 25.212*** 19.436*** 30.443*** -368 4141.5 
Price of Capital (p2) 144,543 0.559*** 0.169*** 28.354*** -54 9810 
Price of Funds (p3) 146,322 0.563*** 0.025*** 20.034*** 0 4068.5 
NOTES: The table presents summary statistics for Total Cost, Outputs and Inputs used in the efficiency estimation for all banks 
(Panel A), Community banks (Panel B) and Non-Community banks (Panel C). The price of labour is calculated as salaries and 
employee benefits over the number of full- time equivalent employees, the price of capital calculated as expenses on premises and 
fixed assets over premises and fixed assets and the price of funds calculated as total interest expenses over total deposits. Monetary 
amounts have been deflated using the GDP deflator and are expressed in thousands USD. *** denotes statistical significance at 
the 1% level. 
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics for the variables used in the second stage analysis. 
Variable Obs Mean Median SD Min Max 
Panel A: All banks 
Total Assets (ln) 1,213,125 11.273 11.119 1.386 4.727 21.411 
Deposits/Assets 1,213,125 0.853 0.876 0.091 0.000 1.686 
Credit Risk 1,207,785 0.249 0.051 8.226 -143 6658 
Loan Loss Allowance/Gross Loans 1,213,125 0.016 0.013 0.017 -0.104 8 
Equity/Assets 1,213,125 0.101 0.090 0.054 0.010 0.999 
Liquidity Risk 1,213,125 0.368 0.304 4.497 -1.528 1,304.750 
ROE 1,213,125 0.037 0.055 0.737 -53.534 394.019 
z-score (ln) 1,206,664 2.896 3.031 0.672 -6.875 6.768 
Cost/Income 1,207,006 0.838 0.808 1.595 -143.909 1,470 
Liquidity creation 1,031,307 0.221 0.213 0.477 -0.948 230.036 
Construction & Development Loans  1,213,125 0.031 0.213 0.053 0 0.843 
Agricultural Loans 1,213,125 0.051 0.008 0.085 0 0.790 
Commercial Real Estate Loans  1,213,125 0.331 0.310 0.182 0 1.009 
Commercial & Industrial Loans  1,213,125 0.072 0.048 0.086 0 1.891 
Residential Mortgages  1,213,125 0.163 0.135 0.128 0 1.145 
Loans to Individuals  1,213,125 0.085 0.063 0.089 0 1.204 
Panel B: Community Banks 
Total Assets (ln) 1,066,649 11.072 10.9998 1.155 5.649 16.924 
Deposits/Assets 1,066,649 0.861 0.878 0.068 0.000 1.686 
Credit Risk 1,055,983 0.235 0.046 4.746 -143 2863 
Loan Loss Allowance/Gross Loans 1,066,649 0.016 0.013 0.013 -0.104 4.545 
Equity/Assets 1,066,649 0.102 0.092 0.049 0.010 0.999 
Liquidity Risk 1,066,649 0.295 0.300 0.245 -0.986 54.021 
ROE 1,066,649 0.035 0.054 0.771 -53.534 394.019 
z-score (ln) 1,060,940 2.914 3.047 0.665 -6.875 6.263 
Cost/Income 1,060,850 0.842 0.809 1.663 -143.909 1,470 
Liquidity creation 900,649 0.207 0.204 0.180 -0.948 3.477 
Construction & Development Loans  1,066,649 0.031 0.010 0.053 0 0.843 
Agricultural Loans  1,066,649 0.056 0.012 0.089 0 0.738 
Commercial Real Estate Loans  1,066,649 0.333 0.312 0.180 0 0.989 
Commercial & Industrial Loans  1,066,649 0.069 0.045 0.084 0 1.891 
Residential Mortgages  1,066,649 0.164 0.136 0.127 0 1.145 
Loans to Individuals  1,066,649 0.079 0.061 0.069 0 1.158 
Panel C: Non-Community Banks 
Total Assets (ln) 146,322 12.746*** 12.411*** 1.933*** 4.727 21.411 
Deposits/Assets 146,322 0.795*** 0.852*** 0.174*** 0 1.429 
Credit Risk 143,900 0.366** 0.096*** 20.067*** -63 6658.000 
Loan Loss Allowance/Gross Loans 146,322 0.019*** 0.014*** 0.036*** 0 8 
Equity/Assets 146,322 0.097*** 0.078*** 0.080*** 0.010 0.998 
Liquidity Risk 146,322 0.900*** 0.340*** 12.918*** -1.528 1,304.750 
ROE 146,322 0.051*** 0.063*** 0.399*** -37.572 12.830 
z-score (ln) 145,579 2.768*** 2.928*** 0.712*** -5.366 6.768 
Cost/Income 146,007 0.815*** 0.799*** 0.958*** -116.921 276 
Liquidity creation 130,578 0.319*** 0.278*** 1.251*** -0.888 230.036 
Construction & Development Loans  146,322 0.036*** 0.016*** 0.054*** 0 0.702 
Agricultural Loans  146,322 0.014*** 0*** 0.037*** 0 0.790 
Commercial Real Estate Loans  146,322 0.317*** 0.295*** 0.194*** 0 1.009 
Commercial & Industrial Loans  146,322 0.095*** 0.075*** 0.099*** 0 1.007 
Residential Mortgages  146,322 0.156*** 0.130 0.133*** 0 1.008 
Loans to Individuals  146,322 0.131*** 0.086*** 0.169*** 0 1.204 
NOTES: The table shows the summary statistics for the bank- specific variables used in the second stage analysis. Data are 
retrieved from Call reports. Z-score is calculated following Cihak and Hesse (2007). Statistics are based on quarterly data 
from 1984 to 2013. Sample consists of 20,099 banks. Panel A contains all banks in the sample, panel B contains only 
community banks and panel C only non-community. Assets and z-score are expressed in logarithms. The credit and liquidity 
risk proxies are calculated following Imbierowicz & Rauch (2014), see section 4.2 for more details. Liquidity creation is 
measured by the CatFat to Gross Total Assets, following Berger and Bowman (2009). All loan categories are expressed as 
a ratio to total assets. *** and ** denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level respectively.  
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Table 3.3: Efficiency measures per year and bank type 













1984 0.756 0.716*** 0.903 0.900*** 0.838 0.796*** 
1985 0.754 0.713*** 0.899 0.898** 0.838 0.794*** 
1986 0.705 0.707*** 0.896 0.892*** 0.839 0.793*** 
1987 0.758 0.709*** 0.901 0.893*** 0.840 0.793*** 
1988 0.755 0.708*** 0.898 0.889*** 0.841 0.795*** 
1989 0.748 0.701*** 0.888 0.880*** 0.842 0.796*** 
1990 0.746 0.696*** 0.884 0.876*** 0.843 0.794*** 
1991 0.746 0.695*** 0.884 0.874*** 0.844 0.794*** 
1992 0.757 0.706*** 0.896 0.887*** 0.845 0.795*** 
1993 0.764 0.716*** 0.903 0.896*** 0.846 0.798*** 
1994 0.768 0.723*** 0.906 0.903*** 0.847 0.800*** 
1995 0.763 0.717*** 0.900 0.894*** 0.847 0.801*** 
1996 0.764 0.713*** 0.900 0.890*** 0.848 0.800*** 
1997 0.763 0.712*** 0.898 0.888*** 0.850 0.801*** 
1998 0.759 0.711*** 0.891 0.882*** 0.851 0.805*** 
1999 0.762 0.717*** 0.893 0.887*** 0.852 0.807*** 
2000 0.763 0.714*** 0.893 0.885*** 0.853   0.806*** 
2001 0.758 0.707*** 0.886 0.878*** 0.855 0.803*** 
2002 0.771 0.722*** 0.901   0.894*** 0.855 0.805*** 
2003 0.772 0.724*** 0.902 0.895*** 0.856 0.807*** 
2004 0.775 0.735*** 0.904 0.903 0.857 0.811*** 
2005 0.777 0.738*** 0.906 0.907 0.857 0.811*** 
2006 0.775 0.733*** 0.903 0.897*** 0.858 0.815*** 
2007 0.771 0.733*** 0.898 0.896** 0.859   0.817*** 
2008 0.776 0.736*** 0.903 0.897*** 0.859 0.819 *** 
2009 0.774 0.728*** 0.900 0.888*** 0.860 0.817*** 
2010 0.772 0.716*** 0.897   0.882*** 0.860   0.809*** 
2011 0.767 0.704*** 0.890 0.873*** 0.860 0.805*** 
2012 0.761 0.697*** 0.883 0.865*** 0.860 0.804*** 
2013 0.754 0.692*** 0.876 0.860*** 0.860 0.803*** 
Total 0.762 0.712*** 0.896 0.889*** 0.849 0.800*** 
NOTES: Table reports mean values and t tests for overall, residual and persistent efficiency for the two bank types. 
Mean values are reported by year. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level respectively. 
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Table 3.4: Efficiency measures per state and bank type 













AK 0.712 0.699*** 0.897 0.885*** 0.793 0.789  
AL 0.757 0.736*** 0.897 0.897  0.844 0.820*** 
AR 0.754 0.717*** 0.896 0.891*** 0.841 0.804*** 
AZ 0.743 0.713*** 0.894 0.881*** 0.831 0.808*** 
CA 0.733 0.730*** 0.892 0.889*** 0.821 0.820* 
CO 0.751 0.703*** 0.897 0.884*** 0.838 0.794*** 
CT 0.761 0.698*** 0.895 0.889*** 0.850 0.785*** 
DE 0.734 0.629*** 0.892 0.862*** 0.822 0.726*** 
FL 0.745 0.702*** 0.895 0.889*** 0.832 0.789*** 
GA 0.763 0.735*** 0.896 0.895*** 0.851 0.821*** 
HI 0.689 0.730*** 0.893 0.897  0.772 0.813*** 
IA 0.795 0.744*** 0.896 0.895* 0.886 0.831*** 
ID 0.736 0.668*** 0.894 0.892  0.823 0.748*** 
IL 0.769 0.742*** 0.896 0.894*** 0.858 0.829*** 
IN 0.750 0.716*** 0.897 0.894*** 0.835 0.801*** 
KS 0.782 0.683*** 0.897 0.877*** 0.871 0.776*** 
KY 0.760 0.717*** 0.897 0.893*** 0.847 0.803*** 
LA 0.733 0.669*** 0.896 0.889*** 0.817 0.753*** 
MA 0.749 0.675*** 0.895 0.886*** 0.836 0.759*** 
MD 0.751 0.736*** 0.897 0.896  0.837 0.821*** 
ME 0.743 0.679*** 0.897 0.893** 0.828 0.759*** 
MI 0.752 0.712*** 0.897 0.894*** 0.838 0.797*** 
MN 0.791 0.740*** 0.897 0.889*** 0.881 0.832*** 
MO 0.773 0.724*** 0.897 0.895*** 0.861 0.808*** 
MS 0.752 0.694*** 0.897 0.893*** 0.837 0.777*** 
MT 0.779 0.700*** 0.897 0.885*** 0.868 0.791*** 
NC 0.753 0.725*** 0.897 0.883*** 0.839 0.822*** 
ND 0.792 0.744*** 0.895 0.888*** 0.884 0.837*** 
NE 0.795 0.728*** 0.897 0.898  0.886 0.810*** 
NH 0.742 0.675*** 0.897 0.892** 0.827 0.756*** 
NJ 0.742 0.703*** 0.896 0.889*** 0.827 0.790*** 
NM 0.726 0.704*** 0.896 0.894** 0.810 0.787*** 
NV 0.750 0.698*** 0.895 0.884*** 0.838 0.789*** 
NY 0.743 0.708*** 0.896 0.878*** 0.830 0.805*** 
OH 0.757 0.704*** 0.898 0.895*** 0.843 0.786*** 
OK 0.757 0.680*** 0.896 0.890*** 0.844 0.763*** 
OR 0.745 0.707*** 0.895 0.894  0.832 0.791*** 
PA 0.746 0.713*** 0.898 0.891*** 0.830 0.799*** 
RI 0.717 0.698** 0.890 0.899* 0.804 0.776*** 
SC 0.756 0.708*** 0.897 0.897  0.843 0.789*** 
SD 0.781 0.624*** 0.896 0.847*** 0.872 0.731*** 
TN 0.753 0.714*** 0.897 0.893*** 0.840 0.798*** 
TX 0.745 0.681*** 0.895 0.881*** 0.831 0.771*** 
UT 0.735 0.669*** 0.894 0.882*** 0.822 0.758*** 
VA 0.746 0.717*** 0.897 0.894*** 0.832 0.801*** 
VT 0.735 0.720*** 0.897 0.900  0.819 0.799*** 
WA 0.756 0.718*** 0.897 0.884*** 0.842 0.811*** 
WI 0.784 0.740*** 0.898 0.894*** 0.873 0.828*** 
WV 0.745 0.711*** 0.898 0.891*** 0.830 0.797*** 
WY 0.765 0.730*** 0.897 0.888*** 0.852 0.822*** 
NOTES: Table reports mean values and t tests for overall, residual and persistent efficiency for the two bank types. Mean 
values are reported by state. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level respectively. 
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Table 3.5: Second-stage regression results (dependent variable: Overall Efficiency score)  
 All banks Community banks Non-Community banks 
 Model I Model II Model I Model II Model I Model II 
Community Bank 0.187*** 0.193***     
 (0.019) (0.023)     
Total Assets (ln) -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.011*** -0.012*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Deposit / Assets -0.111*** -0.111*** -0.113*** -0.109*** -0.117*** -0.119*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Credit risk -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.008*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Loan Loss Allowance / Loans -0.428*** -0.331*** -0.260*** -0.223*** -0.317*** -0.248*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.012) (0.016) (0.027) (0.026) 
Equity / Assets -0.082*** -0.079*** 0.032*** 0.034*** -0.053*** -0.065*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.003) (0.004) (0.012) (0.011) 
Liquidity risk -0.004*** -0.007*** -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.008*** -0.010*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ROE -0.023*** -0.020*** 0.050*** 0.047*** -0.027*** -0.024*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.011) (0.006) (0.007) 
z-score (ln) 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.001 0.001 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Cost / Income -0.095*** -0.092*** -0.024* -0.024 -0.109*** -0.104*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.013) (0.015) (0.009) (0.009) 
Bank Holding Company 0.009*** 0.008*** -0.004*** -0.003*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Liquidity Creation 0.024*** 0.025*** -0.031*** -0.028*** 0.040*** 0.038*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Construction & Development Loans -0.002 -0.012** 0.011*** 0.015*** -0.028*** -0.026*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) 
Agricultural Loans 0.238*** 0.237*** 0.155*** 0.150*** 0.254*** 0.261*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Commercial Real Estate Loans 0.047*** 0.054*** 0.090*** 0.085*** 0.052*** 0.056*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Commercial & Industrial Loans 0.145*** 0.143*** 0.093*** 0.089*** 0.098*** 0.105*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
Residential Mortgages Loans 0.040*** 0.036*** -0.048*** -0.041*** 0.045*** 0.042*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
Loans to Individuals -0.036*** -0.038*** 0.003 -0.001 -0.042*** -0.040*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Crisis  -0.001***  -0.001**  -0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.003) 
Policy Uncertainty Index (ln)  0.001***  0.002***  -0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Real GDP Growth  -0.020**  0.002  -0.034*** 
  (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.011) 
Inflation  0.080***  0.019  -0.110*** 
  (0.030)  (0.024)  (0.032) 
Total Assets (ln) × CB -0.018*** -0.018***     
 (0.001) (0.001)     
Deposit / Assets × CB -0.004 -0.001     
 (0.003) (0.003)     
Credit risk × CB -0.001 0.001         
 (0.001) (0.001)     
Loan Loss Allowance / Loans × CB 0.185*** 0.121***     
100 
 (0.031) (0.032)     
Equity / Assets × CB 0.117*** 0.113***     
 (0.011) (0.012)     
Liquidity risk × CB -0.018*** -0.015***         
 (0.001) (0.001)     
ROE × CB 0.073*** 0.066***     
 (0.011) (0.012)     
z-score (ln) × CB -0.002*** -0.002***     
 (0.001) (0.001)     
Cost / Income × CB 0.071*** 0.067***     
 (0.014) (0.016)     
Bank Holding Company × CB -0.013*** -0.011***     
 (0.002) (0.002)     
Liquidity Creation × CB -0.053*** -0.051***         
 (0.003) (0.003)     
Real GDP Growth × CB  0.019*     
  (0.010)     
Inflation × CB  -0.087***     
  (0.019)     
Construction & Development Loans × CB 0.010** 0.024***     
 (0.005) (0.005)     
Agricultural Loans × CB -0.082*** -0.085***     
 (0.006) (0.007)     
Commercial Real Estate Loans × CB 0.042*** 0.032***     
 (0.003) (0.004)     
Commercial & Industrial Loans × CB -0.056*** -0.057***     
 (0.003) (0.004)     
Residential Mortgages Loans × CB -0.085*** -0.075***     
 (0.003) (0.003)     
Loans to Individuals × CB 0.035*** 0.035***     
 (0.003) (0.003)     
Constant 0.975*** 0.963*** 1.156*** 1.146*** 1.022*** 1.032*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.018) (0.024) (0.011) (0.015) 
State Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Pseudo R2 0.2182 0.2256 0.2106 0.2181 0.1332 0.1380 
Log Pseudolikelihood 1,773,706 1,657,477 1,619,898 1,514,545 175,533 165,184 
Observations 947,291 870,599 835,878 766,872 111,413 103,727 
NOTES: The table presents second-stage regression results for the overall efficiency score. Model Ⅰ includes only bank- 
specific variables and Model Ⅱ includes both bank- specific and macroeconomic variables. The credit and liquidity risk 
proxies are calculated following Imbierowicz & Rauch (2014), see section 4.2 for more details. CatFat is the preferred 
measure for liquidity creation, following Berger and Bowman (2009). CatFat is normalized by GTA. GTA equals total 
assets plus the allowance for loan and lease losses and the allocated transfer risk reserve (a reserve for certain foreign loans). 
All loan categories are expressed as a ratio to total assets. At each regression state and year fixed effects are included but 
not reported for brevity. Robust standard errors clustered at the bank level are reported in brackets. ***, **, * denote statistical 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level respectively. 
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Table 3.6: Asset size and financial stability splits (dependent variable: Overall Efficiency score)  







































































































Community Bank 0.008 0.195*** 0.178*** 0.276***         
 (0.024) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018)         
Total Assets (ln) -0.035*** -0.007** -0.010*** -0.014*** -0.031*** -0.026*** -0.027*** -0.033*** -0.036*** -0.007*** -0.011*** -0.013*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Deposit / Assets -0.036*** -0.109*** -0.106*** -0.118*** -0.084*** -0.112*** -0.117*** -0.109*** -0.027*** -0.114*** -0.114*** -0.125*** 
 (0.010) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.009) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
Credit risk -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.001 -0.003*** -0.010*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.009*** -0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Loan Loss Allowance / Loans -0.297*** -0.385*** -0.318*** -0.263*** -0.231*** -0.369*** -0.259*** -0.247*** -0.235*** -0.306*** -0.234*** -0.134** 
 (0.040) (0.029) (0.028) (0.060) (0.010) (0.013) (0.012) (0.008) (0.043) (0.029) (0.028) (0.058) 
Equity / Assets 0.088*** -0.137*** -0.161*** -0.025 0.035*** 0.120*** 0.036*** 0.037*** 0.075*** -0.132*** -0.164*** -0.011 
 (0.020) (0.014) (0.017) (0.018) (0.005) (0.009) (0.008) (0.003) (0.019) (0.013) (0.018) (0.018) 
Liquidity risk -0.011*** -0.009*** -0.007*** -0.012*** -0.016*** -0.026*** -0.025*** -0.021*** -0.007** -0.012*** -0.007*** -0.018*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
ROE 0.017* -0.025*** -0.024*** 0.008 0.017*** 0.058*** 0.044*** 0.033*** 0.017* -0.033*** -0.030*** -0.009 
 (0.010) (0.008) (0.005) (0.013) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.002) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.016) 
z-score (ln) 0.005*** 0.0018*** 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.004*** -0.005*** 0.001** -0.001 0.005*** 0.002*** 0.0032*** 0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Cost / Income -0.0873*** -0.113*** -0.101*** -0.074*** -0.053*** -0.013 -0.016 -0.085*** -0.083*** -0.124*** -0.111*** -0.085*** 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.007) (0.016) (0.006) (0.011) (0.011) (0.002) (0.012) (0.013) (0.009) (0.021) 
Bank Holding Company 0.009** 0.0075*** 0.003 0.014*** -0.002*** -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.002*** 0.005 0.010*** 0.005* 0.016*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Liquidity Creation -0.025*** 0.026*** 0.033*** 0.026*** -0.052*** -0.007*** -0.017*** -0.027*** -0.033*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Construction & Development 
Loans 
-0.004 -0.016*** -0.023*** -0.035*** -0.002 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.004* 0.004 -0.032*** -0.033*** -0.060*** 
 (0.012) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.013) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) 
Agricultural Loans 0.208*** 0.194*** 0.250*** 0.224*** 0.159*** 0.131*** 0.134*** 0.147*** 0.196*** 0.234*** 0.269*** 0.232*** 
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.010) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
Commercial Real Estate Loans 0.120*** 0.071*** 0.069*** 0.034*** 0.104*** 0.073*** 0.076*** 0.085*** 0.121*** 0.072*** 0.071*** 0.037*** 
 (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Commercial & Industrial Loans 0.120*** 0.155*** 0.155*** 0.106*** 0.110*** 0.097*** 0.077*** 0.104*** 0.139*** 0.120*** 0.129*** 0.072*** 
 (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) 
Residential Mortgages Loans -0.011* 0.027*** 0.0270*** 0.052*** -0.044*** -0.030*** -0.045*** -0.029*** -0.015** 0.031*** 0.033* 0.056*** 
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 (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
Loans to Individuals 0.005 -0.026*** -0.038*** -0.021*** 0.018*** -0.016*** -0.011*** 0.010*** 0.007 -0.031*** -0.036*** -0.020*** 
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Crisis -0.001 -0.002*** -0.001 -0.001* -0.001 -0.001*** -0.001 -0.001** -0.035 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.025) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Policy Uncertainty Index (ln) 0.001 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.001** 0.001 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Real GDP Growth -0.001 -0.001*** -0.001** 0.001** -0.001*** 0.001 0.001 -0.001* -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Inflation -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.002*** -0.001*** 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant 1.155*** 0.696*** 0.729*** 0.970*** 1.162*** 0.869*** 0.893*** 1.235*** 1.165*** 0.981*** 1.021*** 1.030*** 
 (0.022) (0.013) (0.010) (0.018) (0.010) (0.017) (0.017) (0.004) (0.030) (0.018) (0.017) (0.026) 
State Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Community bank interactions  YES YES YES YES — — — — — — — — 
Pseudo R2 0.1940 0.1744 0.1916 0.2925 0.1900 0.1681 0.1764 0.2947 0.2054 0.1437 0.1539 0.1404 
Log Pseudolikelihood 913,606 875,334 834,106 944,537 827,252 720,034 714,237 836,396 31,059 143,876 91,590 80,255 
Observations 435,451 473,739 457,226 451,967 393,673 374,157 378,572 389,261 16,154 88,450 59,272 45,332 
NOTES: The table presents second-stage regression results for the overall efficiency score. For the variant related to All banks, community bank interactions are included in the estimation 
(like in Table 5) but are not reported for brevity. Each model is estimated separately for small and large banks with the cut-offs determined by the median total assets of each bank type. 
The financial stability split is done on the basis of the median value of the z-score for each bank type. The credit and liquidity risk proxies are calculated following Imbierowicz & Rauch 
(2014), see section 4.2 for more details. CatFat is the preferred measure for liquidity creation, following Berger and Bowman (2009). CatFat is normalized by GTA. GTA equals total assets 
plus the allowance for loan and lease losses and the allocated transfer risk reserve (a reserve for certain foreign loans). All loan categories are expressed as a ratio to total assets. At each 
regression state and year fixed effects are included but not reported for brevity. Robust standard errors clustered at the bank level are reported in brackets. ***, **, * denote statistical 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level respectively. 
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1984 0.796 0.774 
1985 0.789 0.768 
1986 0.786 0.756 
1987 0.794 0.758 
1988 0.783 0.749 
1989 0.761 0.727 
1990 0.753 0.719 
1991 0.753 0.717 
1992 0.778 0.747 
1993 0.793 0.768 
1994 0.799 0.780 
1995 0.785 0.759 
1996 0.784 0.751 
1997 0.780 0.746 
1998 0.769 0.740 
1999 0.774 0.748 
2000 0.773 0.738 
2001 0.763 0.724 
2002 0.788 0.755 
2003 0.788 0.758 
2004 0.789 0.769 
2005 0.793 0.774 
2006 0.789 0.763 
2007 0.782 0.762 
2008 0.790 0.769 
2009 0.783 0.751 
2010 0.773 0.725 
2011 0.758 0.702 
2012 0.738 0.681 
2013 0.719 0.664 
Total 0.778 0.749 
NOTES: Table reports mean values and t tests for efficiency scores calculated using the 
basic cost frontier model for the two bank types. Mean values are reported by year. ***, **, * 














AK 0.748 0.760 
AL 0.757 0.776 
AR 0.764 0.741 
AZ 0.733 0.711 
CA 0.753 0.776 
CO 0.749 0.702 
CT 0.803 0.746 
DE 0.751 0.619 
FL 0.750 0.740 
GA 0.774 0.786 
HI 0.710 0.815 
IA 0.832 0.786 
ID 0.735 0.698 
IL 0.794 0.793 
IN 0.770 0.747 
KS 0.805 0.689 
KY 0.775 0.750 
LA 0.727 0.696 
MA 0.799 0.722 
MD 0.783 0.794 
ME 0.769 0.723 
MI 0.771 0.740 
MN 0.817 0.789 
MO 0.787 0.746 
MS 0.769 0.735 
MT 0.786 0.732 
NC 0.780 0.783 
ND 0.820 0.807 
NE 0.829 0.757 
NH 0.769 0.717 
NJ 0.778 0.765 
NM 0.711 0.715 
NV 0.751 0.685 
NY 0.775 0.765 
OH 0.772 0.739 
OK 0.754 0.695 
OR 0.751 0.746 
PA 0.778 0.761 
RI 0.737 0.748 
SC 0.768 0.755 
SD 0.807 0.609 
TN 0.762 0.758 
TX 0.736 0.711 
UT 0.726 0.698 
VA 0.764 0.759 
VT 0.762 0.776 
WA 0.774 0.756 
WI 0.820 0.791 
WV 0.750 0.745 
WY 0.765 0.753 
NOTES: Table reports mean values and t tests for efficiency scores calculated using the 
basic cost frontier model for the two bank types. Mean values are reported by state. ***, **, * 





Table 3.9: Second-stage regression results (dependent variable: Efficiency score calculated from the basic cost efficiency model)  
 All banks Community banks Non-Community banks 
 Model I Model II Model I Model II Model I Model II 
Community Bank 0.084** 0.077**     
 (0.032) (0.037)     
Total Assets (ln) 0.001 0.001 -0.005*** -0.005*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Deposit / Assets -0.105*** -0.105*** -0.177*** -0.164*** -0.001 -0.004 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) 
Credit risk -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Loan Loss Allowance / Loans -0.913*** -0.782*** -0.616*** -0.563*** -0.760*** -0.733*** 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.020) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) 
Equity / Assets -0.097*** -0.083*** -0.001 0.006 -0.172*** -0.191*** 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.012) (0.014) (0.019) (0.020) 
Liquidity risk -0.033*** -0.038*** -0.050*** -0.051*** -0.060*** -0.061*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
ROE -0.025*** -0.028*** 0.077*** 0.074*** 0.003 0.001 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.020) (0.020) 
z-score (ln) 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Cost / Income -0.167*** -0.168*** -0.039*** -0.039** -0.051* -0.048 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.030) (0.030) 
Bank Holding Company 0.010*** 0.011*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 0.014*** 0.016*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
Liquidity Creation 0.028*** 0.039*** -0.059*** -0.046*** 0.103*** 0.105*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
Construction & Development Loans 0.024*** -0.002 -0.005** -0.003 -0.082*** -0.088*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.009) 
Agricultural Loans 0.388*** 0.381*** 0.399*** 0.388*** 0.486*** 0.495*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.012) (0.012) 
Commercial Real Estate Loans 0.177*** 0.180*** 0.223*** 0.211*** 0.252*** 0.251*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) 
Commercial & Industrial Loans 0.326*** 0.310*** 0.273*** 0.254*** 0.325*** 0.322*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) 
Residential Mortgages Loans 0.020*** 0.017*** -0.082*** -0.069*** 0.006 0.005 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) 
Loans to Individuals -0.023*** -0.029*** 0.063*** 0.050*** -0.030*** -0.033*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.007) 
Crisis  -0.001  0.001  0.005 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.004) 
Policy Uncertainty Index (ln)  0.001***  0.001***  0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Real GDP Growth  0.001  0.001***  0.001** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Inflation  0.001  0.001***  0.002*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Total Assets (ln) × CB -0.006*** -0.006***     
 (0.001) (0.001)     
Deposit / Assets × CB -0.089*** -0.077***     
 (0.005) (0.005)     
Credit risk × CB -0.001 0.001     
 (0.001) (0.001)     
Loan Loss Allowance / Loans × CB 0.424*** 0.347***     
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 (0.046) (0.049)     
Equity / Assets × CB 0.170*** 0.162***     
 (0.017) (0.018)     
Liquidity risk × CB -0.015*** -0.011***     
 (0.002) (0.002)     
ROE × CB 0.109*** 0.108***     
 (0.016) (0.019)     
z-score (ln) × CB -0.001 -0.001*     
 (0.001) (0.001)     
Cost / Income × CB 0.122*** 0.121***     
 (0.023) (0.027)     
Bank Holding Company × CB -0.015*** -0.015***     
 (0.002) (0.003)     
Liquidity Creation × CB -0.087*** -0.086***     
 (0.004) (0.004)     
Real GDP Growth × CB  0.001     
  (0.001)     
Inflation × CB  0.001***     
  (0.001)     
Construction & Development Loans × CB -0.034*** -0.004     
 (0.008) (0.008)     
Agricultural Loans × CB -0.006 -0.007     
 (0.010) (0.011)     
Commercial Real Estate Loans × CB 0.030*** 0.017***     
 (0.005) (0.006)     
Commercial & Industrial Loans × CB -0.076*** -0.074***     
 (0.005) (0.005)     
Residential Mortgages Loans × CB -0.092*** -0.077***     
 (0.005) (0.005)     
Loans to Individuals × CB 0.065*** 0.061***     
 (0.005) (0.005)     
Constant 0.565*** 0.559*** 0.614*** 0.601*** 0.659*** 0.660*** 
 (0.015) (0.0164) (0.020) (0.023) (0.036) (0.037) 
State Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Pseudo R2 0.1864 0.1791 0.1791 0.1704 0.2496 0.2460 
Log Pseudolikelihood 1177103.2 1108552.5 1057817.3 998236.79   127367.46 118882.63 
Observations 993,479 908,653 890,029 810,642 128,271 118,221 
NOTES: The table presents second-stage regression results for the efficiency score calculated from the basic cost efficiency model. Model Ⅰ 
includes only bank- specific variables and Model Ⅱ includes both bank- specific and macroeconomic variables. The credit and liquidity risk 
proxies are calculated following Imbierowicz & Rauch (2014), see section 4.2 for more details. CatFat is the preferred measure for liquidity 
creation, following Berger and Bowman (2009). CatFat is normalized by GTA. GTA equals total assets plus the allowance for loan and lease 
losses and the allocated transfer risk reserve (a reserve for certain foreign loans). All loan categories are expressed as a ratio to total assets. At 
each regression state and year fixed effects are included but not reported for brevity. Robust standard errors clustered at the bank level are 






Table A3.1. FDIC Community bank definition. 
Exclude Include 
Organisations with: Remaining organisations with: 
• 50% or more of their Assets within a 
specialty organization such as: 
o Credit card specialists 
o Consumer nonbank banks 
o Industrial loan companies 
o Trust companies 
o Banker’s banks 
• Loans/Assets > 33% 
• Core Deposits/Assets > 50% 
• At least one office but fewer than an 
indexed maximum number of offices* 
• Offices in no more than 3 states and no 
more than 2 large metropolitan areas 
• No single office with deposits above an 
indexed maximum deposit size* 
• Foreign assets ≥ 10% of Total assets Total Assets < indexed size threshold* 
• No loans or no core deposits *Adjusted over time 
▪ The maximum number of offices was 
40 in 1985 and 75 in 2010. 
▪ The maximum deposit size per branch 
was $1.25 billion in 1985 and $5 billion 
in 2010. 
▪ The assets size threshold was $250 
million in 1985 and $1 billion in 2010. 
NOTES: Source: FDIC.  Aggregate charter-level data at banking organization level. If a banking organization is 
reported as a community bank, every bank under that organization is considered a Community Bank. 
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Table A3.2: Credit risk, liquidity risk and financial stability proxy variables.  
Category Proxy Calculation Values 




𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 − 𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑡 − 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡
 
Values above 1 indicate 
unexpected losses 
Liquidity Risk Imbierowicz and 
Rauch (2014) 
measure (LR) 
𝐿𝑅𝑡 = [(Demand Deposits𝑡  +  Transaction Deposits𝑡  
+  Brokered Deposits𝑡  +  NOW Accounts𝑡  
+  Unused Loan Commitments𝑡)
− (Cash𝑡  +  Currency & Coin𝑡  
+  Trading Assets𝑡  
+  Fed Funds Purchased𝑡  
+  Commercial Paper𝑡  
+  Securities available for Sale𝑡)
± Net Interbank Lending Position𝑡
± Net Interbank Acceptances𝑡




Values above zero imply that 
the bank is ceteris paribus not 




Z-score (Cihák and 






Higher values indicate higher 
stability 
NOTES: The table displays descriptions and calculations of the three proxy variables for credit risk, liquidity risk and financial stability. The 
credit risk proxy is calculated by dividing the net loan charge-offs by the loan loss allowance in the previous year. It indicates the degree to 
which the current period losses were expected in the period before. The liquidity risk proxy is standardised by total assets and indicates to 
what degree the bank is able to cover sudden and unexpected liquidity demand with liquid assets. The Z-score is calculated as the sum of the 
return on assets and the ratio of equity to total assets divided by the standard deviation of the return on assets. Because of its high skewness, 
we use its natural logarithm (Laeven and Levine, 2009). It measures a bank’s distance to insolvency and it is inversely related to the probability 
of default.  
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Table A3.3: Cost Frontier 













0.5* Ln(y1)* Ln(y1) 0.085*** 
 (0.001) 
Ln(y1)* Ln(y2) -0.013*** 
 (0.001) 
0.5* Ln(y2)* Ln(y2) 0.019*** 
 (0.001) 
0.5* Ln(p1/p3)* Ln(p1/p3) -0.080*** 
 (0.001) 
Ln(p1/p3)* Ln(p2/p3) 0.052*** 
 (0.001) 
0.5* Ln(p2/p3) * Ln(p2/p3) -0.023*** 
 (0.001) 
Ln(p1/p3)* Ln(y1) 0.044*** 
 (0.001) 










NOTES: Table reports the coefficients and robust standard errors in parentheses for the Panel 
Translog Cost Frontier. We follow the approach of Kumbhakar et al. (2014) and divide the 
efficiency into persistent and residual. Time effects are included but not reported for brevity. . ***, 
**, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level respectively. 
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Table A3.4i: Second-stage regression results by period (Pre-Basel I and pre-FDICIA, 1984-1990). 
 All banks Community banks Non-Community banks 
 Model I Model II Model I Model II Model I Model II 
Community Bank 0.157*** 0.156***     
 (0.013) (0.014)     
Total Assets (ln) -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.014*** -0.013*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Deposit / Assets -0.102*** -0.104*** -0.104*** -0.109*** -0.122*** -0.121*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) 
Credit risk -0.004*** -0.007*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Loan Loss Allowance / Loans -0.087** -0.062 -0.185*** -0.184*** 0.023 0.033 
 (0.041) (0.044) (0.010) (0.010) (0.043) (0.045) 
Equity / Assets 0.038 0.065*** 0.051*** 0.049*** 0.014 0.0312 
 (0.026) (0.024) (0.007) (0.008) (0.025) (0.023) 
Liquidity risk -0.026*** -0.025*** 0.004*** 0.005*** -0.028*** -0.027*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
ROE -0.015*** -0.020*** 0.006** 0.006* -0.011*** -0.014*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
z-score (ln) 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.0032*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Cost / Income -0.116*** -0.118*** -0.074*** -0.073*** -0.119*** -0.118*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) 
Bank Holding Company 0.020*** 0.018*** 0.001 0.001 0.021*** 0.019*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) 
Liquidity Creation 0.070*** 0.070*** -0.064*** -0.066*** 0.064*** 0.066*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.006) 
Construction & Development Loans -0.006 -0.013 -0.022*** -0.020*** -0.002 -0.005 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.009) 
Agricultural Loans 0.244*** 0.256*** 0.211*** 0.216*** 0.246*** 0.254*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.009) 
Commercial Real Estate Loans 0.034*** 0.037*** 0.139*** 0.140*** 0.049*** 0.048*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.007) 
Commercial & Industrial Loans 0.087*** 0.088*** 0.149*** 0.152*** 0.083*** 0.082*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.007) 
Residential Mortgages Loans 0.069*** 0.067*** -0.026*** -0.026*** 0.058*** 0.055*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.006) 
Loans to Individuals -0.032*** -0.031*** 0.045*** 0.047*** -0.012*** -0.015*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) 
Policy Uncertainty Index (ln)  -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.003 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
Real GDP Growth  -0.035***  -0.016***  -0.059*** 
  (0.012)  (0.006)  (0.020) 
Inflation  -0.215***  -0.021  -0.010 
  (0.028)  (0.014)  (0.039) 
Total Assets (ln) × CB -0.015*** -0.016***     
 (0.001) (0.001)     
Deposit / Assets × CB -0.005 -0.008     
 (0.007) (0.008)     
Credit risk × CB 0.002*** 0.004***     
 (0.001) (0.001)     
Loan Loss Allowance / Loans × CB -0.082* -0.107**     
 (0.042) (0.044)     
Equity / Assets × CB 0.012 -0.018     
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 (0.027) (0.025)     
Liquidity risk × CB 0.031*** 0.031***     
 (0.003) (0.003)     
ROE × CB 0.021*** 0.026***     
 (0.005) (0.005)     
z-score (ln) × CB -0.002*** -0.003***     
 (0.001) (0.001)     
Cost / Income × CB 0.044*** 0.046***     
 (0.008) (0.008)     
Bank Holding Company × CB -0.020*** -0.018***     
 (0.004) (0.005)     
Liquidity Creation × CB -0.133*** -0.135***     
 (0.005) (0.006)     
Real GDP Growth × CB  0.012     
  (0.011)     
Inflation × CB  0.225***     
  (0.028)     
Construction & Development Loans × CB -0.018** -0.008     
 (0.008) (0.009)     
Agricultural Loans × CB -0.033*** -0.039***     
 (0.007) (0.008)     
Commercial Real Estate Loans × CB 0.109*** 0.106***     
 (0.006) (0.007)     
Commercial & Industrial Loans × CB 0.061*** 0.064***     
 (0.006) (0.007)     
Residential Mortgages Loans × CB -0.097*** -0.095***     
 (0.005) (0.006)     
Loans to Individuals × CB 0.074*** 0.076***     
 (0.004) (0.004)     
Constant 0.986*** 1.006*** 1.137*** 1.153*** 1.037*** 1.055*** 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.009) (0.012) (0.011) (0.019) 
State Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Pseudo R2 0.2262 0.2254 0.2134 0.2119 0.1514 0.1512 
Log Pseudolikelihood 562,616 489,232 494,940 430,284 76,192 66,592 
Observations 284,979 248,531 240,478 209,428 44,501 39,103 
NOTES: The table presents second-stage regression results for the overall efficiency score. Model Ⅰ includes only bank- specific 
variables and Model Ⅱ includes both bank- specific and macroeconomic variables. The dependent variable is the Overall 
Efficiency score. The credit and liquidity risk proxies are calculated following Imbierowicz & Rauch (2014), see section 4.2 for 
more details. CatFat is the preferred measure for liquidity creation, following Berger and Bowman (2009). CatFat is normalized 
by GTA. GTA equals total assets plus the allowance for loan and lease losses and the allocated transfer risk reserve (a reserve 
for certain foreign loans). All loan categories are expressed as a ratio to total assets. At each regression state and year fixed 
effects are included but not reported for brevity. Robust standard errors clustered at the bank level are reported in brackets. ***, 
**, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level respectively. 
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Table A3.4ii: Second-stage regression results by period (Pre-FMA 1999, 1991-1999). 
 All banks Community banks Non-Community banks 
 Model I Model II Model I Model II Model I Model II 
Community Bank 0.138*** 0.137***     
 (0.020) (0.021)     
Total Assets (ln) -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.014*** -0.014*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Deposit / Assets -0.126*** -0.125*** -0.111*** -0.111*** -0.133*** -0.133*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
Credit risk -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.014*** -0.015*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Loan Loss Allowance / Loans -0.107*** -0.113*** -0.204*** -0.204*** -0.117*** -0.119*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.010) (0.010) (0.031) (0.031) 
Equity / Assets -0.191*** -0.186*** 0.0589*** 0.058*** -0.209*** -0.209*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.006) (0.006) (0.020) (0.020) 
Liquidity risk -0.007*** -0.009*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.011*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
ROE -0.015 -0.016 0.069*** 0.070*** -0.011 -0.013 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.005) (0.005) (0.012) (0.012) 
z-score (ln) 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Cost / Income -0.106*** -0.108*** -0.007 -0.008 -0.110*** -0.110*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.007) (0.007) (0.018) (0.018) 
Bank Holding Company 0.015*** 0.015*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
Liquidity Creation -0.024*** -0.022*** -0.064*** -0.064*** -0.010* -0.010* 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) 
Construction & Development Loans 0.054*** 0.055*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.021** 0.021** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.003) (0.003) (0.011) (0.011) 
Agricultural Loans 0.265*** 0.265*** 0.193*** 0.193*** 0.301*** 0.301*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.010) 
Commercial Real Estate Loans 0.076*** 0.075*** 0.118*** 0.118*** 0.075*** 0.075*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) 
Commercial & Industrial Loans 0.225*** 0.223*** 0.154*** 0.154*** 0.208*** 0.208*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.007) 
Residential Mortgages Loans 0.038*** 0.038*** -0.031*** -0.031*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) 
Loans to Individuals -0.020*** -0.021*** 0.026*** 0.0262*** -0.010** -0.010** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) 
Policy Uncertainty Index (ln)  0.003***  0.003***  0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
Real GDP Growth  -0.056***  0.007  -0.028 
  (0.017)  (0.005)  (0.017) 
Inflation  0.108**  0.023  -0.175*** 
  (0.049)  (0.017)  (0.060) 
Total Assets (ln) × CB -0.019*** -0.019***     
 (0.001) (0.001)     
Deposit / Assets × CB 0.012*** 0.012**     
 (0.005) (0.005)     
Credit risk × CB 0.001 0.001     
 (0.001) (0.001)     
Loan Loss Allowance / Loans × CB -0.097*** -0.090***     
 (0.033) (0.033)     
Equity / Assets × CB 0.245*** 0.239***     
113 
 
 (0.021) (0.020)     
Liquidity risk × CB -0.005*** -0.003*     
 (0.002) (0.002)     
ROE × CB 0.085*** 0.086***     
 (0.012) (0.013)     
z-score (ln) × CB 0.001 0.001     
 (0.001) (0.001)     
Cost / Income × CB 0.098*** 0.100***     
 (0.017) (0.018)     
Bank Holding Company × CB -0.017*** -0.017***     
 (0.003) (0.003)     
Liquidity Creation × CB -0.040*** -0.043***     
 (0.006) (0.006)     
Real GDP Growth × CB  0.067***     
  (0.018)     
Inflation × CB  -0.127**     
  (0.050)     
Construction & Development Loans × CB -0.049*** -0.049***     
 (0.010) (0.010)     
Agricultural Loans × CB -0.069*** -0.069***     
 (0.009) (0.009)     
Commercial Real Estate Loans × CB 0.043*** 0.044***     
 (0.007) (0.007)     
Commercial & Industrial Loans × CB -0.071*** -0.069***     
 (0.007) (0.007)     
Residential Mortgages Loans × CB -0.068*** -0.069***     
 (0.006) (0.006)     
Loans to Individuals × CB 0.047*** 0.048***     
 (0.005) (0.005)     
Constant 1.001*** 0.984*** 1.132*** 1.111*** 1.034*** 1.034*** 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.011) (0.013) (0.020) (0.027) 
State Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Pseudo R2 0.2756 0.2757 0.2702 0.2703 0.1704 0.1705 
Log Pseudolikelihood 622,683 622,732 561,908 561,930 68,595 68,601 
Observations 308,973 308,973 269,207 269,207 39,766 39,766 
NOTES: The table presents second-stage regression results for the overall efficiency score. Model Ⅰ includes only bank- 
specific variables and Model Ⅱ includes both bank- specific and macroeconomic variables. The dependent variable is the 
Overall Efficiency score. The credit and liquidity risk proxies are calculated following Imbierowicz & Rauch (2014), see 
section 4.2 for more details. CatFat is the preferred measure for liquidity creation, following Berger and Bowman (2009). 
CatFat is normalized by GTA. GTA equals total assets plus the allowance for loan and lease losses and the allocated transfer 
risk reserve (a reserve for certain foreign loans). All loan categories are expressed as a ratio to total assets. At each regression 
state and year fixed effects are included but not reported for brevity. Robust standard errors clustered at the bank level are 
reported in brackets. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level respectively. 
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Table A3.4iii: Second-stage regression results by period (Pre-Basel III and pre-DFA 2010, 2000-2010). 
 All banks Community banks Non-Community banks 
 Model I Model II Model I Model II Model I Model II 
Community Bank 0.306*** 0.300***     
 (0.022) (0.024)     
Total Assets (ln) -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Deposit / Assets -0.120*** -0.120*** -0.110*** -0.110*** -0.122*** -0.122*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) 
Credit risk -0.012*** -0.014*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.012*** -0.014*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Loan Loss Allowance / Loans -0.635*** -0.655*** -0.342*** -0.346*** -0.650*** -0.656*** 
 (0.071) (0.072) (0.021) (0.021) (0.070) (0.070) 
Equity / Assets -0.017 -0.017 0.009 0.009 -0.038* -0.039** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.007) (0.007) (0.020) (0.020) 
Liquidity risk -0.009*** -0.008** -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.015*** -0.015*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
ROE -0.028 -0.032* 0.027*** 0.024*** -0.032* -0.038** 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.007) (0.007) (0.018) (0.019) 
z-score (ln) -0.002* -0.002* -0.004*** -0.004*** 0.002 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Cost / Income -0.090*** -0.091*** -0.056*** -0.056*** -0.091*** -0.092*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.007) (0.007) (0.016) (0.017) 
Bank Holding Company -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.007** -0.007** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
Liquidity Creation 0.077*** 0.077*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 0.078*** 0.078*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) 
Construction & Development Loans -0.072*** -0.071*** 0.022*** 0.022*** -0.080*** -0.080*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.008) 
Agricultural Loans 0.083*** 0.082*** 0.096*** 0.095*** 0.123*** 0.122*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.002) (0.002) (0.011) (0.011) 
Commercial Real Estate Loans 0.054*** 0.053*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) 
Commercial & Industrial Loans 0.079*** 0.081*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.082*** 0.082*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.012) (0.012) 
Residential Mortgages Loans 0.028*** 0.028*** -0.050*** -0.050*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.006) (0.006) 
Loans to Individuals -0.051*** -0.049*** -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.050*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.008) 
Policy Uncertainty Index (ln)  0.004***  0.004***  0.004 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.003) 
Real GDP Growth  -0.001  -0.009**  -0.0169 
  (0.017)  (0.004)  (0.0195) 
Inflation  -0.223***  -0.057***  -0.213*** 
  (0.049)  (0.018)  (0.0683) 
Total Assets (ln) × CB -0.023*** -0.023***     
 (0.001) (0.001)     
Deposit / Assets × CB 0.007 0.008*     
 (0.005) (0.005)     
Credit risk × CB 0.002 0.004*     
 (0.002) (0.002)     
Loan Loss Allowance / Loans × CB 0.298*** 0.314***     
 (0.074) (0.076)     
Equity / Assets × CB 0.022 0.022     
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 (0.020) (0.020)     
Liquidity risk × CB -0.021*** -0.021***     
 (0.003) (0.003)     
ROE × CB 0.055*** 0.056***     
 (0.019) (0.020)     
z-score (ln) × CB -0.002* -0.002     
 (0.001) (0.001)     
Cost / Income × CB 0.034** 0.035**     
 (0.017) (0.018)     
Bank Holding Company × CB 0.001 0.001     
 (0.003) (0.003)     
Liquidity Creation × CB -0.086*** -0.086***     
 (0.006) (0.006)     
Real GDP Growth × CB  -0.010     
  (0.017)     
Inflation × CB  0.166***     
  (0.050)     
Construction & Development Loans × CB 0.094*** 0.092***     
 (0.007) (0.007)     
Agricultural Loans × CB 0.015 0.015     
 (0.009) (0.010)     
Commercial Real Estate Loans × CB -0.009* -0.009     
 (0.006) (0.006)     
Commercial & Industrial Loans × CB -0.039*** -0.041***     
 (0.008) (0.009)     
Residential Mortgages Loans × CB -0.074*** -0.075***     
 (0.005) (0.006)     
Loans to Individuals × CB -0.001 -0.003     
 (0.007) (0.007)     
Constant 0.951*** 0.940*** 1.252*** 1.235*** 0.982*** 0.967*** 
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.011) (0.011) (0.022) (0.027) 
State Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Pseudo R2 0.2084 0.2086 0.2115 0.2116 0.1538 0.1541 
Log Pseudolikelihood 536,056 536,130 512,274 512,323 33,378 33,387 
Observations 287,157 287,157 264,076 264,076 23,081 23,081 
NOTES: The table presents second-stage regression results for the overall efficiency score. Model Ⅰ includes only bank- specific 
variables and Model Ⅱ includes both bank- specific and macroeconomic variables. The dependent variable is the Overall 
Efficiency score. The credit and liquidity risk proxies are calculated following Imbierowicz & Rauch (2014), see section 4.2 for 
more details. CatFat is the preferred measure for liquidity creation, following Berger and Bowman (2009). CatFat is normalized 
by GTA. GTA equals total assets plus the allowance for loan and lease losses and the allocated transfer risk reserve (a reserve for 
certain foreign loans). All loan categories are expressed as a ratio to total assets. At each regression state and year fixed effects 
are included but not reported for brevity. Robust standard errors clustered at the bank level are reported in brackets. ***, **, * denote 
statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level respectively. 
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Table A3.4iv: Second-stage regression results by period (Post-DFA, 2011-2013). 
 All banks Community banks Non-Community 
banks 
 Model I Model II Model I Model II Model I Model II 
Community Bank 0.224*** 0.450***     
 (0.037) (0.050)     
Total Assets (ln) 0.003*** 0.003* -0.025*** -0.029*** 0.001 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Deposit / Assets -0.259*** -0.189*** -0.185*** -0.174*** -0.240*** -0.171*** 
 (0.022) (0.032) (0.006) (0.008) (0.023) (0.033) 
Credit risk 0.0015 0.003 -0.008*** -0.013*** -0.010** 0.008 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.007) 
Loan Loss Allowance / Loans -1.197*** -1.341*** -0.683*** -0.541*** -1.147*** -1.377*** 
 (0.156) (0.239) (0.030) (0.044) (0.155) (0.248) 
Equity / Assets -0.073* 0.076 -0.022 -0.052** -0.165*** 0.010 
 (0.042) (0.071) (0.018) (0.023) (0.041) (0.069) 
Liquidity risk 0.043*** 0.048*** -0.024*** -0.028*** 0.037*** 0.044*** 
 (0.008) (0.012) (0.002) (0.003) (0.008) (0.012) 
ROE -0.179*** -0.022 0.120*** 0.019 -0.155*** -0.027 
 (0.027) (0.038) (0.016) (0.016) (0.026) (0.039) 
z-score (ln) -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.008*** -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.011** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.005) 
Cost / Income -0.170*** -0.083*** -0.021* -0.099*** -0.163*** -0.079*** 
 (0.015) (0.018) (0.012) (0.014) (0.016) (0.019) 
Bank Holding Company -0.013 -0.007 -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.009 -0.011 
 (0.009) (0.013) (0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.014) 
Liquidity Creation 0.074*** 0.020 -0.088*** -0.057*** 0.095*** 0.022 
 (0.016) (0.022) (0.004) (0.005) (0.016) (0.024) 
Construction & Development Loans -0.250*** -0.261*** 0.004 0.031** -0.337*** -0.306*** 
 (0.050) (0.070) (0.009) (0.013) (0.061) (0.088) 
Agricultural Loans 0.129*** 0.155*** 0.230*** 0.156*** 0.118*** 0.157*** 
 (0.020) (0.032) (0.007) (0.009) (0.029) (0.0426) 
Commercial Real Estate Loans 0.073*** 0.052*** 0.123*** 0.088*** 0.083*** 0.072*** 
 (0.013) (0.020) (0.004) (0.005) (0.014) (0.022) 
Commercial & Industrial Loans — — — — — — 
 
      
Residential Mortgages Loans -0.100*** -0.086*** -0.133*** -0.094*** -0.109*** -0.084*** 
 (0.020) (0.027) (0.005) (0.006) (0.023) (0.031) 
Loans to Individuals 0.007 -0.077 -0.017** -0.055*** 0.009 -0.043 
 (0.035) (0.053) (0.008) (0.011) (0.033) (0.054) 
Policy Uncertainty Index (ln)  0.025***  0.026***  -0.020 
  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.034) 
Real GDP Growth  -0.413***  -0.288***  0.0386 
  (0.156)  (0.067)  (0.359) 
Inflation  0.124  -0.168***  0.275 
  (0.235)  (0.049)  (0.257) 
Total Assets (ln) × CB -0.028*** -0.032***     
 (0.001) (0.002)     
Deposit / Assets × CB 0.074*** 0.015     
 (0.023) (0.033)     
Credit risk × CB -0.009* -0.016**     
 (0.005) (0.006)     
Loan Loss Allowance / Loans × CB 0.502*** 0.788***     
 (0.159) (0.243)     
Equity / Assets × CB 0.044 -0.134*     
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 (0.046) (0.075)     
Liquidity risk × CB -0.067*** -0.076***     
 (0.008) (0.012)     
ROE × CB 0.298*** 0.041     
 (0.032) (0.041)     
z-score (ln) × CB 0.005 0.003     
 (0.003) (0.005)     
Cost / Income × CB 0.149*** -0.016     
 (0.019) (0.023)     
Bank Holding Company × CB -0.002 -0.006     
 (0.009) (0.013)     
Liquidity Creation × CB -0.162*** -0.080***     
 (0.016) (0.023)     
Real GDP Growth × CB  0.001     
  (0.002)     
Inflation × CB  -0.003     
  (0.002)     
Construction & Development Loans × CB 0.248*** 0.289***     
 (0.050) (0.071)     
Agricultural Loans × CB 0.098*** -0.001     
 (0.021) (0.033)     
Commercial Real Estate Loans × CB 0.049*** 0.036*     
 (0.013) (0.021)     
Commercial & Industrial Loans × CB — —     
 
  
    
Residential Mortgages Loans × CB -0.032 -0.007     
 (0.020) (0.027)     
Loans to Individuals × CB -0.025 0.022     
 (0.036) (0.054)     
Constant 1.047*** 0.796*** 1.269*** 1.236*** 1.110*** 1.089*** 
 (0.030) (0.057) (0.022) (0.034) (0.034) (0.204) 
State Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Pseudo R2 0.2065 0.2294 0.1956 0.2252 0.2425 0.1902 
Log Pseudolikelihood 93,736 36,134 90,239 34,848 4,261 1,608 
Observations 61,040 21,419 57,616 20,228 3,424 1,191 
NOTES: The table presents second-stage regression results for the overall efficiency score. Model Ⅰ includes only bank- 
specific variables and Model Ⅱ includes both bank- specific and macroeconomic variables. The dependent variable is the 
Overall Efficiency score. The credit and liquidity risk proxies are calculated following Imbierowicz & Rauch (2014), see 
section 4.2 for more details. CatFat is the preferred measure for liquidity creation, following Berger and Bowman (2009). 
CatFat is normalized by GTA. GTA equals total assets plus the allowance for loan and lease losses and the allocated transfer 
risk reserve (a reserve for certain foreign loans). All loan categories are expressed as a ratio to total assets. At each regression 
state and year fixed effects are included but not reported for brevity. Robust standard errors clustered at the bank level are 




Table A3.5: Second-stage regression results, balanced sample. 
 All banks Community banks Non-Community 
banks 
 Model I Model II Model I Model II Model I Model II 
Community Bank 0.298*** 0.321***     
 (0.0169) (0.017)     
Total Assets (ln) 0.005*** 0.005*** -0.031*** -0.031*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Deposit / Assets -0.151*** -0.137*** -0.134*** -0.126*** -0.092*** -0.089*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.008) 
Credit risk -0.008*** -0.010*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.010*** -0.009** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) 
Loan Loss Allowance / Loans 0.027 0.155 -0.291*** -0.239*** 0.239 0.332* 
 (0.114) (0.125) (0.012) (0.012) (0.167) (0.181) 
Equity / Assets -0.086** -0.065* 0.039*** 0.068*** 0.172*** 0.200*** 
 (0.035) (0.038) (0.008) (0.007) (0.040) (0.043) 
Liquidity risk 0.020*** 0.006 -0.019*** -0.019*** 0.015*** -0.006 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.006) 
ROE -0.032*** -0.017 0.071*** 0.070*** -0.038*** -0.021 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.004) (0.004) (0.013) (0.014) 
z-score (ln) -0.014*** -0.014*** 0.002*** 0.001*** -0.014*** -0.014*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Cost / Income -0.105*** -0.097*** -0.006 -0.005 -0.151*** -0.146*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.006) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010) 
Bank Holding Company 0.002 0.008 -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.039*** -0.043*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.008) 
Liquidity Creation -0.046*** -0.036*** -0.069*** -0.057*** -0.051*** -0.036*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.010) (0.010) 
Construction & Development Loans -0.074*** -0.140*** -0.008*** -0.010*** -0.021 -0.027 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.003) (0.003) (0.022) (0.022) 
Agricultural Loans 0.147*** 0.113*** 0.188*** 0.174*** 0.121*** 0.195*** 
 (0.027) (0.030) (0.002) (0.002) (0.038) (0.043) 
Commercial Real Estate Loans -0.022** 0.005 0.098*** 0.090*** -0.025* -0.014 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002) (0.013) (0.013) 
Commercial & Industrial Loans 0.139*** 0.135*** 0.121*** 0.105*** 0.015 0.0047 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002) (0.015) (0.015) 
Residential Mortgages Loans 0.095*** 0.070*** -0.042*** -0.034*** 0.103*** 0.081*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.002) (0.001) (0.013) (0.013) 
Loans to Individuals -0.108*** -0.108*** 0.018*** 0.011*** -0.169*** -0.130*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.001) (0.002) (0.015) (0.015) 
Crisis  -0.001  -0.001  0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.005) 
Policy Uncertainty Index (ln)  0.001*  0.001*  0.002 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.005) 
Real GDP Growth  -0.043*  0.019***  -0.015 
  (0.024)  (0.004)  (0.031) 
Inflation  0.187***  0.097***  -0.096 
  (0.065)  (0.013)  (0.097) 
Total Assets (ln) × CB -0.035*** -0.035***     
 (0.001) (0.001)     
Deposit / Assets × CB 0.017** 0.011     
 (0.008) (0.008)     
Credit risk × CB 0.004 0.006*     
 (0.003) (0.003)     
Loan Loss Allowance / Loans × CB -0.310*** -0.387***     
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 (0.114) (0.125)     
Equity / Assets × CB 0.125*** 0.132***     
 (0.036) (0.039)     
Liquidity risk × CB -0.039*** -0.025***     
 (0.004) (0.004)     
ROE × CB 0.103*** 0.087***     
 (0.012) (0.012)     
z-score (ln) × CB 0.016*** 0.015***     
 (0.002) (0.002)     
Cost / Income × CB 0.099*** 0.092***     
 (0.010) (0.011)     
Bank Holding Company × CB -0.005 -0.011*     
 (0.006) (0.006)     
Liquidity Creation × CB -0.023*** -0.022***     
 (0.007) (0.007)     
Real GDP Growth × CB  0.063**     
  (0.024)     
Inflation × CB  -0.101     
  (0.065)     
Construction & Development Loans × CB 0.066*** 0.130***     
 (0.019) (0.019)     
Agricultural Loans × CB 0.042 0.062**     
 (0.027) (0.030)     
Commercial Real Estate Loans × CB 0.120*** 0.085***     
 (0.011) (0.011)     
Commercial & Industrial Loans × CB -0.019** -0.030***     
 (0.009) (0.010)     
Residential Mortgages Loans × CB -0.138*** -0.104***     
 (0.012) (0.012)     
Loans to Individuals × CB 0.126*** 0.119***     
 (0.012) (0.012)     
Constant 0.863*** 0.829*** 1.161*** 1.150*** 0.889*** 0.872*** 
 (0.015) (0.017) (0.008) (0.007) (0.020) (0.036) 
State Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Pseudo R2 0.2716 0.2809 0.2717 0.2818 0.2194 0.2277 
Log Pseudolikelihood 517,219 483,004 508,117 475,038 13,181 12,067 
Observations 251,110 227,348 243,217 220,336 7,893 7,012 
NOTES: The table presents second-stage regression results for the overall efficiency score. Model Ⅰ includes only bank- 
specific variables and Model Ⅱ includes both bank- specific and macroeconomic variables. The dependent variable is the 
Overall Efficiency score. The credit and liquidity risk proxies are calculated following Imbierowicz & Rauch (2014), see 
section 4.2 for more details. CatFat is the preferred measure for liquidity creation, following Berger and Bowman (2009). 
CatFat is normalized by GTA. GTA equals total assets plus the allowance for loan and lease losses and the allocated transfer 
risk reserve (a reserve for certain foreign loans). All loan categories are expressed as a ratio to total assets. At each regression 
state and year fixed effects are included but not reported for brevity. Robust standard errors clustered at the bank level are 





Table A3.6: Second-stage regression results using the asset-based definition of Community Banks 
 All banks Community banks Non-Community 
banks 
 Model I Model II Model I Model II Model I Model II 
Community Bank 0.428*** 0.471***     
 (0.037) (0.039)     
Total Assets (ln) 0.008*** 0.009*** -0.029*** -0.029*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Deposit / Assets -0.137*** -0.124*** -0.106*** -0.104*** -0.131*** -0.123*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) 
Credit risk -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.011*** -0.012*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Loan Loss Allowance / Loans -0.422*** -0.229*** -0.310*** -0.270*** -0.268*** -0.168*** 
 (0.058) (0.061) (0.012) (0.016) (0.048) (0.051) 
Equity / Assets -0.325*** -0.284*** 0.033*** 0.034*** -0.251*** -0.234*** 
 (0.034) (0.036) (0.003) (0.004) (0.028) (0.030) 
Liquidity risk 0.017*** 0.007** -0.021*** -0.021*** 0.010*** 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) 
ROE -0.006 0.004 0.048*** 0.044*** -0.010 -0.003 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.009) (0.012) (0.020) (0.021) 
z-score (ln) -0.001 0.001 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002* 0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Cost / Income -0.089*** -0.082*** -0.025* -0.026* -0.095*** -0.088*** 
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.013) (0.0162) (0.032) (0.033) 
Bank Holding Company -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.004*** -0.003** -0.011*** -0.013*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Liquidity Creation 0.019*** 0.025*** -0.024*** -0.021*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) 
Construction & Development Loans -0.029** -0.036*** 0.008*** 0.012*** -0.009 0.001 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.001) (0.001) (0.010) (0.011) 
Agricultural Loans -0.160*** -0.172*** 0.159*** 0.155*** -0.080** -0.124*** 
 (0.028) (0.032) (0.004) (0.004) (0.033) (0.039) 
Commercial Real Estate Loans 0.127*** 0.130*** 0.092*** 0.087*** 0.129*** 0.122*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) 
Commercial & Industrial Loans 0.195*** 0.190*** 0.097*** 0.094*** 0.135*** 0.146*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.001) (0.002) (0.010) (0.010) 
Residential Mortgages Loans -0.121*** -0.109*** -0.041*** -0.035*** -0.080*** -0.056*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.008) 
Loans to Individuals -0.059*** -0.056*** 0.001 -0.001 -0.087*** -0.080*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.008) 
Crisis  -0.001**  -0.001**  -0.002 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.004) 
Policy Uncertainty Index (ln)  0.001***  0.001***  0.002 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.003) 
Real GDP Growth  0.001  0.001  -0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Inflation  0.003***  0.00  -0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Total Assets (ln) × CB -0.038*** -0.039***     
 (0.001) (0.001)     
Deposit / Assets × CB 0.030*** 0.019***     
 (0.006) (0.006)     
Credit risk × CB 0.006*** 0.006**     
 (0.001) (0.001)     
Loan Loss Allowance / Loans × CB 0.115* -0.039     
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 (0.060) (0.064)     
Equity / Assets × CB (0.034) 0.318***     
 (0.034) (0.037)     
Liquidity risk × CB -0.038*** -0.028***     
 (0.003) (0.003)     
ROE × CB 0.054** 0.040*     
 (0.022) (0.023)     
z-score (ln) × CB 0.001 0.001     
 (0.001) (0.001)     
Cost / Income × CB 0.063** 0.055     
 (0.031) (0.034)     
Bank Holding Company × CB 0.010*** 0.012***     
 (0.003) (0.003)     
Liquidity Creation × CB -0.044*** -0.047***     
 (0.006) (0.007)     
Real GDP Growth × CB  -0.001     
  (0.001)     
Inflation × CB  -0.003***     
  (0.001)     
Construction & Development Loans × CB 0.038*** 0.048***     
 (0.011) (0.012)     
Agricultural Loans × CB 0.320*** 0.327***     
 (0.029) (0.033)     
Commercial Real Estate Loans × CB -0.034*** -0.041***     
 (0.007) (0.008)     
Commercial & Industrial Loans × CB -0.097*** -0.096***     
 (0.010) (0.011)     
Residential Mortgages Loans × CB 0.080*** 0.073***     
 (0.008) (0.008)     
Loans to Individuals × CB 0.060*** 0.055***     
 (0.007) (0.007)     
Constant 0.729*** 0.678*** 1.156*** 1.148*** 0.722*** 0.691*** 
 (0.032) (0.033) (0.018) (0.024) (0.037) (0.046) 
State Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Pseudo R2 0.2320 0.2396 0.2284 0.2362 0.1762 0.1804 
Log Pseudolikelihood 1,785,575 1,668,566 1,763,239 1,648,008 27,288 25,204 
Observations 941,179 865,030 924,097 849,567 17,082 15,463 
NOTES: The table presents second-stage regression results for the overall efficiency score. Model Ⅰ includes only bank- 
specific variables and Model Ⅱ includes both bank- specific and macroeconomic variables. The dependent variable is the 
Overall Efficiency score. The credit and liquidity risk proxies are calculated following Imbierowicz & Rauch (2014), see 
section 4.2 for more details. CatFat is the preferred measure for liquidity creation, following Berger and Bowman (2009). 
CatFat is normalized by GTA. GTA equals total assets plus the allowance for loan and lease losses and the allocated transfer 
risk reserve (a reserve for certain foreign loans). All loan categories are expressed as a ratio to total assets. At each regression 
state and year fixed effects are included but not reported for brevity. Robust standard errors clustered at the bank level are 
reported in brackets. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level respectively. 
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Table A3.7: Second-stage regression results using both Community Banks definitions 
 All banks 
 Model I Model II 
Community Bank_FDIC 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Community Bank_Size 0.435*** 0.477*** 
 (0.036) (0.039) 
Total Assets (ln) 0.009*** 0.009*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Deposit / Assets -0.137*** -0.124*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
Credit risk -0.012*** -0.011*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Loan Loss Allowance / Loans -0.426*** -0.233*** 
 (0.058) (0.061) 
Equity / Assets -0.323*** -0.282*** 
 (0.034) (0.036) 
Liquidity risk 0.017*** 0.007** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
ROE -0.006 0.003 
 (0.019) (0.020) 
z-score (ln) -0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Cost / Income -0.089*** -0.082*** 
 (0.029) (0.030) 
Bank Holding Company -0.013*** -0.014*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Liquidity Creation 0.018*** 0.025*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) 
Construction & Development Loans -0.031*** -0.038*** 
 (0.011) (0.012) 
Agricultural Loans -0.160*** -0.170*** 
 (0.028) (0.032) 
Commercial Real Estate Loans 0.127*** 0.130*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) 
Commercial & Industrial Loans 0.196*** 0.190*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) 
Residential Mortgages Loans -0.121*** -0.108*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) 
Loans to Individuals -0.058*** -0.056*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) 
Crisis  -0.001** 
  (0.001) 
Policy Uncertainty Index (ln)  0.001*** 
  (0.001) 
Real GDP Growth  0.001 
  (0.001) 
Inflation  0.003*** 
  (0.001) 
Total Assets (ln) × CB -0.038*** -0.039*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Deposit / Assets × CB 0.028*** 0.018*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
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Credit risk × CB 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Loan Loss Allowance / Loans × CB 0.127** -0.027 
 (0.060) (0.064) 
Equity / Assets × CB 0.357*** 0.315*** 
 (0.034) (0.037) 
Liquidity risk × CB -0.039*** -0.029*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
ROE × CB 0.054** 0.040* 
 (0.022) (0.023) 
z-score (ln) × CB 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Cost / Income × CB 0.063** 0.055 
 (0.031) (0.034) 
Bank Holding Company × CB 0.009*** 0.011*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Liquidity Creation × CB -0.042*** -0.046*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) 
Real GDP Growth × CB  -0.001 
  (0.001) 
Inflation × CB  -0.003*** 
  (0.001) 
Construction & Development Loans × CB 0.039*** 0.050*** 
 (0.011) (0.012) 
Agricultural Loans × CB 0.319*** 0.325*** 
 (0.028) (0.033) 
Commercial Real Estate Loans × CB -0.035*** -0.042*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) 
Commercial & Industrial Loans × CB -0.099*** -0.097*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) 
Residential Mortgages Loans × CB 0.080*** 0.073*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) 
Loans to Individuals × CB 0.060*** 0.055*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) 
Constant 0.717*** 0.668*** 
 (0.032) (0.033) 
State Fixed Effects YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES 
Pseudo R2 0.232 0.239 
Log Pseudolikelihood 1,785,787 1,668,757 
Observations 941,179 865,030 
NOTES: The table presents second-stage regression results for the overall efficiency score. Model Ⅰ 
includes only bank- specific variables and Model Ⅱ includes both bank- specific and macroeconomic 
variables. The dependent variable is the Overall Efficiency score. Community Bank_FDIC denotes the 
dummy created based on the FDIC definition whereas Community Bank_Size denotes the dummy 
created based on only size criterion. Variables are interacted with the Community Bank_Size dummy 
here. The credit and liquidity risk proxies are calculated following Imbierowicz & Rauch (2014), see 
section 4.2 for more details. CatFat is the preferred measure for liquidity creation, following Berger and 
Bowman (2009). CatFat is normalized by GTA. GTA equals total assets plus the allowance for loan and 
lease losses and the allocated transfer risk reserve (a reserve for certain foreign loans). All loan categories 
are expressed as a ratio to total assets. At each regression state and year fixed effects are included but 
not reported for brevity. Robust standard errors clustered at the bank level are reported in brackets. ***, 




Basic cost efficiency analysis 
A stylized cost frontier model is the following 
𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑎 = 𝑙𝑛𝐶∗(𝑤, 𝑦) +  + 𝜈 (1) 
= 𝑙𝑛𝐶∗(𝑤, 𝑦) +  є (2) 
η ~ 𝑁+(0, 𝜎𝑢
2), (3) 
ν ~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜈
2), (4) 
 
Where є ≡ 𝜈 +  is the composed error of the model (subscript i is omitted). 
The log-likelihood function for observation i is 




































The sum of this function for all observations is the log-likelihood function of the model. Maximizing 




k-means nearest neighbour matching 
The k-means nearest neighbor matching relies on some distance function to quantify the closeness 
between two (or more) observations. In our context, for each observation of a community bank, the k-
means nearest neighbor approach determines the “nearest” observation of a non-community. To define 
the closeness of the observations, a distance function is used. In the general form we can denote this 
variable as 𝑥. Then the distance between two observations 𝑖, 𝑗 is given as: 
 
|𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑗| =




We can generalize this formula for when we have 𝑝 number of covariates using matrix algebra. Assume 
that 𝑥 = {𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑝} and that each observation, 𝑖, has the following set of covariates 𝐱𝑖 =
{𝑥1,𝑖, 𝑥2,𝑖, … , 𝑥𝑝,𝑖}. The distance between observations 𝑖, 𝑗 is now given as: 
 ‖𝐱𝑖 − 𝐱𝑗‖ = ((𝐱𝑖 − 𝐱𝑗)
′𝐒−1(𝐱𝑖 − 𝐱𝑗))
1/2
 (2)  
where 𝐒 is the variance-covariance matrix of the covariates. Typical choices for 𝑺 are:  
 
𝐒 = {
𝐈𝒑   for the Euclidean case
(𝐗 − ?̅?′𝟏𝒏)′𝑾(𝐗 − ?̅?′𝟏𝒏)
∑ 𝑤𝑖 − 1
𝑛
𝑖
   for the Mahalanobis case
 
(3)  
where 𝟏𝒏 is an 𝑛 × 1 vector of ones, 𝐈𝒑 is the identity matrix of order p, same as the number of covariates 
used. 𝑤𝑖 is the frequency weight for the 𝑖 observation, x̅ = ∑ 𝑤𝑖
𝑛
𝑖 x𝑖 ∑ 𝑤𝑖
𝑛
𝑖⁄  which denotes a weighted 
mean and W is an 𝑛 × 𝑛 diagonal matrix containing the frequency weights. Compared to the Euclidean 
case, the Mahalanobis is preferred as it accounts for interactions between the covariates. We can define 
the following set of nearest-neighbor index for observation 𝑖: 
 𝛺(𝑖)𝑥 = {𝑗|𝑡𝑗 = 1 − 𝑡𝑖, ‖𝐱𝑖 − 𝐱𝑗‖ < ‖𝐱𝑖 − 𝐱𝑙‖𝐒 , 𝑡𝑙 = 1 − 𝑡𝑖∀𝑙 ≠ 𝑗} (4)  
where 𝑖 is the observation corresponding to a community bank and for which we want to find a matching 
non-community. 𝑗 denotes the matching non-community (is only one in this case) and 𝑙 denotes another 
candidate non-community. 𝑡 denotes the treatment effect and takes the value 1 for community banks, 
zero otherwise. ‖𝐱𝑖 − 𝐱𝑗‖ and ‖𝐱𝑖 − 𝐱𝑙‖ denote the distance between 𝑖, 𝑗 and 𝑖, 𝑙 respectively and in the 
formula above we require that the distance between 𝑖, 𝑗 is smaller than 𝑖, 𝑙 ; hence minimized over 
possible matching candidate observations. The above can be generalized for 𝑚 matching observations 




𝑥 = {𝑗1, 𝑗2, … , 𝑗𝑚|𝑡𝑗𝑘 = 1 − 𝑡𝑖, ‖𝐱𝑖 − 𝐱𝑗𝑘‖𝐒
< ‖𝐱𝑖 − 𝐱𝑗𝑘‖𝐒
 , 𝑡𝑙 = 1 − 𝑡𝑖∀𝑙
≠ 𝑗𝑘} 
(5)  
For the prediction of the potential outcomes we remind the following notation. 𝑦1,𝑖 is the potential 
outcome of the 𝑖 observation that corresponds to a community bank (𝑡 = 1). Conversely, 𝑦0,𝑖 is the 
potential outcome of the 𝑖 observation that corresponds to a non-community (𝑡 = 0). As discussed, only 
𝑦1,𝑖 or 𝑦0,𝑖 is observed, never both. The 𝑘-means nearest neighbors estimates the potential outcome for 
the 𝑖 observation as follows: 
 
?̂?𝑡,𝑖 = {





Where the first is the case that the outcome of the individual observation (𝑦𝑖) is observed whether 
community (𝑡 = 1) or non-community (𝑡 = 0). The second case is the counterfactual outcome, which 
does not exist and is estimated as the outcome of the closest match (or matches). The following 
quantities of interest, namely the Average Treatment Effect (ATE) and the Average Treatment Effect 
on the Treated (ATET) can be defined as: 
 𝐴𝑇𝐸 = 𝜏1 = 𝛦(𝑦1 − 𝑦0) (7)  




Chapter 4 - The impact of competition on the capitalisation-stability-
efficiency nexus across different bank types; the case of US community 
banks 
4.1 Introduction 
Financial markets have become increasingly integrated as a result of deregulation and 
globalisation. Higher competition is therefore observed as banks offer an increasing number of 
products, with the once clear boundaries between investment and commercial banking 
activities becoming blurred. The increasing importance of non-banks provides yet another 
contender for the same pool of investors/depositors. In this background banks realise that 
inefficiency may be harshly penalised by their competitors. Likewise, increased competition 
may induce higher risk-taking as banks try to maintain their established market position, often 
at the expense of stakeholders and/or taxpayers. As a counterbalance, regulators require banks 
to have higher capital ratios, and place tighter controls on the market risk and the liquidity risk 
of banks. However, the exact effect of an increase in banks’ capitalisation requirements upon 
bank risk is not a straightforward one (Jeitschko and Jeung 2005). 
A number of studies have focused on the impact of capital (Gropp and Heider 2010), efficiency 
(Casu and Girardone 2009), business model (Scott and Dunkelberg 2010; Berger et al. 2009) 
and competition (Schaeck and Cihak 2014) on financial stability. Other studies have recognised 
the existence of intertemporal relations between several of these variables, most notably the 
capital-risk-efficiency nexus (Altunbas et al. 2007; Fiordelisi et al. 2011). In a similar context, 
the triple relation between competition-efficiency-stability is examined in Schaeck and Cihak 
(2014), Boyd and De Nicolo (2005), De Nicolo and Lucchetta (2009) and Casu and Girardone 
(2009) suggesting that efficiency is the conduit through which competition contributes to 
stability. In this context, the role of the business model has received limited attention, see for 
example De Angelo and Stulz (2015). However, there is no study to date that has jointly 
investigated the relationship of all five variables in a unified framework. In particular, the 
ongoing financial consolidation suggests that competition has an important role on banking 
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operations and risk management typically portrayed in the capital-risk-efficiency nexus.37 
Besides, banking systems comprise different types of financial institutions each with its own 
unique characteristics; thereby challenging the validity of one-size-fits-all regulatory and 
supervisory policies.38 This paper aims at filling this gap in the literature. 
The business model of US community banks is markedly different from their non-community 
counterparts. We distinguish community banks based on the FDIC (2012) definition that goes 
beyond the single size criterion, that has been previously used in US literature in order to define 
this bank type (see for example Feng and Zhang 2012; Bonilla et al. 2018; Chiorazzo et al. 
2018), and captures differences associated with the geographic scope of operations, the access 
to capital markets, too big to fail subsidies, lending opportunities and lending technology. Thus, 
this definition expands to an array of business model criteria that can drive differences in 
research outcomes. Community banks are traditional deposit-taking/loan-making financial 
institutions that abstain from complex financial derivative structures and other exotic 
investments and focus their operations to the real economy. They are, perhaps, most known for 
being proponents of “relationship lending” practices. In contrast to hard information, soft 
information is neither easily quantifiable nor collected. Community bankers have an intimate 
knowledge of the local community that gives them detailed, soft information on particular 
aspects of their customers, such as managerial skill and reputation. Competition is listed among 
the top challenges that community banks face impacting them in their ability to attract deposits 
and generate loans as well as diluting their business focus (CSBS Study, 2019). First, 
competition impedes the ability of community banks to attract deposits; their main financing 
tool. In securing core deposits, community banks are particularly vulnerable to competition 
from other institutions with a physical presence, due to the traditional profile of their clientele 
that ranks proximity higher than technological innovations and/or remuneration. Competition 
from online financial institutions (e.g., microbanks) is bound to increase as depopulation and 
population aging change the profile of the bank users. Besides, the use of alternatives to core 
 
 
37 Competition is known to affect stability (see section 4.2.2.1 below for a detailed review), while competition 
measures that belong to the efficient structure hypothesis (e.g., Lerner index, Boone indicator) link performance 
to competition at the bank level; thus necessitating the use of a unified framework to account for endogeneity. 
38 A plethora of banking models may be operating within country, with marked differences between them and a 
differentiated regulatory touch. Besides the distinction between community and non-community (commercial) 
banks in the US that we examine here; building societies in the UK, co-operative banks in Germany, Islamic banks 
in the Middle and Far East have distinctive business model from the commercial banks that operate alongside to, 




deposits (e.g., wholesale funds) is confined to the larger of community banks, typically due to 
their riskier nature and a “stigma” attached to their use, plausibly related to the fact that they 
may be contradictory to the relationship approach. Second, competition erodes the loan 
generating business of community banks; effectively constraining them into business lines 
where proximity and relationships matter the most, such as agricultural, real estate and small 
business loans. Increases in compliance costs (e.g., current expected credit loss - CECL) place 
additional challenges and disadvantage these banks compared to the technologically more 
capable institutions. Third, competition forces community banks to use products and services 
that are beyond their technological capabilities; thus effectively diluting their business model. 
For example, the primary driver in adopting online banking and technology, such as online 
loans and remote deposits, is to match the competition rather enhancing bank profitability 
and/or stability, and despite the lack of in-house expertise for such offerings. In addition, 
community banks consider M&A activity for reasons not related to their business model, but 
to fence off competition through achieving increased technological capabilities. Based on the 
distinct business model of community banks we derive empirically testable questions to 
investigate the relationships between capital, risk, efficiency, competition and business model.  
Against this background we motivate our paper. First, we provide comprehensive evidence on 
whether the alternative banking model practiced by the US community banks exhibits a distinct 
financial profile – in terms of capitalisation, financial stability, efficiency and market power– 
compared to the non-community banks. We delve deeper and explore the bank- specific and 
macroeconomic factors that drive these differences in the financial profile of the two bank 
types. In particular we investigate if the links between capitalisation, financial stability, 
efficiency and market power and the related hypotheses39 suggest further differentiation in the 
banking models practiced by the two bank types. Second, we examine the extent to which the 
unique business model of community banks acts as a protection layer for their financial profile 
that could curtail potential threats from competitive pressure. Third, taking the converse 
viewpoint we present novel evidence on the determinants of banking competition and whether 
it is primarily driven by the small-and-numerous community banks or the large-and-few non-
community banks. Fourth, we conduct follow-up analysis to explore the underlying benefits 
 
 
39 In line with the banking literature we test the hypotheses of “bad luck”, “bad management”, “cost skimping”, 
“moral hazard” and “regulatory hypothesis” (Berger and DeYoung 1997), the “franchise value” (Keeley 1990) 
and “risk-shifting” paradigm (Boyd and De Nicolo 2005), the “quiet life” hypothesis (Berger and Hannan 1998), 
the “efficient structure hypothesis” (Demsetz 1973) and the “information generating hypothesis” (Marquez 2002) 
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that the traditional banking approach could bring to the non-community banks’ financial 
profile, and the specific channels through which it materialises. Furthermore, we seek to 
identify any limitations of the traditional banking approach upon the financial profile of 
community banks.  
Our empirical findings document that after controlling for bank- specific and macroeconomic 
factors commonly present in other banking studies, community banks have higher 
capitalisation ratios, superior cost efficiency, greater financial stability and higher market 
power than their non-community counterparts. Furthermore, we verify a positive relationship 
between stability and capitalization for both bank types in accordance with the “moral hazard 
hypothesis”. Banks with lower levels of risk need less capital to compensate for potential losses 
from their loan portfolio, while banks that are better capitalised have lower probability of 
default. We also find a positive relationship between capitalisation and cost efficiency. 
Efficient banks utilise their resources better and achieve high earnings without the need to take 
on excessive risks and/or push capitalisation buffers to the limit. Additionally, we document a 
negative relationship between efficiency and stability, typically evidence of risky, cost 
skimping practices, albeit only for the non-community banks. Competition affects the financial 
profile of banks in a complex way. Among the non-community banks, we find strong support 
for the “competition-fragility” hypothesis. The evidence is more muted for the community 
banks, where their relationship-based approach and loan due diligence process are robust to 
competitive pressure. The fragility of the non-community banks is further aggravated by the 
lower – around 22 times – marginal effect of competition compared to the community banks 
that affects their capitalisation. The higher marginal effect of capitalisation on financial 
stability for community banks is supportive of the smoother regulatory touch for this bank type. 
We find support for the “information generating hypothesis” (Marquez 2002) as higher market 
power increases the efficiency of banks. The community banks reap the most benefits as their 
business model emphasizes on unique loan-level and/or bank-level characteristics; thus giving 
them information monopoly. With regards to the drivers of market power at the bank level, we 
find stability to be the key determinant, with a positive link for both bank types. In addition, 
market power is increased through higher efficiency in the case of non-community banks, and 
higher liquidity creation in the case of community banks. Finally, we find that a shift towards 
a traditional banking approach in the non-community banks can increase their stability, 
efficiency and market power. This is largely manifested through the channels of relationship 
lending and branch networks, whereby the former can bring significant benefits in both stability 
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and efficiency, and the latter is associated with increased market power. The traditional banking 
approach is not panacea, as evidenced by its quadratic relationship (U-shaped or inverse U-
shaped) to each of capitalisation, stability, efficiency and market power. However, the majority 
of the community banks experience the positive side of this relationship.  
We contribute to the banking literature in three ways. This is the first study to introduce an 
important fourth factor in the capital-efficiency-stability nexus that has long been precluded - 
competition. Amidst financial consolidation, globalisation and market deregulation; 
competition has been at the epicentre of banking research, see for example Allen et al. (2011), 
Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) and Keeley (1990) and references therein documenting the 
convoluted effect of competition on bank stability and how it has shifted through the years. 
Second, by introducing banking model dynamics in the above framework we provide novel 
results about how an alternative banking model (community banks) fares against its 
competitors. Community banks are renowned for their traditional banking model and 
relationship banking approach, but whether this manifests advantages (or disadvantages) upon 
their financial profile has been previously unexplored. In a related context, Islamic banks40 
command increased customer loyalty and enjoy lower credit risk (Beck et al. 2019; Abedifar 
et al. 2013). Third, and to the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to quantify the 
benefits and limitations of the traditional banking model to non-community and community 
banks respectively. To do so, we go further than the extant binary classification of community 
banks, and gauge the exact channels through which the traditional banking model operates (i.e., 
relationship lending, deposit funding, traditional income and branch coverage), which are used 
to construct a continuous variable measuring the intensity of traditional banking activities at 
the bank-level. 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the relevant 
literature.  Section 4.3 presents the methodology used in this study. In section 4.4 we describe 
the data. We present and discuss the results in section 4.5. Finally, section 4.6 summarises and 




40 Islamic banks are a type of an alternative banking model largely practiced in the Middle and Far-East. Like 
community banks, Islamic banks are also proponents of the relationship banking approach. 
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4.2 Theoretical background 
4.2.1 The capital-risk-efficiency nexus 
A number of studies have focused on the impact of capital (Gropp and Heider 2010), efficiency 
(Casu and Girardone 2009), business model (Scott and Dunkelberg 2010) and competition 
(Schaeck and Cihak 2014) on bank risk. Several studies have recognised the existence of 
intertemporal relationships between subsets of these variables, most notably the capital-risk-
efficiency nexus. Berger and DeYoung (1997) use Granger-causality techniques to test four 
hypotheses regarding the relationships between bad loans, cost efficiency and capitalization for 
US commercial banks from 1985 to 1994. They refer to these hypotheses as the “bad luck”, 
“bad management”, “skimping” and “moral hazard” hypotheses. Their findings show that 
relationships between bad loans and cost efficiency run in both directions. The “bad luck” 
hypothesis assumes that exogenous events affect the performance of bank’s investments. 
Therefore, an increase in non-performing loans would bring additional costs to deal with these 
loans and would translate to a decrease in cost efficiency. As such, an increase in bank risk 
may precede a decline in efficiency. The “bad management” hypothesis implies that poor 
senior management quality would lead to low levels of cost efficiency. It is argued that 
inefficient banks would have higher costs related to operating expenses and/or monitoring of 
its investments, hence bank risk would be higher. As such, declines in efficiency are likely to 
precede rises of bank risk. Under the “cost skimping” hypothesis, the bank managers are 
willing to exploit the lag in the relationship between efficiency and risk. Managers reduce 
short-term operating costs associated with underwriting and monitoring loans which makes the 
bank appear to be more cost efficient in the short run because lower operating expenses support 
the same quantity of outputs. However, as time passes, deterioration in the loan portfolio 
becomes apparent. The “moral hazard” hypothesis posits that managers of thinly capitalized 
banks are more likely to take on higher risks, reflective perhaps of the lower shareholder 
engagement in the bank management. By contrast, when capitalization is high, such moral 
hazard problems are reduced since shareholders are more actively involved in the bank’s 
operations (Fiordelisi et al. 2011). The Basel Accord attempts to control bank risk through 
capital adequacy requirements. The framework that governs the capitalization levels of banks 
is built on the premise of risk-weighted assets. The intended effect that higher capitalization 
will limit bank’s risk-taking behaviour is described through the “regulatory” hypothesis. This 
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hypothesis supports a positive relationship between capitalization and bank risk, which is 
plausible since regulators require banks to increase their capital in proportion to the risk taken.  
Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997) employ a simultaneous equation framework to examine the 
interrelationships between risk, capitalization and efficiency for US banking organizations 
during the period 1986 to 1995. They find that declines in efficiency precede rises of risk – 
both credit and interest rate risk and capital. This offers support for the “bad management” 
hypothesis, whereas the negative effect of efficiency on capital is attributed to pressure from 
the regulators for inefficient banks to hold more capital. Their results also show a positive 
relationship between capital and efficiency. Hughes and Mester (1998) find evidence that US 
bank managers are risk averse and they use capital level to signal risk. At any level of bank 
performance, they increase capital to control for risk management. Altunbas et al. (2007) do 
not find a strong relationship between efficiency and risk-taking for European banks during the 
period 1992 to 2000, which contradicts the evidence from the US literature. Their results 
suggest that less efficient banks hold higher levels of capital and take on less risk. They also 
find a positive relationship between risk and capital, in support of the “regulatory hypothesis”. 
Fiordelisi et al. (2011) employ Granger-causality methods to assess the intertemporal 
relationships between capital, risk and efficiency for a sample of European commercial banks 
from 1995 to 2007. Their results show a bi-directional relationship between efficiency and risk 
which confirms the “bad management” hypothesis. They also show that higher bank capital 
leads to improvements in cost efficiency, suggesting that better capitalized banks are more 
likely to reduce their costs. They also find that banks that are more efficient become better 
capitalized and that higher capital positively affects efficiency. Little evidence is found for the 
“moral hazard” hypothesis between capital and risk and is mostly driven by accounting-based 
and not market-based risk proxies. In the Chinese banking, Tan and Floros (2013) find a 
positive relationship between (credit) risk and efficiency and a negative between (insolvency) 
risk and capitalization.  
4.2.2 The role of competition 
4.2.2.1 The link between competition and risk 
The trade-off between bank competition and stability has been a controversial issue among 
policy makers and academic circles alike, particularly since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) 
of 2007 (Berger et al. 2004; Martinez-Miera and Repullo 2010; Wagner 2009). Two 
competitive views have emerged in the banking research on the relationship between 
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competition and stability. Under the “franchise value” paradigm, which was proposed by 
Keeley (1990), increased competition can erode the franchise value of banks thus forcing them 
to pursue riskier policies, leading to financial fragility. On the other hand, the “risk-shifting” 
paradigm argues that excessive competition could lower loan rates, thus decrease borrower’s 
credit risk and promote financial stability (Boyd and De Nicolo 2005). The “competition -
stability/fragility” nexus has been a debated issue in the banking literature. Martinez-Miera and 
Repullo, (2010) combine these opposite views and show that there exists a U-shaped 
relationship between bank competition and stability. In their model increased competition 
reduces the borrower’s probability of default when loan rates decrease (risk-shifting effect). 
However, there also exists a “margin effect” that decreases interest payments from bank’s 
performing loans. Hence, the risk first decreases and then increases as competition increases.  
Empirical research investigates this competition-stability/fragility nexus in different economies 
and the results are best described as mixed. Empirical results from Keeley (1990) suggest that 
increased competition brought by relaxation of interstate banking restrictions in the 1980s 
caused large US bank holding companies to take on more risk. Boyd et al. (2006) using two 
large samples, a 2003 cross-sectional sample of US banks and a panel data set from 134 non-
industrialized countries for the period 1993-2004, find a negative relationship between 
competition, as measured by the HHI, and probability of failure, as measured by the Z-score. 
Their results however are dependent on two different model specifications. The first model 
(CVH), which allows for competition in the deposit but not in the loan market, predicts a 
positive relationship between competition and stability. The second model (BDN) implies a 
negative relationship. Similar theoretical results are obtained by Boyd et al. (2009) suggesting 
that the relationship between bank competition and stability depends on the model specification 
and can be reversed by adopting a different specification. Their empirical results, obtained from 
the same two datasets as per Boyd et al. (2006), show that as the market becomes more 
competitive, the risk of failure decreases, thus giving support for the “competition stability” 
doctrine.  
Goetz (2018), Goetz et al. (2016) and Jiang et al. (2017) examine how the process of interstate 
banking deregulation affects competition. Regulatory restrictions in the US prohibited banks 
from interstate banking for many decades. During the 1980s and 1990s, individual states 
gradually lifted these restrictions and allowed banks to expand across states and compete with 
local banks. Finally, the Riegle-Neal Act (1994) removed all remaining barriers to interstate 
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banking and branching. The removal of entry barriers fostered competition across banks. 
Interstate banking deregulation allowed banks to enjoy benefits of geographic diversification. 
That geographic expansion lowers Bank Holding Companies’ risk, by enabling banks to 
diversify their exposure to idiosyncratic local market risks (Goetz et al. 2016). Jiang et al. 
(2017) find empirical evidence for the “competition fragility” paradigm for the US banks over 
the 1980s and 1990s. Competition reduces bank profits and bank charter values, increases the 
provision of non-traditional banking products and decreases relationship lending. The findings 
of Goetz (2018) suggest that removal of interstate banking restrictions is associated with an 
increase in bank stability. Because removing entry barriers fosters competition, their finding 
supports the “competition-stability” doctrine.  
Empirical evidence on the relationship between regulation, competition and stability in the EU 
is ambiguous as well. National regulations, such as restriction on activities, capital 
requirements and supervisory power, shape the risk-taking behaviour of banks and this is 
channelled through the market power possessed by banks (Agoraki et al. 2011). Empirical 
results from their study suggest that banks with more market power have a lower probability 
of default. Uhde and Heimeshoff (2009) find evidence consistent with the “competition-
stability” view across the EU-25 over the period 1997 to 2005 and suggest that national banking 
market concentration has a negative impact on bank’s stability as measured by the Z-score. A 
more recent study by Leroy and Lucotte (2017) find evidence in line with the “competition-
fragility”  doctrine, suggesting that listed European banks, when facing with more competition, 
take on more risk, thus increase individual bank fragility. Using a global sample, Berger et al. 
(2009) find support for both the “competition-stability” and “competition-fragility” paradigms. 
Banks with more market power hold more loan portfolio risk but may bear less overall risk 
exposure by increasing their equity capital or engage in risk-mitigating activities.  
4.2.2.2 The link between competition and efficiency 
Competition and efficiency are closely related in banking. The Efficient structure hypothesis 
(ESH) suggests that more efficient banks survive competitive pressures and acquire market 
shares, thus efficiency determines market structure (Demsetz 1973).41  Berger and Hannan 
(1998) employ a sample of US banks from 1980 to 1989 and find evidence that the “quiet life” 
 
 
41 Market structure hypothesis suggests reverse causality between efficiency and market structure. 
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hypothesis prevails in the US banking. The “quiet life” hypothesis posits that banks operating 
in less competitive markets exhibit lower cost efficiency than banks that are more exposed to 
competition. This can be because managers do not have the incentives to work as hard or they 
pursuit objectives other than profit maximization. Hence, under the “quiet life” hypothesis 
market power determines efficiency. Koetter et al. (2012) use efficiency-adjusted Lerner 
indices and they find support for the ESH rather than the “quiet life” hypothesis for US bank 
holding companies for the period 1986 to 2006. Marquez (2002) introduces a model that 
proposes an adverse direction between competition and efficiency, which is referred in the 
literature as the “Information Generating Hypothesis” (IGH). In this model, increased 
competition leads to inefficiency. As competition increases, this creates “information 
dispersion” among a larger number of small banks. These banks have now less information 
about the market and thus they are less effective in their screening process. This implies a 
higher likelihood of adverse selection that leads to bank inefficiencies. Maudos and de Guevara 
(2007) find a negative relationship between competition and cost efficiency for EU banks over 
the period 1993 to 2002, thus rejecting the “quiet life hypothesis” of Berger and Hannan (1998).   
4.2.2.3 The competition-risk-efficiency nexus 
Another strand of literature examines the simultaneous relationship between competition, 
efficiency and stability. Schaeck and Cihák (2008) find empirical evidence that competition 
increases bank stability, via the efficiency channel for both a European and US sample. The 
triple relation between competition-efficiency-risk is again examined in Schaeck and Cihak 
(2014). Their results indicate that the stability-enhancing effect of competition is greater for 
healthy banks whereas fragile banks benefit less from competition, suggesting that efficiency 
is the conduit through which competition, as measured by the Boone indicator, improves 
stability. In addition, the competition-efficiency-risk nexus in developing economies has been 
examined in Turk Ariss (2010), with the results indicating that increased competition 
undermines bank stability and cost efficiency but improves profit efficiency. The theoretical 
work of De Nicolo and Lucchetta (2009) introduces two models under which more bank 
competition results in lower economy-wide risk and capital and more efficient production 
plans.  
4.2.3 Business model and hypotheses development 
Based on the distinct business model of community banks, we derive empirically testable 
hypotheses to investigate the relationships between the variables discussed above. Concerning 
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the relationship between risk and efficiency, exogenous factors affect community banks 
stronger than non-community, since they often do not have the ability to hedge against 
exogenous events. So, we expect that the “bad luck” hypothesis will get stronger support for 
this bank group. The personnel of community banks are often skilled, which would lead to 
higher levels of efficiency, suggesting that the “bad management” hypothesis is less likely to 
find support. No a priori hypothesis is made for the “cost skimping” hypothesis. In terms of the 
capital and risk relationship, we suggest that there are lower moral hazard incentives for 
community banks as they often pursue goals other than profit maximization. This implies lower 
risk for this bank type due to lower moral hazard. Due to the fact that community banks have 
more flexible regulation, we cannot make any assumptions on the “regulatory hypothesis”.  
Community banks compete against other community and non-community banks. Excessive 
competition from non-community banks could induce community banks to increase risk, as 
they would be afraid of losing customers and they would not want to break any long-term 
relationships they have with them (Besanko and Thakor 2010). So, we expect to find evidence 
of the “franchise value” rather than the “risk-shifting” paradigm. Concerning the relationship 
between competition and efficiency, we suggest that the “information generating hypothesis” 
would be more relevant for community banks. As competition increases, the information 
benefits that community banks derive from their proximity to their customers and the long-
term relationship with them, disperse among a larger number of small banks. This leads to more 
adverse selection and higher inefficiency.  
4.3 Methodological framework 
4.3.1 Model Specification 
The current section discusses the methodology adopted in this paper. We are specifying a 
system of four equations, one for each variable of interest, namely capitalisation, stability, 
efficiency and market power. We rely on a three stage least square estimation (3SLS) to 
investigate the relationships between these variables in line with Tan and Floros (2013). The 
advantage of this approach is that it takes into account endogeneity and the cross correlation 
between the error terms. The system of equations is given below:  
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𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽0𝐶𝐵
+  𝛽1𝐶𝐵𝑖𝑡 × 𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐵𝑖𝑡 × 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐵𝑖𝑡 × 𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶𝐵𝑖𝑡 × 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐶𝐵𝑖𝑡 × 𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 
(4.1) 
𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾3𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾4𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾5𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿0𝐶𝐵
+  𝛿1𝐶𝐵𝑖𝑡 × 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿2𝐶𝐵𝑖𝑡 × 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿3𝐶𝐵𝑖𝑡 × 𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿4𝐶𝐵𝑖𝑡 × 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛿5𝐶𝐵𝑖𝑡 × 𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 
(4.2) 
𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑡 = 0 + 1𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 2𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 3𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 4𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 5𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑖𝑡 + 0𝐶𝐵
+  1𝐶𝐵𝑖𝑡 × 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 2𝐶𝐵𝑖𝑡 × 𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 3𝐶𝐵𝑖𝑡 × 𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 4𝐶𝐵𝑖𝑡 × 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡
+ 5𝐶𝐵𝑖𝑡 × 𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 
(4.3) 
𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇0 + 𝜇1𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇2𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇3𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇4𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇5𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑖𝑡 + 𝜎0𝐶𝐵
+  𝜎1𝐶𝐵𝑖𝑡 × 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝜎2𝐶𝐵𝑖𝑡 × 𝑆𝑇 + 𝜎3𝐶𝐵𝑖𝑡 × 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝜎4𝐶𝐵𝑖𝑡 × 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜎5𝐶𝐵𝑖𝑡 × 𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 
(4.4) 
Where subscripts i and t denote banks and quarters respectively. CA denotes the capitalisation 
and is proxied by the ratio of Equity/Assets. ST denotes insolvency risk and is proxied by the 
z-score. EFF is cost efficiency and MP is market power proxied by the Lerner Index. CB is the 
community bank dummy and takes the value of 1 for a community bank, zero otherwise. 
𝐶𝐵𝑖𝑡 × 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡, 𝐶𝐵𝑖𝑡 × 𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡, 𝐶𝐵𝑖𝑡 × 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑡   and 𝐶𝐵𝑖𝑡 × 𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑡 are the interactions between the 
community bank dummy and the four endogenous variables (i.e. capitalisation, stability, 
efficiency and market power) respectively. Bank and Macro are the exogenous, bank-specific 
and macroeconomic factors influencing the capitalisation, stability, efficiency, market power 
relationship. 𝐶𝐵𝑖𝑡 × 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡  and 𝐶𝐵𝑖𝑡 × 𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑖𝑡  are the interactions between the community 
bank dummy and bank- specific and macroeconomic control variables respectively and 𝑖𝑡  is 
the random error term. 
4.3.2 Endogenous Variables 
Capitalisation is calculated as the ratio of Equity over Total Assets, with higher values denoting 
a more capitalised bank. To proxy for financial stability we employ the z-score, a commonly 
used measure in the banking literature, see for example (Imbierowicz and Rauch 2014; Laeven 
and Levine 2009). The z-score calculates the number of standard deviations that the bank’s 
return on assets must fall below its mean to deplete equity as a percentage of assets. Higher 
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profitability and capitalisation increase the z-score whereas more earnings volatility decreases 
it. Therefore, higher values of the z-score indicate more financially stable banks. To construct 
the z-score we follow Cihák and Hesse (2007) where the z-score considers only the last period 
value for the equity/assets and the ROA, while it computes 𝜎(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑇) over the whole sample 
period.42 We construct the z-score as follows: 







We use the natural logarithm transformation as the z-score features high skewness.  
We use a Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA) to obtain estimates of cost efficiency, following 
the Kumbhakar et al. (2014) model.43 Stochastic Frontier Analysis is particularly well suited to 
deal with panel data and allows for stochastic errors. The Kumbhakar et al., (2014) model 
decomposes the unobserved fixed effects from the persistent efficiency, while maintaining the 
residual efficiency component of the earlier models. This essentially allows for a persistent 
component of efficiency that affects all banks in the sample, while another component (i.e., 
residual efficiency) identifies deficiencies in specific banks. As such the persistent efficiency 
component is associated with factors that are relatively constant over short time spans, such as 
structural inflexibilities or regulatory restrictions. The residual component reflects the usual 
managerial efficiency. However, it allows a bank’s efficiency to adjust over time as the bank 
may eradicate some of the short-term rigidities. Bank heterogeneity, which could be due to 
different business models and practices, is captured by the firm effects. To proxy for market 
power we use the Lerner Index following Beck et al. (2013). Lerner is a market power indicator 
that varies at the bank level. It captures the impact of pricing power on the asset and funding 
side of the bank and, in contrast to other market share proxies, it does not need to define a 









42 Mare et al. (2016) provide a comprehensive review of several alternative definitions of the z-score. 
43 Details on this approach are given in the Appendix 4.1. 
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Where 𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the ratio of total interest income to total loans. We assume that the bank produces 
one output, loans. We believe this is more appropriate for our case since community banks are 
more concentrated in loan generating activities. We derive marginal cost 𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡 from a translog 
cost function (explained in the Appendix 4.2). 
4.3.3 Exogenous Variables 
The bank-level control variables included are size, liquidity risk, credit risk, profitability, 
liquidity creation and loan concentration. Size is proxied by the natural logarithm of total 
assets. To proxy for liquidity risk and credit risk we use the respective measures of Imbierowicz 
and Rauch (2014). The intuition behind this proxy is that in case of sudden liquidity 
withdrawals from the bank, the full volume of liabilities may not be liquidated at short notice 
and/or without substantial cost. Hence the liquidity risk ratio subtracts the volume of all assets 
that the bank can at short-time and low-cost turn into cash from the volume of liabilities that 
can be withdrawn from the bank on short notice. It takes into account the bank’s exposure to 
the interbank lending market and derivatives market as well as off-balance sheet liquidity risk 
positions through, for example, unused loan commitments. The ratio is standardised by total 
assets with higher values of the liquidity risk ratio indicating a bank that is in worse situation 
to meet unexpected liquidity demand. Values above zero imply that the bank is not able to 
endure a sudden bank run, ceteris paribus. 
The credit risk proxy measures the unexpected loan default ratio of the bank and is calculated 
by dividing the average net loan losses (loan charge-offs minus loan recoveries) in the current 
year by the average loan loss allowance in the previous year. This measure captures the current 
riskiness of a bank’s loan portfolio and the ability of the bank’s risk management to anticipate 
near-term future loan losses. High values of the credit risk ratio suggest high credit risk for the 
particular bank.44  
Profitability is proxied by the return on assets (ROA). To account for liquidity creation we use 
the “catfat” measure of liquidity creation, as developed by Berger and Bouwman (2009). This 
measure classifies assets based on their liquidity attributes and includes off-balance sheet 
activities in its calculation. Loan concentration is measured by the Hirschman-Herfindahl 
index. It is calculated by adding the loan shares of each loan category (e.g., agriculture, 
 
 
44 Appendix 4.3 summarises the formulas for liquidity and credit risk proxies.  
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commercial….) that a bank is administering to total loans. Higher values of the Loan HHI 
indicate a more concentrated loan portfolio.  
As macroeconomic factors we include the following: i) the quarterly real GDP growth and ii) 
the quarterly inflation rate to capture the general economic conditions; iii) the Federal Funds 
rate i.e. the interest rate at which depository institutions with surplus balances in their accounts 
lend federal funds to other banks that need to quickly raise liquidity overnight; iv) the quarterly 
change in the Coincident Economic Activity Index that captures the change in the condition of 
the economy, and is calculated from four indicators, the nonfarm payroll employment, 
unemployment rate, average hours worked in manufacturing and wages and salaries; the 
unemployment rate; v) the spread between the 10-year and the 2-year treasury bond rate 
calculated as the spread between 10-year treasury constant maturity and 2-year treasury 
constant maturity; vi) and the Financial Stress Index which measures the degree of financial 
stress in the market and is constructed from 18 weekly data series: seven interest rate series, 
six yield spreads and five other indicators. Each of these variables capture unique aspect of 
financial stress. Zero value for this index represents normal financial market conditions, values 
below zero suggest below-average financial market stress and values above zero suggest 
above-average financial stress.45  
 
4.4 Data 
In this section we describe the dataset used in this study. We use quarterly data for the 2001Q1 
- 2015Q4 period, extracted from the Call Reports of US banks. For the community bank 
specialisation we rely on the FDIC definition, obtained from the respective website and we 
match it to the Call Reports data using the FDIC certificate number which uniquely identifies 
every bank in our sample. We present key descriptive statistics for the endogenous variables 
related to our research hypotheses as well as the bank-specific, macroeconomic and market 
structure exogenous control variables. Bank- specific variables have been trimmed at 1% and 
99%. Our final dataset is an unbalanced panel that consists of 11,266 banks and around half 
 
 
45 Macroeconomic data are retrieved from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
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million bank-quarter observations. Of these observations more than 433,000 refer to 
community banks and around 43,000 to non-community banks. 
Table 4.1 presents descriptive statistics for the endogenous variables used in the analysis for 
the sample of all banks, community banks and non-community banks. Capitalisation of 
community banks is lower on average than their non-community counterparts (0.112 versus 
0.138). Community banks have higher stability, suggesting that they face lower insolvency risk 
(3.156 versus 2.944). In terms of cost efficiency and market power, community banks appear 
to outperform, on average, their counterparts (0.804 versus 0.762 and 0.696 versus 0.652 
respectively).  
[Table 4.1 here] 
Table 4.2 and Figure 4.1 present the time evolution of key descriptive statistics relating to 
capitalisation, stability, efficiency and market power of the two bank types for the full sample 
on a yearly basis. Across the sample period capitalisation for non-community banks is 
consistently higher, with the difference between the two bank groups being less pronounced 
around the GFC period of 2008-2010 (Panel A). Across all the years community banks exhibit 
superior stability compared to the non-community counterparts by around 0.21 (Panel B), while 
they appear to be minimally affected by the GFC. The cost efficiency of community banks is 
consistently higher than that of the non-community banks ranging between 0.804 and 0.802 
across all years, the highest being in 2008 and the lowest in 2016 (Panel C). When it comes to 
market power, up until the years of the GFC the two groups perform closely to each other with 
community banks maintaining a slightly higher level of market power. However, following the 
GFC, the two bank groups move in opposite ways. Market power of non-community banks 
shows a markedly dip while community banks appear to be strengthening their position (Panel 
D). During the pre- crisis period community banks’ average market power stands at 0.690 but 
in the years after the crisis it increases to 0.712. For non-community banks market power stands 
on average at 0.669 before the crisis but it plunges at 0.591 in the subsequent years. It appears 
that non-community banks took a hit in terms of market power after the GFC, whereas the 
banking model of community banks made them more resilient to adverse pressure from 
competition. 
[Table 4.2 here] 
[Figure 4.1 here] 
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Table 4.3 presents descriptive statistics for capitalisation, stability, efficiency and market 
power in each state and table 4.4 ranks the states based on the mean value of each variable 
across the full sample period. A cursory inspection of these statistics shows important 
differences across the states in terms of capitalisation, with a 6.2pp difference between the 
highest (DE) and lowest (VT) states; stability, with VT (highest) exhibiting around three times 
higher financial stability than NV (lowest); efficiency, with an observed gap of 7pp between 
the most and least efficient states – Nebraska (NE) and Delaware (DE) respectively; market 
power, where banks in Hawaii (HI) are around 25% less competitive than those in RI. The 
interrelation among capitalisation, financial stability, efficiency and market power is also 
evident by the relative ranks of the states in these measures. In particular, Delaware (DE), 
Arizona (AZ) and Utah (UT) rank among the better capitalised states and among the lowest in 
stability. Alaska (AK) ranks high in terms of stability but very low in terms of efficiency and 
market power. Nebraska (NE) is one of the highest states in both efficiency and market power. 
Hawaii (HI) ranks first in terms of market power but is one of the states with the lowest overall 
stability.  
[Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 here] 
The low stability and efficiency scores for Delaware is an interesting observation. Delaware 
accounts for more than 50% of all public firms (Daines, 2001). Yet, is home to only around 
0.30% of the total US population, and contributes 0.40% of the US GDP. Delaware has one of 
the lowest shares of community banks in the US (below 39% in 2018). Community banks are 
very few here because the majority of the firms are large, and in need of more sophisticated 
financial products; yet the handful of banks operating therein have a significantly above 
average loans/assets ratio and a significantly below average security/assets ratio (see Table 
4.5). This could be suggestive that non-community banks incorporated there do not play in 
home ground; they operate largely in loans yet they lack the relationship banking approach and 
the expertise of community banks. Conversely their securities operations fall short of their non-
community bank peers across the rest of the US states.  At the same time, the prices of all input 
variables are significantly inflated compared to the rest of the US suggesting that Delaware’s 
banks absorb more resources in the process of creating more loans but yet fewer securities. 
With respect to stability, the lower z-scores for banks incorporated in Delaware are driven by 
higher volatility of ROA. Post 1998 bank’ earnings have been constant for the US in general 
but rather volatile for Delaware (Figure 4.2). North Dakota, Idaho and New Hampshire are 
states comparable to Delaware in terms of population and GDP share. However, these states 
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are at the other end of the spectrum in regard to community banking share as they are served 
exclusively by community banks. The higher stability and efficiency scores of these states 
compared to Delaware underlines the competitive advantage that community banks get from 
playing in their own field (Table 4.6). 
[Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 around here] 
[Figure 4.2 around here] 
The dynamics of capitalisation, stability, efficiency and market power at the state level are also 
insightful. Table 4.7 reports mean values in 2001, in 2015 as well as the percentage change of 
each of these measures at the state-level. In 80% of the states the average capitalisation has 
increased, with Rhode Island (RI) and New Hampshire (NH) the two states with the highest 
percentage change – 104.43% and 65.34% respectively. Despite the capitalisation increase, 
financial stability decreased in the majority of the states with the biggest decline documented  
at the state of Delaware (DE) – at around 22.26%, while the state of Vermont (VT) reported a 
much smaller increase of around 2.26%. Marked increases in efficiency are documented for 
the majority of the states, with the largest and smallest change of 5.39% and -1.03% for the 
states of Rhode Island (RI) and South Carolina (SC) respectively. During the study period the 
US banking system has turned less competitive at the state level, with banks increasing their 
market power in 46 out of the 50 states. The largest increase in market power is reported in 
Nevada (NV) around 17.90%, while Hawaii (HI) is one of the few states that market power 
dropped – at around 17.21%.  
[Table 4.7 here] 
Table 4.8 summarizes the main descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables used in the 
3SLS analysis for the full sample (Panel A), community banks (Panel B) and non-community 
banks (Panel C). The average value of bank assets (in natural logs) is 11.753 for the community 
banks and 13.638 for the non-community indicating that there is a significant size advantage 
for the non-community banks, as we expected. With respect to profitability, the mean value of 
ROA is significantly higher for the non-community banks compared to the community (6% 
against 5% respectively). In addition, liquidity risk is higher in community banks compared to 
the non-community (0.175 against 0.125 respectively), which may be plausible due to the fact 
that the community banks have limited access to money markets to attract funding in case of 
emergency. Community banks have significantly lower credit risk compared to the non-
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community banks (0.152 against 0.256 respectively). The loan concentration is significantly 
higher for community banks, which may be reflective to the traditional banking business of 
deposit-taking/loan-making that these banks engage into. Non-community banks appear to 
create more liquidity than their community counterparts (0.486 versus 0.301). 
[Table 4.8 here] 
4.5 Empirical Results 
Table 4.9 presents estimated coefficients and robust standard errors in parenthesis from the 
three-stage least square estimation of the system of equations described in the previous section. 
Equation Ⅰ presents the estimates for the capitalisation equation. Equation Ⅱ shows the 
estimates of the stability equation that uses the z-score.  For the cost efficiency equation, the 
results are represented in equation Ⅲ and equation Ⅳ presents the estimates related to market 
power. All four equations contain the community bank dummy variable, interactions of the 
community bank dummy with the endogenous variables and interactions of the community 
bank dummy with explanatory bank- specific and macroeconomic variables. 
[Table 4.9 here] 
4.5.1 Results on Capital 
Results from estimates of equation Ⅰ report higher capitalisation for community banks, as 
evident by the positive coefficient of the community bank dummy. Essentially all banks are 
subject to regulatory capital requirements; community banks though, appear to be more 
affected by adverse shocks and for this reason they hold higher capital buffers to confront times 
of distress. Moreover, community banks have fewer opportunities to diversify and withhold 
higher capital levels for extra security. Stability and capitalisation are positively linked46, 
whereby capital works as a cushion to compensate for losses and banks operating at lower risk 
levels need lower capitalisation. Although the direction of this effect is the same for both bank 
groups, the magnitude of the effect is more pronounced for non-community banks. Our results 
indicate a positive link between cost efficiency and capitalisation, which may reflect the fact 
 
 
46 The positive relation between stability and capitalisation is in line with the findings of Tan and Floros (2013) 




that more efficient banks have higher earnings, and this causes increases in capital. The 
magnitude of the effect is about 20 times more pronounced for non-community banks. In terms 
of market power, we find a negative link with capitalisation. Banks with higher market power 
may be subject to regulatory forbearance in times of distress and thus hold less capital. 
Increased competition causes banks to hold higher capital levels, most likely as a buffer against 
the elevated probability of default that arises from operating in a more competitive 
environment. However, this effect is 22 times less pronounced for community banks. This 
result can be explained by the fact that issuing equity is more costly, especially for this bank 
group. Community banks have relatively greater difficulties to draw on capital markets. At 
times of higher competitiveness, it is more likely for community banks to turn to attracting 
more deposits rather than issuing more equity. 
In summary, community banks hold higher capital levels than non-community banks and their 
capitalisation is less responsive to changes in their stability, cost efficiency and market power.  
4.5.2 Results on Stability 
The community bank dummy enters the equation with a positive coefficient suggesting higher 
stability for this bank group. Results from estimates of equation Ⅱ suggest that there is a 
positive relationship between capital and stability, meaning that stability increases when capital 
increases. Holding more capital reduces the probability of bankruptcy as the bank is more 
capable of absorbing the losses incurred from non-performing loans and this enhances bank 
stability. This may relate to actions taken by the regulators, who would encourage banks to 
increase their capitalisation (reduce leverage) with the anticipated reaction being that the 
stability of these banks would increase. Also, managers of better capitalised banks have less 
moral hazard incentives to take on higher risk, resulting in higher stability for their banks; thus 
supporting the moral hazard hypothesis (Berger and DeYoung, 1997). Allowing for a 
difference in the business model does not change the direction of the relationship, but the 
magnitude of the response for community banks is around five times lower than that of the 
non-community ones. Furthermore, our results offer evidence of a “skimping behaviour” for 
both bank types as we find a negative relationship between efficiency and stability, indicating 
that more efficient banks bear higher risk. Bank managers, in their attempt to improve bank’s 
cost efficiency in the short-run, reduce operating costs associated with loan due diligence. In 
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the long-run though the deterioration of the quality of the loan portfolio becomes apparent.47 
The coefficient of the community bank interaction suggests that the direction of the effect is 
the same for this bank type, but the magnitude is two times smaller. In terms of competition 
we find clear evidence for the “competition-fragility” doctrine for both bank groups, with the 
effect being less pronounced for community banks as the lower coefficient on market power 
suggests (2.301-0.403=1.898). Under increased competition the bank is more tempted to 
pursue riskier policies and the likelihood of adverse selection increases resulting in 
deterioration of its overall soundness. In higher competition discounts in the quality of the 
borrowers is likely. For community banks the positive effect of greater market power on 
stability is less pronounced indicating that their loan due diligence process remains less 
vulnerable to competitive pressure. 
Overall, the financial stability of community banks is less responsive to regulatory 
capitalisation changes and to cost skimping behaviour, whereas more competition is not as 
much a detriment for them as it is for their non-community counterparts.   
4.5.3 Results on Efficiency 
Results from estimates of equation Ⅲ show that community banks are more efficient than their 
non-community counterparts. Higher capitalisation is associated with increased efficiency, 
however, community banks benefit around 20 times less from it. Banks that hold more capital 
adopt more risk reduction practices and appear to be more cost efficient. Community banks 
though might lack the managerial quality and sophisticated mechanisms to translate the 
additional equity capital into cost benefits. In terms of stability, riskier banks appear to be more 
efficient. Those banks are tempted to take on more risk to boost efficiency producing a positive 
relationship between risk and cost efficiency. The magnitude of this effect is 1.5 times smaller 
for community banks, suggesting that this bank type is less prone to this behaviour compared 
to non-community banks. Moreover, we document a positive link between efficiency and 
market power, i.e. negative link between efficiency and competition. Our results suggest that 
more competition among banks leads to inefficiency, thus rejecting the “quiet life” hypothesis 
of Berger and Hannan (1998). This result can be explained by a couple of reasons. Increased 
competition brings managers additional pressure to upgrade the quality of banking services 
 
 
47 It has been noted that banks may pursue higher cost efficiency strategies to enable them to take on more risk, 
see Altunbas et al. (2007). 
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provided. This increases operating costs and results in lower cost efficiency. In addition, more 
competition comes with a higher likelihood of adverse selection since it creates information 
dispersion among a larger number of banks and banks become less effective in their screening 
process. As the number of risky borrowers increases the monitoring costs increase as well. This 
result offers support for the information generating hypothesis of Marquez (2002). The 
magnitude of the effect though is very different between the two bank groups. For non-
community banks competition is eight times more harmful for their efficiency than it is for 
community banks, suggesting that changes in their market power do not affect community 
banks’ efficiency as much as they do for non-community.  
In sum, community banks’ efficiency benefits less from higher capitalisation and they are less 
prone to cost skimping behaviour to boost their efficiency. Competition does not affect their 
efficiency as unfavourably as it does with non-community banks.  
4.5.4 Results on Market Power 
The community bank dummy enters equation Ⅳ with a positive coefficient. Community banks 
hold proprietary information about their customers obtained through multiple interactions with 
them. This may give them information monopoly which translates into higher market power 
(Boot 2000). Clients prefer them on the basis of doing business with their local banker, perhaps 
instilling a sense of loyalty or help in times of need. Customers of community banks are willing 
to go the extra mile in order to do banking with a bank they trust. The relationship orientation 
of these banks makes them more unique relative to their competitors and this helps to alleviate 
competitive pressure. Stability and efficiency are positively related to market power. 
Institutions that maintain a sound loan portfolio, better asset quality and more sophisticated 
cost efficiency structures are more resilient to competitiveness in the market. The same holds 
for both community and non-community banks however the positive effect of efficiency on 
market power is much less for community banks. Furthermore, we notice a negative 
relationship between capitalisation and market power, (i.e. Lerner Index). A reduction in the 
Lerner Index can be explained by a reduction in the bank’s relative mark-up of the market 
output price over the marginal cost. When this is falling the bank does not have the power to 
charge a lot more than what it costs to produce the service or it does not make abnormal profits. 
Additional equity lowers the bank’s risk appetite so that it targets “safer loans” and that lowers 
per period profits for the bank. Also, the bank attracts funding from equity and liabilities. The 
defining characteristic of liabilities such as deposits and bonds, is that payments for them must 
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be made by the bank and cannot be deferred. However, payments associated with equity are 
either in the form of a share price that is not immediately controlled by the bank or a dividend, 
which level can change. The bank can avoid paying both, so more equity does not put as 
pressure on the bank to perform relatively better in the market. The effect of capitalisation on 
market power for community banks is less pronounced, probably because they have fewer 
opportunities to diversify. 
Overall, community banks have higher market power and are less competitive due to the 
uniqueness of the way they do banking. Capitalisation, stability and efficiency do not affect 
their market power as unfavourably as it does with non-community banks. 
4.5.5 Impact of bank- specific, market structure and macroeconomic variables 
In terms of bank- specific variables, we find a significant and positive relationship between 
liquidity creation and cost efficiency for both bank groups, with the effect being 1.5 times more 
pronounced for non-community banks. The more liquidity the bank creates the greater the 
likelihood of having to dispose illiquid assets to meet liquidity demands. The bank compensates 
for that by being more efficient in its operations. This is more intense for non-community banks 
as they are subject to greater market discipline and more regulatory scrutiny. Our results also 
suggest that liquidity creation is harmful for the institution’s market power. This sends a signal 
to the market that can harm the bank’s market power.  Berger et al. (2010) indicate that 
regulators identify banks that create more liquidity and intervene to constrain it. Regulatory 
interventions and capital injections are associated with lower risk taking and liquidity creation. 
Both effects may be desirable since prominent bailed out institutions Northern Rock and UBS 
in the UK and Switzerland respectively were considered excessive liquidity creators. In this 
sense, our findings provide confirmatory evidence that regulators and bankers associations can 
identify high liquidity creators and intervene to constrain it. Size positively affects market 
power for both bank groups, however the magnitude is around 8.5 times more pronounced for 
non-community banks. Community banks do not reap as many advantages in terms of 
competitiveness by growing bigger as non-community banks do. Both liquidity and credit risk 
unfavourably affect stability for both bank groups. 
A positive relationship between financial stress index and market power is evidenced for non-
community banks, while the opposite holds for community banks. At times of financial 
turbulence there is more intense competition among community banks. This is plausible given 
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the fact that community banks luck the sophisticated financial instruments and know-how to 
reverse unfavourable financial conditions, so they are adversely affected by higher financial 
stress in the market. Economic development as measured by real GDP growth affects positively 
non-community banks’ market power and higher inflation adversely effects community banks’ 
market power. 
4.5.6 The channels of the traditional banking model 
At this section we construct a traditional banking variable based on four characteristics that are 
associated with traditional banking practices.48 First, relationship lending is one key 
characteristic of the traditional banking model and is proxied by the percentage of relationship 
loans to total assets. Relationship loans is the sum of business loans (i.e. commercial and 
industrial loans) and household loans (i.e. consumer loans and residential mortgages). A second 
distinctive feature of the traditional banking model is the use of relationship deposits to fund 
bank assets. The ratio of core deposits to total assets are used as a proxy for relationship 
deposits. Third, a bank that uses the traditional banking model will generate most of its income 
from traditional banking activities such as net interest margins, charges for services to 
depositors and fiduciary activities rather than non-interest income generating activities. Total 
traditional income includes the sum of traditional fee income (i.e. income from fiduciary 
activities and services charges on deposit accounts) and net interest income to total operating 
income. The fourth feature associated with traditional banking is the network of branches, 
measured as number of branches per $1000 of assets. Descriptive statistics for the variables 
associated with these activities are reported at Table 4.10 for the full sample and for community 
and non-community banks separately. The traditional banking variable (TBV) is equal to the 
percentage for which each bank exceeds the sample median of the four attributes calculated 
over a 3-year rolling window, takes values from 0 to 1 and measures the intensity at which the 
bank engages in traditional banking.  





48 A similar approach has been used in Chiorazzo et al. (2018). 
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4.5.6.1 Benefits of traditional banking to non-community banks 
Using the traditional banking variable described earlier, we test if and how the use of a more 
traditional banking approach, typically implemented by community banks, by the non-
community banks affects key aspects of their operations along the lines of capitalization, 
stability, efficiency and market power. To do so, we re-estimate our main model (see section 
4.3.1) only for the non-community banks, while including the traditional banking variable. The 
results of this estimation are presented in Table 4.11. 
[Table 4.11 here] 
Apart from the capitalisation equation, the coefficient of the traditional banking variable is 
significant and positive in all three other equations. This result indicates that there are prima 
facie advantages in terms of stability, efficiency and market power for non-community banks 
that are more oriented towards a traditional banking modus operandi. Especially when it comes 
to market power, the bank can reap significant benefits in terms of competitiveness if it follows 
this kind of traditional approach.  
We take the analysis a step further to examine the specific channels through which the 
traditional banking approach bestows benefits upon the key aspects of non-community bank 
operations that the analysis presented in Table 4.11 identified. We augment the model 
estimated in Table 4.11 by allowing the interactions of the traditional banking variable (TBV) 
with each of the four channels that constitute the traditional banking model, namely 
relationship lending (RL/TA), deposit funding (Core deposits/TA), traditional income 
(TTI/TA), branch coverage (NB/TA). We estimate these models only for the non-community 
banks, and we allow for median sample splits based on total assets (Large/Small Banks) and 
the Traditional Banking Variable, which signifies non-community banks that are closer/further 
away from the traditional banking model (High/Low). For brevity we report only the 
coefficients and the robust standard errors of the interaction terms in Table 4.12. 
[Table 4.12 around here] 
For each of the four variables of interest we discuss the channels through which the benefits 
are bestowed in turn. In terms of capitalisation, high relationship lending (RL / TA) and deposit 
funding (Core deposits / TA) are linked with lower capitalization levels. The result is consistent 
across small and large banks as well as high and low traditional banking activity. By contrast, 
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higher traditional income (TTI / TA) and more extensive branch network is related with higher 
capitalization. Overall, and as it can be inferred from Table 4.11, traditional banking practices 
do not significantly affect the capitalization levels of non-community banks. 
In terms of stability, there is a significant and positive effect from traditional banking practices. 
An examination of the channels suggest that part of the benefit emerges from the increased use 
of relationship lending (RL / TA) and deposit funding (Core deposits / TA) practices. Asset-
based splits suggest that the stability of large banks benefits more from higher relationship 
lending (RL / TA), while the stability of small banks is better enhanced through higher deposit 
funding (Core deposits / TA). Activity-splits show comparable gains for banking stability in 
both groups. Notable is the impact of traditional income (TTI / TA) on stability. Irrespective 
of bank size, gains in financial stability are anticipated through higher shares of traditional 
income (TTI / TA). However, catalytic is the importance of whether these banks are keen users 
of traditional banking approaches, with those populating the lower category (Low TBV) 
observing reductions in stability.49 
Similar to stability, a significant positive effect of traditional banking practices on efficiency 
is also evidenced. Further examining of the channels shows that non-community banks with 
higher relationship lending practices (RL / TA) are linked with higher efficiency. The effect is 
more pronounced for small banks and keen users of traditional banking approaches (High 
TBV). In addition, small banks with higher shares of traditional income (TTI / TA) may be 
expected to be more efficient. 
Traditional banking practices significantly enhance the market power of non-community 
banks. An examination of the channels through which this is manifested, suggests that a more 
extensive branch network (NB / TA) can increase the market power these banks command. 
This is plausibly linked to the close relationships they build and maintain with customers as 
well as the proximity benefits they enjoy around specific financial products (e.g., agricultural 
and small business loans). Furthermore, our results suggest that albeit high relationship lending 
practices (RL / TA) and increased shares of traditional income (TTI / TA) are associated with 
 
 
49 We observe that the impact of specific channels depends on the split (Large/Small bank size, High/Low TBV) 
and may occasionally not be at par with the combined effect represented in the All bank category. We attribute 
this to the confounding effects between bank size (Total Assets) and banking model (Traditional Banking 
Variable), whereby isolating a particular split may yield a certain effect but full sample may yield another. 
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stronger market power of non-community banks overall, these effects are likely susceptible to 
decreasing returns of scale as suggested by both the asset-based splits and the activity-splits. 
4.5.6.2 Limitations of traditional banking to community banks 
Using the traditional banking variable, we examine how such benefits manifest themselves 
upon community banks and whether there are points that maximise/minimize the gains to these 
banks from a traditional banking approach. We re-estimate the 3SLS model for the relationship 
between capital, stability, efficiency and market power for community banks only including 
the traditional banking variable and the quadratic term, and Table 4.13 presents the results. 
We find evidence for a quadratic relationship between the traditional banking variable and all 
four variables of interest for community banks. The results of the coefficient estimates for all 
quadratic terms suggest that the relationship between traditional banking business model and 
capitalisation, stability, efficiency and market power is a U-shaped or inverse U-shaped rather 
than a linear one.  Both stability and market power first increase and then decrease in proportion 
with the traditional banking orientation of the bank, suggesting that there exists an inversed U-
shaped relationship between these two variables and traditional banking variable. The turning 
points beyond which stability and market power decrease is when the community bank operates 
at 65.5% and 67.04% of traditional banking business respectively. Given that the mean value 
for the traditional banking variable is 43% for community banks and the maximum is 57%, 
they experience the positive relationship between stability and market power and traditional 
banking. Meanwhile, the relationship of traditional banking variable with capital and efficiency 
is a U-shaped one. The community bank can minimize the capitalisation levels held when it 
operates at 65.81% of traditional banking variable and it reaches the minimum of efficiency 
levels when it operates at 67.24% of the traditional banking.  
[Table 4.13 here] 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter we assess the relationships between capital, risk and efficiency for US banks 
over the period 2001 to 2015 and we build on previous work by including competition as a 
fourth factor in the analysis. We also distinguish between community and non-community 
banks, the former serving as a proxy for the traditional banking model. Our capitalization proxy 
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is the equity over assets ratio, we use z-score as a proxy for insolvency risk, cost efficiency is 
estimated using the Kumbhakar et al. (2014) and Lerner index captures the degree of market 
power. Previous research in community banks has used a single criterion to define them, 
namely asset size. We innovate by using the FDIC (2012) definition that includes a range of 
financial and business type screening criteria and distinguishes community banks on the base 
of doing “relationship banking”.   
With regards to the community banks’ business model, our empirical evidence suggests that 
this bank type exhibits higher capitalisation ratios, greater cost efficiency, superior financial 
stability and outperform non-community banks in terms of market power. A positive 
relationship between stability and capitalization is documented for both bank types supporting 
the “moral hazard hypothesis”. More cost-efficient banks are shown to be better capitalized as 
they do not need to exhaust capital buffers to achieve higher earnings. We also find that there 
is evidence of cost skimping behaviours for both bank groups, however the community banks 
appear to be much less prone to this kind of practices. Our results offer support for the 
“competition-fragility” doctrine, with the effect being stronger for non-community banks and 
more muted for the community ones. We also find strong support for the “information 
generating hypothesis” especially for community banks, which reap the most benefits of 
information monopoly on their efficiency performance. Marker power is increased through 
higher efficiency for non-community banks and through higher liquidity creation for 
community banks. Finally, we report that even though a shift towards the traditional banking 
model can have positive impact on stability, efficiency and market power for non-community 
banks, it is not panacea and a rather quadratic relationship is documented.  
Albeit the number of community banks in the US has been steeply declining for two decades, 
our results underline that adhering to the traditional banking business model can yield 
significant benefits both in terms of stability and efficiency. Furthermore, community banks 
have proven to be resilient in an environment of intense financial consolidation. Thus, we can 
draw the conclusion that this banking model offers the bank a unique advantage and can 




Figure 4.1: Capitalisation, stability, efficiency and market power across time for the two bank groups 
Panel A: Capitalisation 
 
Panel B: Stability 
 
Panel C: Efficiency 
 
Panel D: Market Power 
 
NOTES: Figure reports the mean values for capitalisation (Equity/Assets), stability (natural logarithm of z-
score), efficiency (cost efficiency following (Kumbhakar et al. 2014) and market power (Lerner index) for 
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Figure 4.2: Earnings volatility for Delaware and US 
Panel A: ROA 
 
Panel B: Equity/Assets 
 
Panel C: SD (ROA) 
 
NOTES: Figures report the mean values for the components of stability for Delaware and 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.1: Summary statistics for capitalisation, stability, efficiency and market power 
Variable Obs Mean Median SD Min Max 
Panel A: All Banks 
Capitalisation 464,561 0.115 0.101 0.065 0.052 0.821 
Stability 464,448 3.137 3.243 0.635 0.864 4.517 
Efficiency 464,725 0.801 0.800 0.035 0.545 0.886 
Market Power 464,700 0.693 0.702 0.118 0.014 1.580 
Panel B: Community Banks 
Capitalisation 427,484 0.112 0.101 0.047 0.052 0.818 
Stability 424,265 3.156 3.261 0.627 0.864 4.517 
Efficiency 429,611 0.804 0.802 0.030 0.551 0.886 
Market Power 429,930 0.696 0.706 0.098 0.014 1.579 
Panel C: Non-Community Banks 
Capitalisation 35,593 0.138*** 0.101 0.124*** 0.052 0.821 
Stability 35,751 2.944*** 3.058*** 0.683*** 0.864 4.513 
Efficiency 35,112 0.762*** 0.779*** 0.059*** 0.545 0.884 
Market Power 34,768 0.652*** 0.640*** 0.257*** 0.014 1.580 
NOTES: The table presents summary statistics for capitalisation, stability, efficiency and risk for all banks (Panel A), 
Community banks (Panel B) and Non-Community banks (Panel C). Capitalisation is proxied by the ratio of Equity to 
Assets, stability is proxied by the natural logarithm of the z-score, efficiency measures cost efficiency following 
Kumbhakar et al. (2014) and market power is proxied by the Lerner index. Variables are trimmed at 1 and 99%. *** 





Table 4.2: Summary statistics for capitalisation, stability, efficiency and market power by year 
 Capitalisation Stability Efficiency Market Power 
Year Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max 
2001 0.113 0.068 0.053 0.820 3.177 0.606 0.879 4.514 0.799 0.037 0.547 0.886 0.666 0.114 0.016 1.579 
2002 0.112 0.066 0.052 0.821 3.159 0.607 0.865 4.515 0.800 0.037 0.547 0.886 0.678 0.118 0.016 1.579 
2003 0.112 0.066 0.052 0.818 3.150 0.604 0.865 4.514 0.800 0.037 0.547 0.886 0.678 0.120 0.016 1.578 
2004 0.113 0.067 0.052 0.820 3.136 0.608 0.877 4.514 0.800 0.036 0.547 0.886 0.688 0.117 0.020 1.579 
2005 0.115 0.072 0.052 0.819 3.125 0.615 0.864 4.513 0.801 0.036 0.547 0.886 0.697 0.116 0.015 1.577 
2006 0.119 0.080 0.053 0.820 3.112 0.623 0.870 4.516 0.801 0.036 0.547 0.886 0.699 0.113 0.018 1.579 
2007 0.122 0.081 0.052 0.819 3.103 0.637 0.873 4.516 0.801 0.035 0.547 0.886 0.696 0.114 0.014 1.578 
2008 0.119 0.075 0.052 0.821 3.057 0.666 0.864 4.516 0.801 0.035 0.547 0.886 0.688 0.123 0.015 1.579 
2009 0.113 0.059 0.052 0.821 3.041 0.683 0.867 4.516 0.801 0.035 0.546 0.886 0.680 0.129 0.014 1.576 
2010 0.112 0.056 0.052 0.819 3.076 0.669 0.866 4.517 0.801 0.035 0.547 0.886 0.698 0.126 0.015 1.580 
2011 0.114 0.055 0.052 0.821 3.112 0.650 0.865 4.514 0.801 0.034 0.547 0.886 0.707 0.124 0.020 1.579 
2012 0.116 0.055 0.052 0.821 3.168 0.665 0.864 4.516 0.801 0.034 0.545 0.886 0.703 0.110 0.016 1.542 
2013 0.115 0.055 0.052 0.820 3.163 0.647 0.869 4.516 0.801 0.034 0.545 0.886 0.699 0.115 0.014 1.579 
2014 0.116 0.052 0.052 0.821 3.189 0.632 0.867 4.516 0.800 0.034 0.545 0.886 0.706 0.112 0.014 1.553 
2015 0.118 0.051 0.052 0.819 3.216 0.621 0.869 4.517 0.800 0.034 0.547 0.886 0.709 0.109 0.014 1.420 
NOTES:  Tables reports descriptive statistics for the four endogenous variables for the full sample by year, ranging from 2001 to 2015. 
Capitalisation is proxied by the ratio of Equity to Assets, stability is proxied by the z-score, efficiency measures cost efficiency following 
Kumbhakar et al. (2014) and market power is proxied by the Lerner index. Variables are trimmed at 1 and 99%. 
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Table 4.3: Summary statistics for capitalisation, stability, efficiency and market power by state 
 Capitalisation Stability Efficiency Market Power 
State Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max 
AK 0.117 0.045 0.064 0.241 3.470 0.228 2.860 4.500 0.772 0.025 0.657 0.789 0.602 0.060 0.317 0.713 
AL 0.115 0.043 0.052 0.813 3.109 0.564 0.887 4.444 0.795 0.025 0.712 0.858 0.707 0.107 0.035 1.579 
AR 0.113 0.036 0.053 0.520 3.236 0.503 0.997 4.440 0.794 0.029 0.654 0.876 0.690 0.090 0.015 0.891 
AZ 0.128 0.075 0.052 0.806 2.385 0.669 0.871 4.439 0.796 0.039 0.580 0.878 0.627 0.154 0.016 1.545 
CA 0.125 0.070 0.052 0.817 2.724 0.698 0.866 4.516 0.785 0.031 0.565 0.878 0.649 0.160 0.016 1.577 
CO 0.100 0.035 0.052 0.675 2.861 0.628 0.870 4.450 0.789 0.042 0.626 0.877 0.683 0.112 0.021 1.575 
CT 0.110 0.049 0.054 0.643 2.774 0.814 0.873 4.242 0.795 0.041 0.615 0.849 0.638 0.150 0.052 1.553 
DE 0.156 0.108 0.053 0.725 2.604 0.715 0.867 4.503 0.750 0.077 0.561 0.847 0.651 0.261 0.014 1.554 
FL 0.114 0.062 0.052 0.810 2.624 0.734 0.865 4.507 0.791 0.029 0.645 0.881 0.645 0.127 0.016 1.579 
GA 0.108 0.048 0.052 0.772 2.690 0.695 0.866 4.509 0.800 0.023 0.631 0.869 0.669 0.098 0.026 1.578 
HI 0.108 0.049 0.057 0.449 2.517 0.713 1.185 3.949 0.791 0.009 0.781 0.808 0.761 0.384 0.054 1.579 
IA 0.109 0.031 0.052 0.355 3.326 0.396 0.870 4.516 0.811 0.024 0.717 0.865 0.734 0.075 0.016 0.930 
ID 0.124 0.067 0.055 0.724 2.839 0.653 0.883 4.505 0.793 0.027 0.733 0.858 0.627 0.091 0.232 1.469 
IL 0.105 0.031 0.052 0.812 3.151 0.650 0.864 4.516 0.801 0.030 0.584 0.877 0.698 0.106 0.016 1.579 
IN 0.108 0.032 0.055 0.497 3.385 0.515 0.921 4.503 0.796 0.032 0.556 0.859 0.669 0.102 0.057 1.577 
KS 0.110 0.035 0.052 0.635 3.254 0.507 0.872 4.471 0.814 0.028 0.705 0.880 0.724 0.091 0.022 0.900 
KY 0.112 0.033 0.052 0.621 3.285 0.519 0.874 4.483 0.806 0.023 0.683 0.871 0.685 0.088 0.024 1.568 
LA 0.108 0.031 0.053 0.743 3.270 0.462 0.933 4.502 0.794 0.028 0.705 0.865 0.697 0.099 0.023 1.578 
MA 0.102 0.082 0.053 0.817 3.244 0.633 1.040 4.449 0.788 0.023 0.723 0.841 0.632 0.166 0.014 1.559 
MD 0.104 0.038 0.053 0.736 3.003 0.645 0.876 4.516 0.791 0.015 0.732 0.841 0.638 0.113 0.018 1.573 
ME 0.095 0.029 0.053 0.379 3.251 0.580 0.880 4.160 0.797 0.014 0.775 0.826 0.616 0.108 0.042 1.458 
MI 0.105 0.034 0.053 0.627 3.053 0.665 0.865 4.487 0.799 0.023 0.612 0.868 0.659 0.111 0.020 1.566 
MN 0.105 0.032 0.052 0.586 3.035 0.529 0.867 4.488 0.816 0.027 0.603 0.883 0.727 0.078 0.017 1.381 
MO 0.105 0.030 0.052 0.610 3.175 0.520 0.872 4.509 0.807 0.027 0.696 0.885 0.702 0.090 0.021 0.906 
MS 0.106 0.024 0.053 0.537 3.268 0.476 0.897 4.420 0.790 0.037 0.551 0.865 0.671 0.107 0.024 1.562 
MT 0.107 0.028 0.062 0.411 3.087 0.540 1.071 4.482 0.813 0.027 0.667 0.862 0.730 0.081 0.108 0.881 
NC 0.114 0.064 0.052 0.788 2.846 0.722 0.879 4.484 0.790 0.025 0.617 0.852 0.624 0.138 0.017 1.578 
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ND 0.100 0.023 0.055 0.223 3.174 0.380 1.007 4.414 0.815 0.027 0.719 0.876 0.736 0.108 0.014 0.901 
NE 0.112 0.038 0.054 0.428 3.290 0.477 0.874 4.488 0.820 0.027 0.705 0.879 0.740 0.078 0.030 0.923 
NH 0.114 0.081 0.061 0.814 3.333 0.577 1.502 4.332 0.781 0.049 0.575 0.835 0.665 0.120 0.019 1.405 
NJ 0.107 0.054 0.052 0.755 2.926 0.730 0.902 4.509 0.784 0.034 0.594 0.857 0.619 0.122 0.015 1.569 
NM 0.100 0.022 0.053 0.334 2.989 0.520 0.914 4.124 0.786 0.043 0.586 0.846 0.697 0.098 0.045 1.575 
NV 0.123 0.068 0.054 0.754 2.278 0.679 0.871 4.105 0.788 0.040 0.549 0.878 0.669 0.135 0.046 1.497 
NY 0.108 0.043 0.053 0.807 3.201 0.637 0.899 4.378 0.782 0.044 0.564 0.884 0.674 0.183 0.023 1.580 
OH 0.109 0.043 0.052 0.796 3.389 0.497 0.868 4.514 0.803 0.030 0.645 0.861 0.699 0.113 0.020 1.575 
OK 0.107 0.033 0.052 0.437 3.109 0.463 0.869 4.477 0.805 0.029 0.668 0.868 0.717 0.100 0.015 1.558 
OR 0.120 0.058 0.053 0.781 2.691 0.698 0.899 4.513 0.797 0.029 0.667 0.862 0.645 0.116 0.023 1.572 
PA 0.106 0.043 0.052 0.732 3.228 0.582 0.869 4.510 0.788 0.024 0.646 0.862 0.633 0.120 0.015 1.579 
RI 0.102 0.039 0.053 0.336 3.142 0.559 1.535 4.300 0.796 0.036 0.706 0.834 0.597 0.211 0.045 1.248 
SC 0.110 0.047 0.052 0.755 2.937 0.697 0.873 4.495 0.795 0.024 0.729 0.858 0.648 0.115 0.023 1.574 
SD 0.117 0.036 0.052 0.430 3.208 0.497 0.955 4.497 0.810 0.035 0.628 0.863 0.725 0.110 0.023 1.459 
TN 0.110 0.043 0.052 0.758 3.070 0.616 0.885 4.513 0.797 0.028 0.567 0.881 0.671 0.096 0.021 1.529 
TX 0.109 0.037 0.052 0.759 3.152 0.524 0.868 4.516 0.791 0.037 0.595 0.885 0.702 0.103 0.015 1.578 
UT 0.126 0.049 0.053 0.668 2.623 0.668 0.874 4.195 0.785 0.047 0.557 0.866 0.728 0.154 0.029 1.575 
VA 0.108 0.041 0.052 0.699 3.115 0.610 0.869 4.456 0.790 0.026 0.586 0.863 0.639 0.110 0.014 1.540 
VT 0.094 0.017 0.070 0.165 3.503 0.255 2.645 4.292 0.795 0.038 0.649 0.861 0.633 0.116 0.398 1.578 
WA 0.110 0.049 0.052 0.803 2.681 0.765 0.864 4.467 0.795 0.027 0.671 0.866 0.647 0.117 0.018 1.426 
WI 0.111 0.035 0.052 0.771 3.254 0.530 0.900 4.511 0.804 0.031 0.546 0.869 0.705 0.084 0.029 1.578 
WV 0.107 0.025 0.054 0.373 3.434 0.470 1.295 4.506 0.802 0.025 0.593 0.863 0.692 0.079 0.041 0.829 
WY 0.099 0.024 0.054 0.315 2.980 0.488 0.941 4.381 0.796 0.038 0.651 0.865 0.717 0.085 0.018 0.886 
NOTES: Table reports summary statistics for the four endogenous variables of our analysis for the full sample per state. Capitalisation is proxied by the ratio of Equity 
to Assets, stability is proxied by the z-score, efficiency measures cost efficiency following Kumbhakar et al. (2014) and market power is proxied by the Lerner index. 
Variables are trimmed at 1 and 99%. 
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Table 4.4: Ranking of the states based on the endogenous variables 
State Capitalisation Stability Efficiency  Market Power 
AK 8 2 49 49 
AL 10 27 26 12 
AR 14 16 29 21 
AZ 2 49 23 44 
CA 4 41 44 33 
CO 45 37 39 23 
CT 18 40 28 39 
DE 1 47 50 32 
FL 13 45 32 37 
GA 28 43 15 28 
HI 29 48 35 1 
IA 23 7 6 4 
ID 5 39 31 45 
IL 39 23 14 17 
IN 30 5 21 29 
KS 21 12 4 9 
KY 15 9 9 22 
LA 26 10 30 19 
MA 43 15 41 43 
MD 42 32 33 40 
ME 49 14 17 48 
MI 38 30 16 31 
MN 40 31 2 7 
MO 41 20 8 15 
MS 36 11 37 25 
MT 32 28 5 5 
NC 11 38 36 46 
ND 46 21 3 3 
NE 16 8 1 2 
NH 12 6 48 30 
NJ 33 36 46 47 
NM 47 33 43 18 
NV 6 50 42 27 
NY 27 19 47 24 
OH 24 4 12 16 
OK 35 26 10 10 
OR 7 42 19 36 
PA 37 17 40 42 
RI 44 24 20 50 
SC 20 35 24 34 
SD 9 18 7 8 
TN 22 29 18 26 
TX 25 22 34 14 
UT 3 46 45 6 
VA 31 25 38 38 
VT 50 1 27 41 
WA 19 44 25 35 
WI 17 13 11 13 
WV 34 3 13 20 
WY 48 34 22 11 




Table 4.5: Mean values for the components of stability and efficiency for Delaware and US 
 All states Delaware 
Price of labour 23.783 33.005 
Price of capital 0.278 0.434 
Price of funds 0.030 1.386 
Loans/Total Assets 0.581 0.667 
Securities/Total Assets 0.271 0.151 
ROA 0.005 0.009 
Equity/Assets 0.098 0.129 
SD(ROA) 0.009 0.022 
NOTES: Table reports mean values for efficiency and stability components for Delaware and for 
























North Dakota (ND) 758,080 59,286.8 
million 
75 100% 3.174 0.815 




13 100% 2.839 0.793 




18 100% 3.333 0.781 
Delaware (DE) 965,479 74,186.7 
million 
22 Less than 
39% 
2.604 0.750 
NOTES: Table reports population size, total GDP, number of FDIC banking institutions, share of community 
banks, stability and efficiency scores for the states of North Dakota (ND), Idaho (ID), New Hampshire (NH) 




Table 4.7: Percentage change in the mean value of the endogenous variables between the beginning of our sample period and the end per state 
 Capitalisation Stability Efficiency Market Power 
State 2001 2015 diff 2001 2015 diff 2001 2015 diff 2001 2015 diff 
AK 0.137 0.115 -16.425% 3.503 3.458 -1.273% 0.757 0.777 2.748% 0.560 0.576 2.943% 
AL 0.109 0.123 12.626% 3.137 3.211 2.381% 0.794 0.795 0.109% 0.681 0.719 5.510% 
AR 0.106 0.120 12.831% 3.210 3.265 1.696% 0.793 0.797 0.416% 0.650 0.715 9.991% 
AZ 0.109 0.114 4.898% 2.610 2.171 -16.820% 0.780 0.801 2.653% 0.612 0.632 3.159% 
CA 0.103 0.121 18.113% 2.958 2.678 -9.473% 0.778 0.788 1.321% 0.605 0.671 11.033% 
CO 0.093 0.108 16.507% 2.949 2.872 -2.620% 0.785 0.800 1.974% 0.668 0.695 4.048% 
CT 0.104 0.104 0.431% 3.162 2.749 -13.058% 0.782 0.788 0.864% 0.634 0.651 2.787% 
DE 0.132 0.115 -13.044% 2.776 2.158 -22.258% 0.745 0.742 -0.485% 0.584 0.621 6.276% 
FL 0.109 0.110 1.317% 2.827 2.662 -5.847% 0.788 0.792 0.523% 0.628 0.665 5.798% 
GA 0.102 0.112 10.373% 2.877 2.785 -3.185% 0.797 0.802 0.559% 0.650 0.699 7.604% 
HI 0.079 0.109 37.022% 2.622 2.444 -6.805% 0.787 0.792 0.687% 0.726 0.601 -17.213% 
IA 0.106 0.115 8.525% 3.312 3.388 2.290% 0.811 0.810 -0.192% 0.696 0.762 9.554% 
ID 0.095 0.125 31.925% 2.888 2.805 -2.884% 0.790 0.796 0.794% 0.610 0.642 5.283% 
IL 0.101 0.112 10.647% 3.146 3.286 4.451% 0.799 0.801 0.313% 0.665 0.720 8.329% 
IN 0.104 0.110 5.633% 3.398 3.475 2.266% 0.794 0.797 0.352% 0.642 0.693 8.011% 
KS 0.108 0.114 5.718% 3.248 3.311 1.952% 0.812 0.815 0.363% 0.692 0.747 8.023% 
KY 0.104 0.122 17.261% 3.260 3.344 2.566% 0.806 0.806 0.010% 0.659 0.699 5.999% 
LA 0.111 0.113 1.539% 3.325 3.319 -0.180% 0.795 0.794 -0.124% 0.670 0.715 6.786% 
MA 0.112 0.107 -4.548% 3.353 3.215 -4.127% 0.789 0.788 -0.079% 0.627 0.619 -1.213% 
MD 0.111 0.105 -5.133% 3.177 2.995 -5.706% 0.789 0.793 0.532% 0.626 0.653 4.312% 
ME 0.086 0.102 18.270% 3.218 3.598 11.795% 0.797 0.791 -0.754% 0.577 0.656 13.817% 
MI 0.102 0.109 6.539% 3.081 3.137 1.825% 0.796 0.801 0.539% 0.634 0.668 5.327% 
MN 0.101 0.110 8.814% 3.035 3.108 2.422% 0.814 0.816 0.249% 0.699 0.755 7.944% 
MO 0.100 0.109 9.290% 3.177 3.242 2.038% 0.808 0.807 -0.137% 0.676 0.721 6.669% 
MS 0.106 0.112 5.059% 3.281 3.352 2.141% 0.792 0.788 -0.448% 0.643 0.682 6.126% 
MT 0.104 0.111 7.461% 3.193 3.061 -4.149% 0.810 0.814 0.422% 0.696 0.745 6.970% 
NC 0.123 0.108 -12.418% 3.173 2.827 -10.927% 0.783 0.790 0.899% 0.612 0.617 0.751% 
ND 0.106 0.101 -5.024% 3.256 3.189 -2.034% 0.813 0.817 0.490% 0.700 0.762 8.834% 
NE 0.112 0.113 0.908% 3.289 3.345 1.697% 0.819 0.820 0.221% 0.710 0.763 7.575% 
NH 0.087 0.177 104.426% 3.345 3.190 -4.646% 0.769 0.786 2.192% 0.680 0.685 0.718% 
NJ 0.118 0.100 -15.420% 3.217 2.796 -13.070% 0.776 0.788 1.615% 0.588 0.641 9.107% 
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NM 0.099 0.103 4.138% 2.978 3.060 2.749% 0.781 0.786 0.591% 0.662 0.716 8.210% 
NV 0.119 0.122 2.176% 2.500 2.301 -7.976% 0.767 0.803 4.652% 0.619 0.730 17.901% 
NY 0.104 0.111 6.935% 3.352 3.144 -6.202% 0.780 0.783 0.343% 0.665 0.657 -1.212% 
OH 0.103 0.114 11.126% 3.362 3.474 3.328% 0.799 0.805 0.760% 0.670 0.716 6.821% 
OK 0.106 0.110 3.237% 3.135 3.135 -0.002% 0.806 0.805 -0.115% 0.681 0.738 8.341% 
OR 0.106 0.114 7.969% 2.980 2.641 -11.375% 0.797 0.803 0.821% 0.644 0.655 1.704% 
PA 0.107 0.109 2.154% 3.328 3.265 -1.915% 0.785 0.789 0.404% 0.607 0.648 6.660% 
RI 0.079 0.131 65.335% 3.217 3.429 6.615% 0.766 0.808 5.387% 0.573 0.593 3.396% 
SC 0.112 0.108 -2.962% 3.139 2.955 -5.848% 0.799 0.791 -1.026% 0.652 0.651 -0.103% 
SD 0.115 0.117 2.186% 3.168 3.261 2.925% 0.808 0.812 0.447% 0.683 0.755 10.547% 
TN 0.106 0.110 3.233% 3.178 3.114 -2.008% 0.795 0.799 0.502% 0.645 0.694 7.605% 
TX 0.103 0.109 5.498% 3.189 3.169 -0.630% 0.790 0.790 0.005% 0.674 0.722 7.086% 
UT 0.118 0.127 7.746% 2.656 2.739 3.119% 0.784 0.778 -0.691% 0.706 0.732 3.675% 
VA 0.101 0.112 11.283% 3.267 3.101 -5.059% 0.782 0.794 1.433% 0.613 0.654 6.726% 
VT 0.096 0.095 -0.867% 3.422 3.501 2.327% 0.790 0.801 1.383% 0.611 0.626 2.437% 
WA 0.101 0.110 8.945% 2.754 2.885 4.765% 0.792 0.794 0.191% 0.625 0.660 5.597% 
WI 0.104 0.121 16.234% 3.239 3.331 2.837% 0.804 0.804 0.023% 0.667 0.728 9.154% 
WV 0.108 0.110 1.896% 3.416 3.471 1.610% 0.800 0.802 0.231% 0.660 0.701 6.162% 
WY 0.096   2.989 3.023 1.136% 0.789 0.798 1.048% 0.695 0.735 5.722% 
NOTES: Table reports mean values for the four endogenous variables per state and percentage change in the mean values between the beginning of our 
sample period (2001) and the end (2015) per state. 
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Table 4.8: Summary statistics for the explanatory variables  
Variable Obs Mean Median SD Min Max 
Panel A: All Banks 
Total Assets 479,414 11.894 11.773 1.363 4.190 21.092 
ROA 479,414 0.005 0.005 0.103 -50.841 21.720 
Liquidity Risk 469,824 0.169 0.170 0.225 -0.567 0.868 
Credit Risk 456,147 0.159 0.031 0.368 -0.178 3.479 
HHI Loans 517,453 0.562 0.497 0.225 0.146 1.000 
Liquidity Creation 413,784 0.316 0.319 0.652 -0.912 230.036 
Panel B: Community Banks 
Total Assets 432,838 11.753 11.702 1.102 7.313 17.480 
ROA 432,838 0.005 0.005 0.014 -1.392 2.309 
Liquidity Risk 430,304 0.175 0.176 0.221 -0.567 0.868 
Credit Risk 423,079 0.152 0.029 0.355 -0.178 3.479 
HHI Loans 432,684 0.574 0.506 0.224 0.163 1.000 
Liquidity Creation 379,600 0.301 0.311 0.179 -0.882 3.477 
Panel C: Non-Community Banks 
Total Assets 41,695 13.638*** 13.564*** 2.125*** 4.190 21.092 
ROA 41,695 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.344*** -50.841 21.720 
Liquidity Risk 36,893 0.125*** 0.111*** 0.249*** -0.566 0.867 
Credit Risk 32,877 0.256*** 0.065*** 0.496*** -0.177 3.478 
HHI Loans 39,955 0.553*** 0.478*** 0.255*** 0.146 1.000 
Liquidity Creation 34,184 0.476*** 0.424*** 2.181*** -0.912 230.036 
NOTES: The table presents summary statistics for the explanatory variables used in the 3SLS model for all banks (Panel 
A), Community banks (Panel B) and Non-Community banks (Panel C). Total Assets are estimated with logs. CatFat is the 
preferred measure for liquidity creation, following Berger and Bowman (2009). CatFat is normalized by GTA. GTA equals 
total assets plus the allowance for loan and lease losses and the allocated transfer risk reserve (a reserve for certain foreign 






Table 4.9: Three stage least square estimation for the relationship between Capital, Stability, Efficiency and Market power 
Variables Capital Stability Efficiency Market Power 
 Ⅰ Ⅱ Ⅲ Ⅳ 
Capital  48.43*** 0.327*** -3.185*** 
  (0.348) (0.0100) (0.0846) 
Stability 0.173***  -0.00721*** 0.0721*** 
 (0.00121)  (0.000618) (0.00466) 
Efficiency 0.842*** -7.105***  24.03*** 
 (0.0201) (0.375)  (0.255) 
Market Power -0.618*** 2.301*** 0.317***  
 (0.0113) (0.154) (0.00364)  
Community Bank 0.265*** 2.059*** 0.626*** 17.60*** 
 (0.0231) (0.375) (0.00581) (0.223) 
Capital × CB   -38.99*** -0.310*** 2.647*** 
  (0.349) (0.0100) (0.0846) 
Stability × CB -0.137***  0.00252*** 0.00415 
 (0.00121)  (0.000615) (0.00464) 
Efficiency × CB  -0.800*** 3.407***  -20.95*** 
 (0.0203) (0.377)  (0.253) 
Market Power × CB 0.590*** -0.403*** -0.276***  
 (0.0113) (0.154) (0.00365)  
Total Assets  -0.0363*** 0.0724*** 0.00887*** 0.214*** 
 (0.000729) (0.0105) (0.000255) (0.00307) 
Total Assets × CB 0.0300*** -0.0186* -0.0312*** -0.189*** 
 (0.000727) (0.0106) (0.000259) (0.00302) 
Liquidity Risk  -0.426***   
  (0.0240)   
Liquidity Risk × CB  0.323***   
  (0.0245)   
Credit Risk  -0.0761***   
  (0.00995)   
Credit Risk× CB  -0.0275***   
  (0.0104)   
ROA 0.240***    
 (0.0515)    
ROA× CB -0.128**    
 (0.0522)    
Liquidity Creation   0.0722*** -1.778*** 
   (0.000786) (0.0204) 
Liquidity Creation× CB   -0.0289*** 1.602*** 
   (0.000817) (0.0204) 
HHI Loans   0.0122***  
   (0.000635)  
HHI Loans× CB   -0.0181***  
   (0.000642)  
Real GDP Growth  -1.911** -0.303*** 7.173*** 
  (0.791) (0.0229) (0.224) 
Real GDP Growth× CB  1.704** 0.342*** -7.809*** 
  (0.796) (0.0231) (0.228) 
CPI  -1.910** 0.0821*** 0.634*** 
  (0.815) (0.0234) (0.182) 
CPI× CB  1.648** -0.0850*** -0.812*** 
  (0.828) (0.0238) (0.183) 
Fedfunds  0.0453*** 0.000939***  
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  (0.00393) (0.000110)  
Fedfunds× CB  -0.0528*** -0.00126***  
  (0.00279) (7.79e-05)  
CEAI -0.00744    
 (0.0313)    
CEAI× CB -0.0271    
 (0.0314)    
Unemployment    -0.0512*** 
    (0.00131) 
Unemployment× CB    0.0525*** 
    (0.00104) 
10Y2Y    0.0170*** 
    (0.00179) 
10Y2Y× CB    -0.0180*** 
    (0.00157) 
Financial Stress Index    0.0500*** 
    (0.00154) 
Financial Stress Index× CB    -0.0549*** 
    (0.00147) 
Constant -0.214*** 1.222*** 0.411*** -19.81*** 
State Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Observations 343,244 343,244 343,244 343,244 
Chi2 118767.16*** 164454.40*** 594680.72*** 151257.02*** 
NOTES: Capital, risk, efficiency and competition proxies are trimmed at 1% and 99%. We are using one lag for the bank- specific 
variables and four lags for the macro variables. We are using log of total assets. CPI and CEAI is calculated as the difference in logs. 
10Y2Y is the 10 minus 2 years treasury bond. Financial stress index measures the degree of financial stress in the markets.  CatFat is the 
preferred measure for liquidity creation, following Berger and Bowman (2009). CatFat is normalized by GTA. GTA equals total assets 
plus the allowance for loan and lease losses and the allocated transfer risk reserve (a reserve for certain foreign loans). The credit and 
liquidity risk proxies are calculated following Imbierowicz and Rauch (2014).  Standard errors clustered at the bank level are reported in 





Table 4.10: Summary statistics for the traditional banking variable and its components 
Variable Obs Mean Median SD Min Max 
Panel A: All banks 
Total Loans (% of Assets) 479,414 0.607 0.640 0.186 -0.021 0.997 
Business Loans (% of Assets) 479,350 0.023 0.000 0.056 0.000 2.301 
Household Loans (% of Assets) 479,350 0.209 0.183 0.145 0.000 1.545 
Relationship Loans (% of Assets) 479,350 0.232 0.208 0.153 0.000 3.846 
Real Estate Loans (% of Assets) 479,350 0.108 0.025 0.143 0.000 0.959 
Core Deposits (% of Assets) 476,284 0.796 0.829 0.171 -59.39 1.152 
Traditional Fee Income (per $1000 of Assets) 479,414 8.548 1.475 101.9 -0.148 34,351 
Total Traditional Income (per $1000 of Assets) 479,414 30.51 23.10 103.4 -1,140 34,719 
Total Traditional Income (% of Total Operating Income) 481,074 0.683 0.692 0.612 -365.0 36.166 
Total Non-Interest Income (per $1000 of Assets) 479,414 13.42 3.243 117.8 -1,026 34,351 
Number of Branches (per $1000 of Assets) 474,493 0.349 0.026 14.52 0.001 2,092 
Traditional Banking Variable 471,564 0.430 0.432 0.054 0.243 0.573 
Panel B: Community Banks 
Total Loans (% of Assets) 432,838 0.622 0.643 0.158 0.000 0.987 
Business Loans (% of Assets) 432,774 0.019 0.000 0.048 0.000 0.861 
Household Loans (% of Assets) 432,774 0.212 0.186 0.140 0.000 0.944 
Relationship Loans (% of Assets) 432,774 0.231 0.207 0.146 0.000 0.944 
Real Estate Loans (% of Assets) 432,774 0.110 0.034 0.142 0.000 0.960 
Core Deposits (% of Assets) 433,139 0.813 0.836 0.093 0.000 1.067 
Traditional Fee Income (per $1000 of Assets) 432,838 2.202 1.451 6.013 -0.148 768.3 
Total Traditional Income (per $1000 of Assets) 432,838 24.25 22.94 13.67 -11.72 786.9 
Total Traditional Income (% of Total Operating Income) 433,102 0.687 0.694 0.251 -96.00 36.17 
Total Non-Interest Income (per $1000 of Assets) 432,838 4.808 3.094 24.99 -352.4 4,805 
Number of Branches (per $1000 of Assets) 432,815 0.045 0.027 0.095 0.000 10.70 
Traditional Banking Variable 428,879 0.432 0.433 0.052 0.243 0.573 
Panel C: Non-Community Banks 
Total Loans (% of Assets) 41,695 0.526 0.635 0.300 -0.021 0.995 
Business Loans (% of Assets) 41,695 0.072 0.041 0.102 0.000 2.301 
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Household Loans (% of Assets) 41,695 0.207 0.172 0.188 0.000 1.545 
Relationship Loans (% of Assets) 41,695 0.279 0.264 0.202 0.000 3.847 
Real Estate Loans (% of Assets) 41,695 0.109 0.000 0.159 0.000 0.867 
Core Deposits (% of Assets) 43,145 0.635 0.705 0.455 -59.39 1.152 
Traditional Fee Income (per $1000 of Assets) 41,695 16.32 1.549 205.7 -0.017 34,351 
Total Traditional Income (per $1000 of Assets) 41,695 39.02 22.92 213.6 -1,140 34,719 
Total Traditional Income (% of Total Operating Income) 43,098 0.623 0.655 1.881 -365.0 9.097 
Total Non-Interest Income (per $1000 of Assets) 41,695 38.16 5.209 253.5 -1,026 34,351 
Number of Branches (per $1000 of Assets) 41,678 3.512 0.050 48.88 0.000 2,092 
Traditional Banking Variable 38,157 0.406 0.410 0.065 0.243 0.573 
Notes: Table reports descriptive statistics for the variables associated with the traditional banking model as per Chiorazzo et al. (2018) and for the traditional banking 
variable for all banks (panel A), community banks (panel B) and non-community banks (panel C) . 
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Table 4.11: The benefits of the traditional banking model on non-community banks. 
Variables Capital Stability Efficiency Market Power 
 I II III IV 
Capital — 12.38* -0.002 -0.433 
  (6.733) (0.071) (1.778) 
Stability 0.021*** — -0.015*** -0.380*** 
 (0.005)  (0.003) (0.072) 
Efficiency 0.127*** -3.909*** — -26.71*** 
 (0.033) (0.507)  (0.680) 
Market Power -0.190*** 1.304*** -0.037*** — 
 (0.022) (0.367) (0.001)  
Traditional Banking Variable -0.007 1.111** 0.087*** 2.286*** 
 (0.012) (0.465) (0.007) (0.179) 
Total Assets -0.014*** 0.086*** -0.015*** -0.408*** 
 (0.002) (0.020) (0.001) (0.011) 
Liquidity Risk — -0.002 — — 
  (0.127)   
Credit Risk  — -0.093*** — — 
  (0.010)   
ROA 0.608*** — — — 
 (0.084)    
Liquidity Creation — — 0.060*** 1.612*** 
   (0.002) (0.060) 
HHI — — 0.001 — 
   (0.001)  
Real GDP Growth — -1.096 0.024 0.689 
  (0.872) (0.048) (1.202) 
CPI — -0.470 0.019 0.553 
  (0.852) (0.041) (1.026) 
Fedfunds — -0.001 0.005* — 
  (0.010) (0.001)  
CEAI 0.006 — — — 
 (0.040)    
Unemployment — — — -0.001 
    (0.001) 
T10Y2Y — — — -0.001 
    (0.001) 
Financial Stress Index — — — 0.001 
    (0.001) 
Constant 0.212*** 2.742*** 0.983*** 26.30*** 
State Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Observations 19,993 19,993 19,993 19,993 
Chi2 3,583*** 5,918*** 16,779*** 2,524*** 
Notes: Only Non-community banks are included here. Capital, risk, efficiency and competition proxies and the 
traditional banking variable are trimmed at 1% and 99%.  We are using one lag for the bank- specific variables 
and four lags for the macro variables. We are using log of total assets. CPI and CEAI is calculated as the difference 
in logs. CatFat is the preferred measure for liquidity creation, following Berger and Bowman (2009). CatFat is 
normalized by GTA. GTA equals total assets plus the allowance for loan and lease losses and the allocated transfer 
risk reserve (a reserve for certain foreign loans). The credit and liquidity risk proxies are calculated following 
Imbierowicz and Rauch (2014). Standard errors clustered at the bank level are reported in brackets. ***, **, *denote 





Table 4.12: Channels of traditional banking model benefits. 
  Relationship 
lending 







All Banks -0.0914*** -0.1420*** 0.1260** 14.350*** 
 (0.0099) (0.0100) (0.0525) (4.1360) 
Large Banks -0.1050*** -0.1400*** 0.0930* 22.750*** 
 (0.0137) (0.0130) (0.0545) (4.7950) 
Small Banks -0.0837* -0.1710*** -0.2610 40.660** 
 (0.0481) (0.0616) (0.1950) (20.220) 
High TBV -0.1150*** -0.0901*** 0.1580*** -21.580*** 
 (0.0161) (0.0145) (0.0560) (6.8780) 
Low TBV -0.1320*** -0.2050*** 0.0823 18.80*** 








All Banks 2.5640*** 2.7560*** -7.5700*** 51.570 
 (0.5880) (0.7530) (2.6960) (141.70) 
Large Banks 1.4050* 1.0410 7.6680** 646.60* 
 (0.7210) (0.8580) (3.7450) (341.40) 
Small Banks 0.6660 2.1890* 5.0210* -616.40 
 (0.6970) (1.2170) (2.5940) (733.60) 
High TBV 2.0180*** 2.4530*** -1.570 257.40 
 (0.2480) (0.7440) (1.420) (299.50) 
Low TBV 2.0050*** 3.2240*** -3.0760* -82.690 








All Banks 0.0441*** -0.0592* 0.0619 -14.880*** 
 (0.0077) (0.0355) (0.0443) (3.5420) 
Large Banks 0.0620*** -0.0281 0.0443 -14.440*** 
 (0.0086) (0.0274) (0.0481) (4.2920) 
Small Banks 0.0980** 0.0562 0.4080*** -217.10* 
 (0.0395) (0.0621) (0.1380) (120.40) 
High TBV 0.1620*** -0.1040*** 0.0298 5.5160 
 (0.0114) (0.0191) (0.0577) (7.1600) 
Low TBV -0.00366 -0.117 0.0486 -7.670 










All Banks 0.2510** -1.6900*** 1.2260** 120.70** 
 (0.1060) (0.1730) (0.5440) (51.810) 
Large Banks -0.9420*** -0.2350 -0.9100 191.30*** 
 (0.1270) (0.5210) (1.0650) (63.650) 
Small Banks -0.6810* -0.7810* -2.4900** 253.20*** 
 (0.3790) (0.4230) (1.1270) (89.530) 
High TBV -0.9790*** 2.0110*** -0.9000 -24.500 
 (0.1990) (0.5030) (1.7200) (57.620) 
Low TBV -0.7640*** -1.9550*** 0.5560 180.10*** 
 (0.1200) (0.2970) (0.5220) (55.610) 
Notes: The table presents the estimates of the model described in section 3.1 with the addition of a traditional banking 
variable (TBV) and the interactions of TBV with each of the four channels that characterise the traditional banking model, 
namely relationship lending, deposit funding, traditional income and branch coverage (see section 5.6 for full description). 
For brevity we present only coefficients and standard errors in parenthesis of these interaction terms. The model is 
estimated for the non-community bank as per the description in section 3.1. The full sample estimation is referred as “All 
banks”, Large/Small banks and High/Low TBV are split on the basis of Total Assets, and traditional banking variable 





Table 4.13: The limitations of the traditional banking model on community banks. 
Variables Capital Stability Efficiency Market Power 
 I II III IV 
Capital — 63.53*** -1.311*** 10.53*** 
  (1.268) (0.023) (0.182) 
Stability 0.015*** — 0.017*** -0.151*** 
 (0.001)  (0.001) (0.006) 
Efficiency -0.746*** 45.97*** — 7.588*** 
 (0.014) (1.394)  (0.149) 
Market Power 0.093*** -5.764*** 0.129*** — 
 (0.004) (0.165) (0.003)  
Traditional Banking Variable -0.283*** 18.50*** -0.347*** 2.903*** 
 (0.014) (0.627) (0.017) (0.137) 
Traditional Banking Variable Squared 0.215*** -14.11*** 0.258*** -2.165*** 
 (0.016) (0.716) (0.019) (0.151) 
Total Assets -0.017*** 1.075*** -0.023*** 0.175*** 
 (0.001) (0.032) (0.001) (0.004) 
Liquidity Risk — 0.014*** — — 
  (0.004)   
Credit Risk  — -0.026*** — — 
  (0.003)   
ROA 0.007 — — — 
 (0.013)    
Liquidity Creation — — -0.001* 0.015*** 
   (0.001) (0.005) 
HHI — — -0.003*** — 
   (0.001)  
Real GDP Growth — -0.238 0.004 0.002 
  (0.161) (0.003) (0.021) 
CPI — -0.943*** 0.011*** -0.039 
  (0.164) (0.003) (0.026) 
Fedfunds — 0.004** -0.001 — 
  (0.002) (0.001)  
CEAI 0.007*** — — — 
 (0.001)    
Unemployment — — — 0.004* 
    (0.002) 
T10Y2Y — — — -0.003*** 
    (0.001) 
Financial Stress Index — — — 0.006*** 
    (0.001) 
Constant 0.806*** -52.24*** 1.181*** -8.705*** 
State Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Observations 321,657 321,657 321,657 321,657 
Chi2 62,717 16,793 141,674 24,200 
Notes: Only community banks are included here. Capital, risk, efficiency and competition proxies and the traditional 
banking variable are trimmed at 1% and 99%. We are using one lag for the bank- specific variables and four lags for 
the macro variables. We are using log of total assets. CPI and CEAI is calculated as the difference in logs. CatFat is 
the preferred measure for liquidity creation, following Berger and Bowman (2009). CatFat is normalized by GTA. 
GTA equals total assets plus the allowance for loan and lease losses and the allocated transfer risk reserve (a reserve 
for certain foreign loans). The credit and liquidity risk proxies are calculated following Imbierowicz and Rauch (2014). 





Cost efficiency estimation – The Kumbhakar et al. (2014) model 
We start with a standard cost function that in a panel data specification may be specified as: 
 ln 𝑐𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0
∗ + 𝑓 (𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑤𝑖𝑡;  𝛽) + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡 
 
(1)  
where 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁 denotes the bank and 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇𝑖 denotes the time period during which bank 
𝑖 is observed, 𝑐𝑖𝑡 are the total costs, 𝑦𝑖𝑡 the vector of outputs, 𝑤𝑖𝑡 the vector of input prices, 
𝑓(·) the cost function, 𝛼𝑖 is the random effect for bank 𝑖 and 𝑖𝑡 is the stochastic error term for 
bank 𝑖 at time 𝑡. In addition, the following quantities are defined: the constant is 𝛼0
∗ =  𝛼0 −
𝐸( 𝑖) − 𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡); the 𝛼𝑖 = 𝜇 − 𝑖 + 𝐸( 𝑖);  and the 𝑖𝑡 = 𝜈𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡). This ensures that 
𝛼𝑖 and 𝑖𝑡 have zero mean and constant variance.  
The Kumbhakar et al. (2014) model splits the error term into four components, taking this way 
into account different factors affecting the output given the inputs. The first component is 
firm’s latent heterogeneity which is disentangled from the inefficiency effects, the second 
captures time-varying inefficiency, the third is time invariant inefficiency and the last 
component captures random shocks. The model may be rewritten as: 
 ln 𝑐𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝑓 (𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑤𝑖𝑡;  𝛽) + 𝜇𝑖+𝜈𝑖𝑡 − 𝑖 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
 
(2)  
This model has four components, 𝑖 > 0 and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 > 0 are inefficiency and 𝜇𝑖 and 𝜈𝑖𝑡 are bank 
random effects and noise respectively.  
To estimate the model in (2) we follow the three-step procedure outlined in Kumbhakar et al. 
(2015). Equation (2) could be rewritten as equation (1). In the first step a standard panel random 
effects regression is used to estimate ?̂? from equation (1) and the predicted values of 𝛼𝑖 and 𝑖𝑡 
which are ?̂?𝑖 and ?̂?𝑡. In the second step estimates of time-varying cost efficiency (𝑢𝑖𝑡) are 
obtained via a standard SFA on 𝑖𝑡 of step 1. Specifically, we estimate the equation outlined 
below as a standard SFA assuming 𝜈𝑖𝑡 is i.i.d. N(0,𝜎𝜈
2) and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is 𝑁
+(0,𝜎𝑢
2) 
 𝑖𝑡 = 𝜈𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡)  
 
(3)  
This step gives prediction of the time-varying residual cost inefficiency components û𝑖𝑡. In 
step 3 estimates of the persistent cost efficiency 𝑖 are obtained via a standard SFA on 𝛼𝑖 of 
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step 1. Specifically, the following equation is estimated as a standard SFA assuming 𝜇𝑖 is i.i.d. 
N(0,𝜎𝜇
2) and 𝑖 is i.i.d. 𝑁
+(0,𝜎𝜂
2). 
 𝛼𝑖 = 𝜇𝑖𝑡 − 𝑖 + 𝐸( 𝑖) 
 
(4)  
Finally, the overall cost efficiency is calculated as the product of persistent and residual cost 
efficiency, namely: 𝑂𝐶𝐸 =  𝑃𝐶𝐸 × 𝑅𝐶𝐸. Persistent efficiency may be attributed to factors that 
remain relatively constant on a short time period, such as regulatory changes, structural 
rigidities, and business/management practices. These are factors that need to be accounted for 
when long time periods are concerned. Residual efficiency captures the time-varying efficiency 









































We follow the existing literature in the choice of input and output variables assuming that bank 
act as intermediaries between fund surplus and deficit units (Beccalli et al. 2006; Berger et al. 
2011; Kaparakis et al. 1994). The input variables are the price of labour (p1) defined as the 
salaries and employee benefits over the number of full-time equivalent employees, the price of 
capital (p2) defined as expenses on premises and fixed assets over premises and fixed assets 
and the price of funds (p3) defined as total interest expenses over total deposits. We define total 
cost as the sum of total interest expense and total non-interest expense. All monetary variables 





Estimating marginal cost using a translog cost function 
Following Beck et al. (2013) we derive the marginal cost estimation using SFA and 1 output 
case. 
More specifically we estimate: 
 

















+ 𝑣𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 
(1)  
 
Where 𝐶𝑖𝑡 is total operating costs and 𝑄𝑖𝑡 is a proxy for bank output (total loans) for bank i at 
time t. The three input prices capture the price of capital 𝑤1, the price of labor 𝑤2  and the 
price of funds 𝑤3. They are constructed as expenses of premises and fixed assets and other 
non- interest expense to total assets, salaries and employee benefits to total assets and interest 
expenses to total. Marginal cost is obtained via the first difference of the translog function with 




















Liquidity risk and Credit risk proxy variables  







= [(Demand Deposits𝑡  
+  Transaction Deposits𝑡  
+  Brokered Deposits𝑡  + NOW Accounts𝑡  
+  Unused Loan Commitments𝑡)
− (Cash𝑡  + Currency & Coin𝑡  
+  Trading Assets𝑡  +  Fed Funds Purchased𝑡  
+  Commercial Paper𝑡  
+  Securities available for Sale𝑡)
± Net Interbank Lending Position𝑡
± Net Interbank Acceptances𝑡




Values above zero 
imply that the bank 
is ceteris paribus not 
able to endure a 
sudden bank run 





𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 − 𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑡 − 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡
 
Values above 1 
indicate unexpected 
losses 
NOTES: The table displays descriptions and calculations of the proxy variables for liquidity and credit risk. The liquidity 
risk proxy is standardised by total assets and indicates to what degree the bank is able to cover sudden and unexpected 
liquidity demand with liquid assets. The credit risk proxy is calculated by dividing the net loan charge-offs by the loan loss 






Chapter 5 – Conclusion 
Community banks conduct business in ways that are different from those of non-community 
banks, however their long-standing presence in the US banking system suggests that they 
compete effectively with their non-community counterparts. This thesis conducts a thorough 
comparative analysis between the two bank types and seeks to identify sources of advantage 
for community banks. First of all, we compare the financial risk profile of community and non-
community banks in terms of insolvency, credit and liquidity risk and question whether their 
risk profile shows similar or different sensitivities to key bank-specific, macroeconomic and 
market structure characteristics. Results suggest that the sensitivity to financial risk shows 
variations among the two bank groups. Community banks are more financially stable and 
derive significant advantages in terms of stability from having higher capitalization, better asset 
quality and higher liquidity whereas, a larger asset base does not seem to produce additional 
benefit for this particular bank group. Community banks outperform non-community in terms 
of credit risk and their source of advantage comes from their capitalization and income 
diversification strategies. However, we find that non-community banks outperform community 
when it comes to liquidity risk. Community banks’ focus on traditional loan making activities 
and limited access to capital markets causes these banks to bear higher liquidity risk.   
Secondly, we examine the efficiency dynamics of community banks. To do so, we rely on the 
Kumbhakar et al (2014) model which allows the decomposition of cost efficiency into a 
residual and a persistent component that captures managerial weaknesses and market 
structure/regulatory rigidities respectively. We document that community banks exhibit higher 
cost efficiency than non-community banks. The largest part of the cost efficiency gap between 
the two bank groups comes from differences in persistent efficiency that are linked to bank- 
specific developments in the sector. We also compare the determinants of cost efficiency of 
community and non-community banks across a wide array of explanatory variables. We report 
a negative link between bank size and cost efficiency, with the magnitude being stronger for 
community banks suggesting that these banks perform better when they are small in size. 
Community banks that are part of a bank holding company exhibit lower cost efficiency scores, 
possibly due to differences in objectives and goals that exist between community and non-
community banks. We also find that higher liquidity creation translates into lower cost 
efficiency for community banks but higher for non-community. 
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Thirdly, we assess the relationship between capital, risk, efficiency and competition for US 
banks, distinguishing between community and non-community banks. Our empirical analysis 
here validates our results from the previous chapters on higher stability and greater cost 
efficiency for community banks. We also document higher capitalization and market power for 
this particular bank group. A positive relationship between stability and capitalization is 
documented for both bank types supporting the “moral hazard hypothesis”. We document 
evidence of cost skimping behaviour for both bank types, however community banks are found 
to be significantly less prone to this practice. We find support for the “competition-fragility” 
doctrine with the effect being more pronounced for community banks and for the “information 
generating hypothesis” where again community banks appear to reap the most benefits from 
information monopoly. Finally, we document quadratic relationship between the traditional 
banking model and stability, efficiency and market power for non-community banks suggesting 
that these banks can reap certain benefits from engaging in that type of banking model however 
it is not panacea. 
The current thesis contributes to the banking-related literature in a number of ways. First, this 
is the first study that defines community banks on the basis of business model and geographical 
criteria rather than relying on a single, size criterion that previous research on this topic has 
used.   Second, it contributes to the literature on the comparative performance of relationship 
banks versus commercial banks and identifies any benefits that arise from engaging into this 
type of approach in terms of financial risk, efficiency and market power. Third, we conduct a 
joint investigation of insolvency, credit and liquidity risk which, to the best of our knowledge, 
has not been conducted before in the community banking research. Forth, we innovate 
methodologically by applying a novel model of cost efficiency in the context of community 
banking. This model is particularly relevant for this bank type, since it identifies whether Fed’s 
softer regulatory touch on community banks has managed to actually translate into benefits in 
their persistent efficiency. Fifth, this is the first time that the effect of liquidity creation on cost 
efficiency is being investigated.  Furthermore, we introduce an important forth factor in the 
capital-efficiency-stability nexus that has been precluded in existing literature i.e. competition. 
Finally, we quantify the benefits and limitations of the traditional banking model for non-
community and community banks. 
Our research offers a number of new insights into the economic performance of relationship 
lenders. These findings can be generalized to other institutional environments outside the US 
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where this type of banking approach exists. In Germany for example, the notion of “house- 
bank” is closely related to the relationship banking approach. House-bank relationships 
describe the ties between large or medium-sized firms and their main bank, which often is a 
savings or a cooperative bank rather than a large bank (Behr and Schmidt 2015). The House-
bank is the main credit provider for the firm. Repeated personal interactions from lending 
relationships are also evident in Italy, where tighter bank-firm relationships helped Italian 
businesses to alleviate the effects of GFC by maintaining higher levels of investment and 
employment (Banerjee et al. 2017). But besides the US and EU, relationship lending plays a 
key role in developing countries. In these economies it is critical for microfinance services to 
reach the financially excluded population segments. The main mechanism through which 
entrepreneurs and small businesses can access credit is relationship banking. In India, firms 
tend to create close ties with state-owned banks and to interact with a smaller number of banks 
(Berger et al. 2008). Similarly, domestic banks in Pakistan have a comparative advantage when 
it comes to soft information-based relationship loans and thus they are more successful at 
renegotiating with the borrowers and enjoy lower default rates (Mian 2006). 
Albeit the number of community banks in the US has been steeply declining for two decades, 
our results underline that adhering to the traditional banking business model can yield 
significant benefits in terms of stability, efficiency and market power. Thus, we can draw the 
conclusion that this banking model offers the bank a unique advantage and can alleviate 
competitive pressures. This creates additional challenges for community banks who need to 
compete in the same environment with non-community banks. Therefore, the implication of 
any bank policy should take into consideration the distinct risk profile of the two bank types. 
Measuring the effect of bank regulation remains a critical issue that poses substantial 
challenges for the supervisors.  
Regulatory burden is perhaps the greatest challenge that community banks face (CSBS, 2018). 
Compliance costs are especially burdensome for small institutions and are the root of concerns 
for community bankers. Regulators attempt to ease the regulatory burden and their current 
proposals revolve around the deregulation of these banks. For instance, the U.S Department of 
the Treasury (2017) suggested regulation to be tailored according to bank size and the 
Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief and Consumer Protection Act (2017) recommended to 
adapt regulation based on size criteria for small banks. The analysis conducted in this thesis 
has shown that community banks are a remarkably dynamic part of the banking industry. This 
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is something that the regulators have acknowledged and hence aim to provide a softer 
regulatory touch to keep community banks in the game. The community banks’ superior 
persistent efficiency that has been documented in chapter three suggests that advantageous 
policy changes rather than short-term management adaptations are able to enhance efficiency 
for this bank group, thus putting the spotlight on the need for further regulatory relief. Results 
from chapter two indicate that capitalisation translates into insolvency and credit risk-reduction 
benefits. Applying regulatory thresholds for community banks capital levels yields into 
stability and portfolio quality gains. Furthermore, higher liquidity creation is associated with 
lower cost efficiency (chapter 3). However, pursuing a strategy that maximizes liquidity 
creation may be desirable by the regulators because it channels funds into the real economy 
and this is a core function of community banks. Policies aimed to increase cost efficiency in 
these institutions may come at the expense of less liquidity created for their communities as 
these too variables are found to be inversely related. Finally, findings from all chapters act in 
a reassuring way for maintaining the relationship-lending model and thus regulatory actions 
should enhance it. 
5.1 Limitations and Future Research 
One of the concerns of community bankers that consistently ranks high up in their agendas is 
about compliance costs (CSBS, 2019). Compliance costs expressed as a share of non-interest 
expense have been on a rising trend since 2014, reaching $4.9 billion in 2018 on average, while 
they are expected to rise even further (CBRO, 2018). On the one hand the compliance cost 
burden falls heavier on the smaller of community banks, which need to dedicate funds to cope 
with the increased requirements of specific regulations (e.g., Bank Secrecy Act, Community 
Reinvestment Act), financial reporting conditions (e.g., Call reports, Basel III requirements), 
and the introduction of new loan monitoring methodologies (e.g., the current expected credit 
loss model - CECL) as well as the transition away from deeply-rooted practices like the linking 
of variable-rate loans to LIBOR that is superseded by the Secured Overnight Financing Rate 
(SOFR). 
On the other hand, the regulator is pushing for deregulation across the board on smaller banks 
in order to level the playing field with the larger institutions. As such and in accordance with 
the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief and Consumer Protection Act (EGRRCPA), 
community banks may benefit from simplified Call report fillings, extended and off-site 
examination cycle, reduced requirements related to the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act 
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(HMDA), relief from Dodd-Frank Act stress test requirements and an exemption from the 
Volker rule among others (CSBS, 2019). While taken independently these measures may be 
greeted with scepticism on their effectiveness, taken collectively may significantly reduce the 
regulatory burden and allow community bankers to focus on banking business. Srivastav and 
Vallascas (2019) provide evidence that favourable regulation for small banks facilitates their 
role in providing credit for small businesses.  
In our studies we have accounted for personnel costs that represent over 80% of a community 
bank’s non-interest expenses (CSBS, 2018). We have opted not to include compliance costs, 
namely i) data processing, ii) accounting and auditing, iii) consulting and advising, and iv) 
legal costs due to data availability issues. Whilst acknowledging this limitation, we plausibly 
attribute the higher persistent efficiency (see chapter 3) of community banks to the softer 
regulatory touch these banks enjoy, and leave this as a direction for future research.  
At the time of writing of this thesis the COVID 19 pandemic continues to unfold with over 27 
million cases confirmed in more than 200 countries. The current pandemic has created an 
unprecedented systemic shock to the global economy, comparable in magnitude to the GFC 
and even the Great Depression.50 Following the GFC banks halted their key liquidity 
transformation function (i.e., credit crunch), which lead to the economic recession that 
followed. However, small banks were able to extend their financing to borrowers for two main 
reasons. First, the relationship lending business model, typically practiced by these banks. In 
times of crises soft information can play a catalytic role in complementing hard information 
when assessing lending decisions. For example, Gartner (2011) and Hardie and Howarth 
(2013) indicate the business model of regional banks in Germany as the main reason behind 
their robust performance following the GFC. Second, the fact that community banks tend to 
raise funding through retained earnings and deposits; thus being capable of acting 
countercyclically – in contrast to capital market funding (Hardie and Howarth 2013). 
Community banks demonstrated their ability to weather the GFC (see chapter 2). Still, 
questions are raised on whether they will be able to do so again now, especially during a time 
when competitive pressure from fintech companies has increased sharply. Many companies, 
especially SMEs are likely to need further financing or credit deferrals from their banks to 
weather the effects of the economic shutdown caused by the pandemic. In the US, the CAREs 
 
 
50 See Figure 1 in Baker et al., (2020) here: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3569410 
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Act (Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act) established new temporary 
programs to help SMEs overcome the adverse effect of COVID 19 outbreak such as the SBA 
Express Bridge Loans and the SBA Debt Relief. These loans are guaranteed by the Small 
Business Administration federal agency. Community banks carry a lot of these SBA loans 
which rocketed during the pandemic. So, the onus is on the community banks to perform their 
liquidity creation function and support the backbone of the economy51. However, this brings 
up questions regarding the solvency of such loans. If too many loans default community banks 
can be at risk of financial difficulties. Besides solvency, moral hazard issues can be at stake as 
these emergency reliefs are backed up by the state and the SBA has waived many of the usual 
requirements for these loans52. Future research can test the effectiveness of the implemented 
Act in the COVID 19 environment. Furthermore, it can explore the channels through which 
community banks can cushion the economic impacts of COVID 19 and compare the behaviour 
of different types of financial providers.  
 
 
51 https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/smefinance  
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Boyd, J.., De Nicoló, G. and Al Jalal, A., 2006. Bank Risk-Taking and Competition Revisited : New 




Boyd, J.H. and De Nicolo, G., 2005. The Theory of Bank Risk Taking and Competition Revisited. The 
Journal of Finance, 60(3), pp.1329–1343.  
Boyd, J.H. and Runkle, D.E., 1993. Size and performance of banking firms. Testing the predictions of 
theory. Journal of Monetary Economics, 31(1), pp.47–67. 
Boyd, J.H., De Nicoló, M.G. and Jalal, A.M., 2009. Bank competition, risk and asset allocations.  IMF  
Paper 09/143. International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC. 
Brevoort, K.P. and Hannan, T.H., 2006. Commercial lending and distance: evidence from Community 
Reinvestment Act data. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 38, pp.1991-2012. 
Brickley, J.A., Linck, J.S. and Smith, C.W., 2003. Boundaries of the firm: evidence from the banking 
industry. Journal of Financial Economics, 70(3), pp.351–383.  
Calomiris, C. and Mason, J., 2000. Causes of U.S. bank distress during the depression. National Bureau 
of Economic Research Working Paper no. 7919, Cambridge, MA. 
Carter, D.A. and Sinkey, J.F., 1998. The use of interest rate derivatives by end-users: The case of large 
community banks. Journal of Financial Services Research, 14(1), pp.17-34. 
Carvalho, D., 2014. The real effects of government‐owned banks: Evidence from an emerging market. 
The Journal of Finance, 69(2), pp.577-609. 
Casu, B. and Girardone, C., 2009. Testing the relationship between competition and efficiency in 
banking: A panel data analysis. Economics Letters, 105(1), pp.134–137. 
Casu, B. and Girardone, C., 2010. Integration and efficiency convergence in EU banking markets. 
Omega, 38(5), pp.260-267. 
Casu, B. and Molyneux, P., 2003. A comparative study of efficiency in European banking. Applied 
Economics, 35(17), pp.1865-1876. 
CBRO, 2018. Compliance costs, economies of scale and compliance performance: Evidence from a 
survey of community banks, Community Bank Research and Outreach, Federal Reserve Bank of 
St. Louis. 
Chen, T.Y. and Yeh, T.L., 1998. A study of efficiency evaluation in Taiwan’s banks. International 
Journal of Service Industry Management, 9(5), pp.402-415. 
Chen, Y.Y., Schmidt, P. and Wang, H.J., 2014. Consistent estimation of the fixed effects stochastic 
frontier model. Journal of Econometrics, 181(2), pp.65-76. 
Chiorazzo, V., D'Apice, V., DeYoung, R. and Morelli, P., 2018. Is the traditional banking model a 
survivor?. Journal of Banking and Finance, 97, pp.238-256. 
Cihák, M. and Hesse, H., 2007. Cooperative Banks and Financial Stability, IMF Working Paper 2. 
International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC. 
Cihák, M. and Hesse, H., 2010. Islamic Banks and Financial Stability: An Empirical Analysis. Journal 
of Financial Services Research, 38(2), pp.95–113.  
Claessens, S., 2017. Regulation and structural change in financial systems. Centre for Economic Policy 
Research Discussion Papers no. 11822. 
189 
 
Cole, R.A. and Gunther, J.W., 1995. Separating the likelihood and timing of bank failure. Journal of 
Banking and Finance, 19(6), pp.1073–1089. 
Cole, R.A. and Gunther, J.W., 1998. Predicting Bank Failures: A Comparison of On-and Off-Site 
Monitoring Systems. Journal of Financial Services Research, 13(2), pp.103–117. 
Cole, R.A. and White, L., 2012. Deja Vu All Over Again: The Causes of U.S. Commercial Bank 
Failures This Time Around. Journal of Financial Services Research, 42(1), pp.5–29.  
Cole, R.A., Goldberg, L.G. and White, L.J., 2004. Cookie cutter vs. character: The micro structure of 
small business lending by large and small banks. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 
39(2), pp.227-251. 
Cornée, S. and Szafarz, A., 2013. Vive la Différence: Social Banks and Reciprocity in the Credit 
Market. Journal of Business Ethics, 125(3), pp.361–380. 
Cornée, S., Masclet, D. and Thenet, G., 2012. Credit Relationships: Evidence from Experiments with 
Real Bankers. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 44(5), pp.957–980. 
Cornett, M.M., Li, L. and Tehranian, H., 2013. The performance of banks around the receipt and 
repayment of TARP funds: Over-achievers versus under-achievers. Journal of Banking and 
Finance, 37(3), pp.730-746. 
Cortes, K.R., 2014. Rebuilding after Disaster Strikes: How Local Lenders Aid in the Recovery. Federal 
Reserve Bank of Cleveland Working Paper 14/28.  
CSBS, 2018. Community bank compliance costs reverse upward trend. 
CSBS, 2019. Community banking in the 21st century: Research and Policy Conference. 
Daines, R., 2001. Does Delaware law improve firm value?. Journal of Financial Economics, 62(3), 
pp.525-558. 
De Angelo, H. and Stulz, R.M., 2015. Liquid-claim production, risk management, and bank capital 
structure: Why high leverage is optimal for banks. Journal of Financial Economics, 116(2), 
pp.219–236.  
De Nicolo, G. and Lucchetta, M., 2009. Financial Intermediation, Competition, and Risk: A General 
Equilibrium Exposition. CentER Discussion Paper, Vol. 2010-67S. 
Degryse, H. and Ongena, S., 2004. The impact of technology and regulation on the geographical scope 
of banking. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 20(4), pp.571-590. 
Demirgüç-Kunt, A. and Detragiache, E., 2000. Monitoring Banking Sector Fragility: A Multivariate 
Logit Approach. The World Bank Economic Review, 14(2), pp.287–307. 
Demsetz, H., 1973. Industry Structure , Market Rivalry and Public Policy. The Journal of Law and 
Economics, 16(1), pp.1–9. 
DeYoung, R. and Nolle, D.E., 1996. Foreign-owned banks in the United States: Earning market share 
or buying it?. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 28(4), pp.622-636. 
DeYoung, R. and Torna, G., 2013. Nontraditional banking activities and bank failures during the 
financial crisis. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 22(3), pp.397–421.  
190 
 
DeYoung, R., Hunter, W.C. and Udell, G.F., 2004. The past, present, and probable future for 
community banks. Journal of Financial Services Research, 25(2-3), pp.85-133. 
Dick, A.A., 2003. Nationwide Branching and its Impact on Market Structure, Quality and Bank 
Performance. Journal of Business, 79(2), pp.567–592.  
Dixit, A.K., Dixit, R.K. and Pindyck, R.S., 1994. Investment under uncertainty. Princeton university 
press. Princeton, NJ. 
Dong, Y., Girardone, C. and Kuo, J.-M., 2017. Governance, efficiency and risk taking in Chinese 
banking. The British Accounting Review, 49(2), pp.211–229. 
Drake, L., Hall, M.J. and Simper, R., 2006. The impact of macroeconomic and regulatory factors on 
bank efficiency: A non-parametric analysis of Hong Kong’s banking system. Journal of Banking 
and Finance, 30(5), pp.1443-1466. 
Eisenbeis, R., Ferrier, G.D. and Kwan, S.H., 1999. The informativeness of stochastic frontier and 
programming frontier efficiency scores: Cost efficiency and other measures of bank holding 
company performance. FRB Atlanta Working Paper, no. 99-23, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 
Atlanta, GA. 
Elsas, R. and Krahnen, J.P., 1998. Is relationship lending special? Evidence from credit-file data in 
Germany. Journal of Banking and Finance, 22 (10-11), pp.1283–1316. 
Elsas, R. and Krahnen, J.P., 2003. Universal banks and relationships with firms. CFS Working Paper,      
no.  2003/20, Goethe University Frankfurt, Center for Financial Studies (CFS), Frankfurt.  
Elsas, R., 2005. Empirical determinants of relationship lending. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 
14(1), pp.32–57. 
Elyasiani, E. and Mehdian, S., 1990. A nonparametric approach to measurement of efficiency and 
technological change: The case of large US commercial banks. Journal of Financial Services 
Research, 4(2), pp.157-168. 
Elyasiani, E. and Mehdian, S., 1995. The comparative efficiency performance of small and large US 
commercial banks in the pre-and post-deregulation eras. Applied Economics, 27(11), pp.1069-
1079. 
Emmons, W.R., Gilbert, R.A. and Yeager, T.J., 2004. Reducing the Risk at Small Community Banks: 
Is it Size or Geographic Diversification that Matters?. Journal of Financial Services Research, 
25(2/3), pp.259–281.  
Evanoff, D.D. and Ors, E., 2008. The competitive dynamics of geographic deregulation in banking: 
Implications for productive efficiency. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 40(5), pp.897-928. 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), 2012. Community Banking Study. FDIC [Online].  
Federal Reserve System and the Conference of State Bank Supervisors 2017, Fifth Annual Community 
Banking Research and Policy Conference, Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, St Louis, MO, 4-5 
Oct 2017. 
Feng, G. and Zhang, X., 2012. Productivity and efficiency at large and community banks in the US: A 
191 
 
Bayesian true random effects stochastic distance frontier analysis. Journal of Banking and 
Finance, 36(7), pp.1883–1895.  
Festić, M., Kavkler, A. and Repina, S., 2011. The macroeconomic sources of systemic risk in the 
banking sectors of five new EU member states. Journal of Banking and Finance, 35(2), pp.310–
322. 
Fiordelisi, F., Marques-Ibanez, D. and Molyneux, P., 2011. Efficiency and risk in European banking. 
Journal of Banking and Finance, 35(5), pp.1315–1326. 
Friedman, M. and Schwartz, A., 1971. A Monetary History of the United States, Princeton University 
Press. Princeton, NJ.  
Fukuyama, H. and Matousek, R., 2017. Modelling bank performance: A network DEA approach. 
European Journal of Operational Research, 259(2), pp.721-732. 
Fungáčová, Z., Klein, P.O. and Weill, L., 2020. Persistent and transient inefficiency: Explaining the 
low efficiency of Chinese big banks. China Economic Review, 59, p.101368. 
Galloway, T.M., Lee, W.B. and Roden, D.M., 1997. Banks’ changing incentives and opportunities for 
risk taking. Journal of Banking and Finance, 21(4), pp.509–527.  
García-Cestona, M. and Surroca, J., 2008. Multiple goals and ownership structure: Effects on the 
performance of Spanish savings banks. European Journal of Operational Research, 187(2), 
pp.582-599. 
Garicano, L., 2000. Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production. Journal of Political 
Economy, 108(5), pp.874-904. 
Gärtner, S., 2011. Regionen und Banken: Gedanken im Lichte der Krise [Regions and Banks: Thoughts 
in the Light of the Crisis]. Informationen zur Raumentwicklung, 2, pp.153-167. 
Gilbert, R.A., Meyer, A.P. and Fuchs, J.W., 2013. The future of community banks: Lessons from banks 
that thrived during the recent financial crisis. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, 95(2), 
pp.115-43. 
Goetz, M.R., 2018. Competition and bank stability. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 35(Part A), 
pp.57–69. 
Goetz, M.R., Laeven, L. and Levine, R., 2016. Does the geographic expansion of banks reduce risk? 
Journal of Financial Economics, 120(2), pp.346–362. 
Goldstein, I. and Pauzner, A., 2005. Demand-deposit contracts and the probability of bank runs. Journal 
of Finance, 60(3), pp.1293–1327. 
Gropp, R. and Heider, F., 2010. The determinants of bank capital structure. Review of Finance, 14(4), 
pp.587–622. 
Hardie, I. and Howarth, D., 2013. Market-based banking and the international financial crisis. Oxford 
University Press, Oxford. 




Hauner, D., 2005. Explaining efficiency differences among large German and Austrian banks. Applied 
Economics, 37(9), pp.969-980. 
Hein, S.E., Koch, T.W. and MacDonald, S.S., 2005. On the uniqueness of community banks. Federal 
Reserve Bank of Atlanta Economic Review, 90(2), pp.15-36. 
Hellwig, M.F., 2009. Systemic risk in the financial sector: An analysis of the subprime-mortgage 
financial crisis. De Economist, 157(2), pp.129–207. 
Holod, D. and Torna, G., 2018. Do community banks contribute to international trade? Evidence from 
US Data. Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 57, pp.185-204. 
Hong, H., Huang, J.-Z. and Wu, D., 2014. The information content of Basel III liquidity risk measures. 
Journal of Financial Stability, 15, pp.91–111.  
Houston, J.F., Lin, C., Lin, P. and Ma, Y., 2010. Creditor rights, information sharing, and bank risk 
taking. Journal of Financial Economics, 96(3), pp.485–512. 
Hughes, J.P. and Mester, L.J., 1998. Bank capitalization and cost: Evidence of scale economies in risk 
management and signaling. Review of Economics and Statistics, 80(2), pp.314–325. 
Imbierowicz, B. and Rauch, C., 2014. The relationship between liquidity risk and credit risk in banks. 
Journal of Banking and Finance, 40(1), pp.242–256. 
Isik, I. and Hassan, M.K., 2003. Efficiency, ownership and market structure, corporate control and 
governance in the Turkish banking industry. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 30(9‐
10), pp.1363-1421. 
Jacewitz, S. and Kupiec, P., 2012. Community bank efficiency and economies of scale. FDIC Special 
Study. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Washington, DC 
Jeitschko, T.D. and Jeung, S.D., 2005. Incentives for risk-taking in banking - A unified approach. 
Journal of Banking and Finance, 29(3), pp.759–777. 
Jiang, L., Levine, R. and Lin, C., 2017. Does competition affect bank risk?. National Bureau of 
Economic Research Working Paper no. w23080, Cambridge MA. 
Jiménez, G., Lopez, J.A. and Saurina, J., 2013. How does competition affect bank risk-taking? Journal 
of Financial Stability, 9(2), pp.185–195.  
Jin, J.Y., Kanagaretnam, K. and Lobo, G.J., 2011. Ability of accounting and audit quality variables to 
predict bank failure during the financial crisis. Journal of Banking and Finance, 35(11), pp.2811–
2819.  
Johnes, J., Izzeldin, M. and Pappas, V., 2014. A comparison of performance of Islamic and conventional 
banks 2004–2009. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 103(Supplement), pp.S93-
S107. 
Kaparakis, E.I., Miller, S.M. and Noulas, A.G., 1994. Short-run cost inefficiency of commercial banks: 
A flexible stochastic frontier approach. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 26(4), pp.875-893. 
Keeley, M.C., 1990. Deposit Insurance, Risk, and Market Power in Banking. The American Economic 
Review, 80(5), pp.1183–1200. 
193 
 
Koetter, M., Kolari, J. and Spierdijk, L., 2012. Efficient competition? Testing the quiet life of US banks 
with adjusted Lerner indices. Review of Economics and Statistics, 94, pp. 462-480. 
Kroszner, R.S. and Strahan, P.E., 2014. Regulation and deregulation of the US banking industry: causes, 
consequences, and implications for the future. In Economic Regulation and Its Reform: What 
Have We Learned? (pp. 485-543). University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL. 
Kumbhakar, S.C. and Heshmati, A., 1995. Efficiency measurement in Swedish dairy farms: an 
application of rotating panel data, 1976–88. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 77(3), 
pp.660-674. 
Kumbhakar, S.C. and Tsionas, E.G., 2016. The good, the bad and the technology: Endogeneity in 
environmental production models. Journal of Econometrics, 190(2), pp.315-327. 
Kumbhakar, S.C., Lien, G. and Hardaker, J.B., 2014. Technical efficiency in competing panel data 
models: A study of Norwegian grain farming. Journal of Productivity Analysis, 41(2), pp.321–
337.  
Kumbhakar, S.C., Wang, H.J. and Horncastle, A.P., 2015. A practitioner's guide to stochastic frontier 
analysis using Stata. Cambridge University Press. 
Kwan, S. and Eisenbeis, R., 1997. Bank Risk, Capitalization, and Operating Efficiency. Journal of 
Financial Services Research, 12(2–3), pp.117–131. 
Kwan, S.H., 2006. The X-efficiency of commercial banks in Hong Kong. Journal of Banking and 
Finance, 30(4), pp.1127-1147. 
La Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A., 2002. Government ownership of banks. The Journal 
of Finance, 57(1), pp.265-301. 
Laeven, L. and Levine, R., 2009. Bank governance, regulation and risk taking. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 93(2), pp.259–275.  
Lane, W.R., Looney, S.W. and Wansley, J.W., 1986. An application of the Cox proportional hazards 
model to bank failure. Journal of Banking and Finance, 10(4), pp.511-531.  
Lepetit, L. and Strobel, F., 2013. Bank insolvency risk and time-varying Z-score measures. Journal of 
International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 25, pp.73–87.  
Lepetit, L., Nys, E., Rous, P. and Tarazi, A., 2008. Bank income structure and risk: An empirical 
analysis of European banks. Journal of Banking and Finance, 32(8), pp.1452–1467. 
Leroy, A. and Lucotte, Y., 2017. Is there a competition-stability trade-off in European banking? Journal 
of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 46, pp.199–215. 
Liberti, J.M. and Mian, A.R., 2008. Estimating the effect of hierarchies on information use. The Review 
of Financial Studies, 22(10), pp.4057-4090. 
Liberti, J.M. and Petersen, M.A., 2019. Information: Hard and soft. Review of Corporate Finance 
Studies, 8(1), pp.1-41. 
Loutskina, E., 2011. The role of securitization in bank liquidity and funding management. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 100(3), pp.663–684.  
194 
 
Louzis, D.P., Vouldis, A.T. and Metaxas, V.L., 2012. Macroeconomic and bank-specific determinants 
of non-performing loans in Greece: A comparative study of mortgage, business and consumer 
loan portfolios. Journal of Banking and Finance, 36(4), pp.1012–1027.  
Lozano-Vivas, A., Pastor, J.T. and Hasan, I., 2001. European bank performance beyond country 
borders: What really matters?. Review of Finance, 5(1-2), pp.141-165. 
Lozano-Vivas, A., Pastor, J.T. and Pastor, J.M., 2002. An efficiency comparison of European banking 
systems operating under different environmental conditions. Journal of Productivity Analysis, 
18(1), pp.59-77. 
Mahajan, A., Rangan, N. and Zardkoohi, A., 1996. Cost structures in multinational and domestic 
banking. Journal of Banking and Finance, 20(2), pp.283-306. 
Mamatzakis, E., Tsionas, M.G., Kumbhakar, S.C. and Koutsomanoli-Filippaki, A., 2015. Does labour 
regulation affect technical and allocative efficiency? Evidence from the banking industry. Journal 
of Banking and Finance, 61(Supplement 1), pp.S84-S98. 
Mare, D.S., Moreira, F. and Rossi, R., 2017. Nonstationary Z-Score measures. European Journal of 
Operational Research, 260(1), pp.348–358.  
Marquez, R., 2002. Competition, Adverse Selection, and Information Dispersion in the Banking 
Industry. Review of Financial Studies, 15(3), pp.901–926. 
Martinez-Miera, D. and Repullo, R., 2010. Does competition reduce the risk of bank failure? Review of 
Financial Studies, 23(10), pp.3638–3664. 
Martín-Oliver, A., Ruano, S. and Salas-Fumás, V., 2013. Why high productivity growth of banks 
preceded the financial crisis. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 22(4), pp.688-712. 
Matousek, R., Rughoo, A., Sarantis, N. and Assaf, A.G., 2015. Bank performance and convergence 
during the financial crisis: Evidence from the ‘old’European Union and Eurozone. Journal of 
Banking and Finance, 52, pp.208-216. 
Maudos, J. and de Guevara, J.F., 2007. The cost of market power in banking: Social welfare loss vs. 
cost inefficiency. Journal of Banking and Finance, 31(7), pp.2103–2125. 
McKee, G. and Kagan, A., 2018. Community bank structure an x-efficiency approach. Review of 
Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 51(1), pp.19-41. 
Mester, L.J., 1996. A study of bank efficiency taking into account risk-preferences. Journal of Banking 
and Finance, 20(6), pp.1025-1045. 
Meyer, A.P. and Yeager, T.J., 2001. Are small rural banks vulnerable to Local Economic Downturns? 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, 83(2), p.25. 
Mian, A., 2006. Distance constraints: The limits of foreign lending in poor economies. The Journal of 
Finance, 61(3), pp.1465-1505. 
Miller, S.M. and Noulas, A.G., 1996. The technical efficiency of large bank production. Journal of 
Banking and Finance, 20(3), pp.495-509. 
Mollah, S. and Zaman, M., 2015. Shari’ah supervision, corporate governance and performance: 
195 
 
Conventional vs. Islamic banks. Journal of Banking and Finance, 58, pp.418–435.  
Myers, S.C., 1977. Determinants of corporate borrowing. Journal of Financial Economics, 5(2), 
pp.147-175. 
Ng, J. and Roychowdhury, S., 2014. Do loan loss reserves behave like capital? Evidence from recent 
bank failures. Review of Accounting Studies, 19(3), pp.1234-1279.  
Pappas, V., Ongena, S., Izzeldin, M. and Fuertes, A.M., 2016. A Survival Analysis of Islamic and 
Conventional Banks. Journal of Financial Services Research, 51(2), pp.1–36. 
Peristiani, S., 1997. Do mergers improve the X-efficiency and scale efficiency of US banks? Evidence 
from the 1980s. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 29(3), pp.326-337. 
Petersen, M.A. and Rajan, R.G., 1994. The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence from Small 
Business Data. Journal of Finance, 49(1), pp.3–37. 
Poorman Jr, F. and Blake, J., 2005. Measuring and modeling liquidity risk: new ideas and 
metrics. Financial Managers Society Inc. White Paper. 
Radner, R., 1993. The organization of decentralized information processing. Econometrica: Journal of 
the Econometric Society, 61(5),  pp.1109-1146. 
Rangan, N., Grabowski, R., Aly, H.Y. and Pasurka, C., 1988. The technical efficiency of US banks. 
Economics Letters, 28(2), pp.169-175. 
Rauch, C., Steffen, S., Hackethal, A. and Tyrell, M., 2010. Determinants of bank liquidity creation. 
Available at SSRN 1343595. 
Riedl, A. and Smeets, P., 2017. Why do investors hold socially responsible mutual funds?. The Journal 
of Finance, 72(6), pp.2505-2550. 
Rogers, K.E., 1998. Nontraditional activities and the efficiency of US commercial banks. Journal of 
Banking and Finance, 22(4), pp.467-482. 
Rossi, C.V., 2010. Decomposing the impact of brokered deposits on bank failure. Study prepared for 
the Anthony T. Cluff Fund, Financial Services Roundtable. 
Salas, V. and Saurina, J., 2002. Credit risk in two institutional regimes: Spanish commercial and savings 
banks. Journal of Financial Services Research, 22(3), pp.203–224.  
Schaeck, K. and Cihák, M., 2008. How Does Competition Affect Efficiency and Soundness in Banking? 
New Perspectives and Empirical Evidence, ECB Working Paper, no. 932, European Central Bank 
(ECB), Frankfurt. 
Schaeck, K. and Cihak, M., 2014. Competition , Efficiency , and Stability. Financial Management, 
43(1), pp.215–241. 
Scott, J.A. and Dunkelberg, W.C., 2010. Competition for small firm banking business: Bank actions 
versus market structure. Journal of Banking and Finance, 34(11), pp.2788–2800. 
Sealey Jr, C.W. and Lindley, J.T., 1977. Inputs, outputs, and a theory of production and cost at 
depository financial institutions. The Journal of Finance, 32(4), pp.1251-1266. 




Srivastav, A. and Vallascas, F., 2019. Is there a Benefit from Reduced Regulation on Small Banks?. 
Available at SSRN 3389946. 
Stein, J.C., 2002. Information production and capital allocation: Decentralized versus hierarchical 
firms. The Journal of Finance, 57(5), pp.1891-1921. 
Stiroh, K.J., 2004. Do community banks benefit from diversification?. Journal of Financial Services 
Research, 25(2-3), pp.135-160. 
Sturm, J.E. and Williams, B., 2004. Foreign bank entry, deregulation and bank efficiency: Lessons from 
the Australian experience. Journal of Banking and Finance, 28(7), pp.1775-1799. 
Tan, Y. and Floros, C., 2013. Risk, capital and efficiency in Chinese banking. Journal of International 
Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 26(1), pp.378–393. 
Thanassoulis, E., Boussofiane, A. and Dyson, R.G., 1996. A comparison of data envelopment analysis 
and ratio analysis as tools for performance assessment. Omega, 24(3), pp.229-244. 
Thomson, J.B., 1992. Modeling the bank regulator’s closure option: A two-step logit regression 
approach. Journal of Financial Services Research, 6(1), pp.5–23.  
Turk Ariss, R., 2010. On the implications of market power in banking: Evidence from developing 
countries. Journal of Banking and Finance, 34(4), pp.765–775. 
Uhde, A. and Heimeshoff, U., 2009. Consolidation in banking and financial stability in Europe: 
Empirical evidence. Journal of Banking and Finance, 33(7), pp.1299–1311. 
Vennet, R.V., 1998. Cost and profit dynamics in financial conglomerates and universal banks in Europe. 
University of Gent Working Paper Series, 12(3), pp. 22-34. 
Vodová, P., 2011. Liquidity of Czech commercial banks and its determinants. International Journal of 
Mathematical Models and Methods in Applied Sciences, 5(6), pp.1060–1067.  
Wagner, W., 2007. The liquidity of bank assets and banking stability. Journal of Banking and Finance, 
31(1), pp.121–139. 
Wagner, W., 2009. Loan market competition and bank risk-taking. Journal of Financial Services 
Research, 37(1), pp.71–81. 
Wheelock, D.C. and Wilson, P.W., 1995. Explaining bank failures: Deposit insurance, regulation, and 
efficiency. Review of Economics and Statistics, 77(4), pp.689–700.  
Wheelock, D.C. and Wilson, P.W., 2000. Why do banks dissapear? the determinants of US bank 
Failures and Acquisitions. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 82(February), pp.127–138. 
Williams, J., 2004. Determining management behaviour in European banking. Journal of Banking and 
Finance, 28(10), pp.2427–2460. 
Yeager, T.J., 2004. The demise of community banks? Local economic shocks are not to blame. Journal 
of Banking and Finance, 28(9), pp.2135–2153. 
Zribi, N. and Boujelbène, Y., 2011. The factors influencing bank credit risk: The case of Tunisia. 
Journal of Accounting and Taxation, 3(4), pp.70–78. 
